South Asia's stable strategic future

Arms Control & Domestic and International Security (ACDIS

Conceptualizing the three Asias

Arms Control & Domestic and International Security (ACDIS

Post-Cold War continuities and the future of nuclear weapons

Arms Control & Domestic and International Security (ACDIS

South Asia's persistent Cold War

Includes bibliographical references. "November 1996"unpublishednot peer reviewe

India's networking response to the Chinese threat

For more about the East-West Center, see http://www.eastwestcenter.org/Rajesh Basrur, Senior Fellow, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University Singapore, explains that "In order to counter the Chinese threat more effectively, Indian policymakers have looked beyond self-help to a wider network of strategic partnerships to bolster their position in both military and economic terms.

Models for Disarmament? China, India, and Pakistan

THE current drive for nuclear disarmament requires a graduated series of steps combining commitments of intent with hard reductions in the types and numbers of weapons possessed by nuclear-armed states. Even though little has been discussed in the public realm in the US about the nature of low-level deterrence, there is already considerable opposition to deep cuts. Some analysts have warned that any reductions below 1,700 warheads will leave the Russians with an opportunity to exercise their “immense advantage” in conventional weapons. Some have urged the US government to retain a posture of “calculated ambiguity” that would leave open the possibility of nuclear use, while others have argued for a shift to “minimum deterrence” as a precursor to disarmament, contending that both deep cuts and “no first use” (NFU) are viable. This debate between the conservatives and the minimizers is critical to the future prospects of disarmament. Yet little has been done to examine the intellectual foundations of the opposing perspectives

Nucelar deterrence : the wohlstetter-blackett debate revisited

The Cold War debate between Albert Wohlstetter and Patrick Blackett over the requirements of effective deterrence is of profound relevance half a century later. The two thinkers offered systematic arguments for their maximalist (Wohlstetter) and minimalist (blackett) positions. How we conceive of these requirements shapes the kinds of nuclear weapons doctrines, forces and postures we adopt. Whereas the Wohlstetter-Blackett debate was based largely on deductive logic, the opposing arguments can today be assessed on the basis of evidence drawing from nearly seven decades of strategic behaviour between nuclear rivals. An analysis of major confrontations in five nuclear dyads – United States-soviet union, United States-China, Soviet union-China, India-Pakistan, and United States-North korea – clearly offers much stronger support for Blackett’s minimalist case than for Wohlsetter’s maximalist one. Effective deterrence does not require second-strike capability as define by wohlstetter and the nuclear balance has no effect on a state’s capacity to deter. Consequently, the central tenets of orthodox nuclear deterrence theory and doctrine are shown to be without foundation. For policymakers, the optimal forces and postures required for effective deterrence are therefore less demanding and the hurdles in the path of arms control and at least partial disarmament less difficult to cross

China-India : the stability-instability paradox

The China-India border clash could lead to various forms of military engagement. Notwithstanding the caution expected from both sides, real stability requires an agreement on the positioning of forces.Published versio

The ‘New’ Nuclear Arms Race

Expectations of a renewed nuclear arms race if the US abandons the INF Treaty are misplaced. The new arms race is already under way

US - China: Competing Amidst Two Transitions

Power transition is the standard explanation for current US-China tensions. But another – more fundamental – transition remains unaddressed