A Two-Stage Approach to Civil Conflict: Contested Incompatibilities and Armed Violence

We present a two-stage approach to civil conflict analysis. Unlike conventional approaches that focus only on armed conflict and treat all other cases as “at peace”, we first distinguish cases with and without contested incompatibilities (Stage 1) and then whether or not contested incompatibilities escalate to armed conflict (Stage 2). This allows us to isolate factors that contribute to conflict origination (onset of incompatibilities) and factors that promote conflict militarization (onset of armed violence). Using new data on incompatibilities and armed conflict, we replicate and extend three prior studies of violent civil conflict, reformulated as a two-stage process, considering a number of different estimation procedures and potential selection problems. We find that the group-based horizontal political inequalities highlighted in research on violent civil conflict clearly influence conflict origination but have no clear effect on militarization, whereas other features emphasized as shaping the risk of civil war, such as refugee flows and soft state power, strongly influence militarization but not incompatibilities. We posit that a two-stage approach to conflict analysis can help advance theories of civil conflict, assess alternative mechanisms through which explanatory variables are thought to influence conflict, and guide new data collection efforts

Poor prospects-Not inequality-Motivate political violence

Despite extensive scholarly interest in the association between economic inequality and political violence, the micro-level mechanisms through which the former influences the latter are not well understood. Drawing on pioneering theories of political violence, social psychological research on relative deprivation, and prospect theory from behavioral economics, we examine individual-level processes that underpin the relationship between inequality and political violence. We present two arguments: despite being a key explanatory variable in existing research, perceived lower economic status vis-à-vis other individuals (an indicator of relative deprivation) is unlikely to motivate people to participate in violence; by contrast, although virtually unexplored, a projected decrease in one’s own economic status (prospective decremental deprivation) is likely to motivate violence. Multilevel analyses of probability samples from many African countries provide evidence to support these claims. Based on this, we posit that focusing on changes in living conditions, rather than the status quo, is key for understanding political violence

Physical strength predicts political violence

Research has revealed an association between individual strength and attitudinal sup-port for modern war. Physical strength of one individual has an infinitesimal effect on the outcomes of state-level aggression involving large-scale armies and complex military technology. The fact that stronger individuals do support such aggression hints at an evolved psychology specialized for small-scale coalitional aggression, where strength of coalition members non-negligibly contribute to the net coalition strength. Here, I examined whether strength also accounts for participation in modern political aggression, as contrasted to mere support. Given that contemporary political aggression primarily occurs within—not between—states, I focused on intra-state forms of political violence, specifically violent antigovernment protests. To enhance external and ecological validity, I relied on large probability samples from both non-WEIRD and WEIRD countries experiencing political violence (N = 6,283; interviewees were quota-sampled from YouGov online panels to generate representative samples of online adult populations). Multinational analyses revealed that strength significantly predicts intentions to participate in political violence and self-reported participation, and that this association is stronger among young interviewees, but not among men (compared to women). The predictive power of strength was modest but comparable to that of gender, an established predictor of aggression. I discuss why the fact that strength—a physiological variable—relates to political violence—a complex modern phenomenon—is remarkable. Subsequently, I suggest a new research agenda that draws on insights from evolutionary research to study modern political violence

Group-based injustice, but not group-based economic inequality, predicts political violence across 18 African countries

Political violence causes immense human suffering. Scholars pinpoint economic in- equalities between ethnic groups as a major cause of such violence. However, the relationships between group-based inequality, group-based injustice, and political violence are not fully understood. Combining insights from social psychological research on collective action and political science research on civil conflict, we underscore that it is group-based injustice that motivates violence. A perception that one’s group has been treated unfairly tends to produce conflict-related emotions (e.g., anger). By contrast, a mere perception that one’s group is of lower economic status rarely produces such emotions. Furthermore, perceived economic disadvantage negatively relates to perceived political efficacy, which may dissuade engagement in political violence. To assess these arguments, we analyzed attitudes toward, intentions to engage, and self-reported engagement in political violence, utilizing probability samples from 18 African countries (N > 37,000). We found that measures of group-based perceived injustice, whether controlling or not for group-based economic inequality, predicted all violent outcomes; whereas measures of perceived group-based inequality predicted (negatively) self-reported participation in violence but not the other outcomes. We advance both social psychological and political science literatures, suggesting that group-based injustice and inequality are distinct constructs, relating to political violence via different pathways

Group-based injustice, but not group-based economic inequality, predicts political violence across 18 African countries

Political violence causes immense human suffering. Scholars pinpoint economic in- equalities between ethnic groups as a major cause of such violence. However, the relationships between group-based inequality, group-based injustice, and political violence are not fully understood. Combining insights from social psychological research on collective action and political science research on civil conflict, we underscore that it is group-based injustice that motivates violence. A perception that one’s group has been treated unfairly tends to produce conflict-related emotions (e.g., anger). By contrast, a mere perception that one’s group is of lower economic status rarely produces such emotions. Furthermore, perceived economic disadvantage negatively relates to perceived political efficacy, which may dissuade engagement in political violence. To assess these arguments, we analyzed attitudes toward, intentions to engage, and self-reported engagement in political violence, utilizing probability samples from 18 African countries (N > 37,000). We found that measures of group-based perceived injustice, whether controlling or not for group-based economic inequality, predicted all violent outcomes; whereas measures of perceived group-based inequality predicted (negatively) self-reported participation in violence but not the other outcomes. We advance both social psychological and political science literatures, suggesting that group-based injustice and inequality are distinct constructs, relating to political violence via different pathways

Poor prospects-Not inequality-Motivate political violence

Despite extensive scholarly interest in the association between economic inequality and political violence, the micro-level mechanisms through which the former influences the latter are not well understood. Drawing on pioneering theories of political violence, social psychological research on relative deprivation, and prospect theory from behavioral economics, we examine individual-level processes that underpin the relationship between inequality and political violence. We present two arguments: despite being a key explanatory variable in existing research, perceived lower economic status vis-à-vis other individuals (an indicator of relative deprivation) is unlikely to motivate people to participate in violence; by contrast, although virtually unexplored, a projected decrease in one’s own economic status (prospective decremental deprivation) is likely to motivate violence. Multilevel analyses of probability samples from many African countries provide evidence to support these claims. Based on this, we posit that focusing on changes in living conditions, rather than the status quo, is key for understanding political violence

A Lexicial Index of Electoral Democracy

We operationalize electoral democracy as a series of necessary-and-sufficient conditions arrayed in an ordinal scale. The resulting Lexical index of electoral democracy (LIED), based partly on new data, covers all independent countries of the world from 1800 to 2013. It incorporates binary coding of its sub-components, which are aggregated into an ordinal scale using a cumulative logic. In this fashion, we arrive at an index that performs a classificatory function, each level identifies a unique and theoretically meaningful regime type,“ as well as a discriminating function. To code the lexical index of electoral democracy (LIED) we make use of five variables developed initially in the Political Institutions and Events (PIPE) dataset collected by Adam Przeworski et al. (2013): LEGSELEC, EXSELEC, OPPOSITION, MALE SUFFRAGE, and FEMALE SUFFRAGE. Since PIPE does not attempt to measure the quality of elections, we generate a sixth variable: COMPETITION. All variables are binary, coded 1 if the following circumstances obtain, and 0 otherwise. LEGSELEC: A legislative body issues at least some laws and does not perform executive functions. The lower house (or unicameral chamber) of the legislature is at least partly elected. The legislature has not been closed. EXSELEC: The chief executive is either directly or indirectly elected (i.e., chosen by people who have been elected). OPPOSITION: The lower house (or unicameral chamber) of the legislature is (at least in part) elected by voters facing more than one choice. Specifically, parties are not banned and (a) more than one party is allowed to compete or (b) elections are nonpartisan (i.e., all candidates run without party labels). MALE SUFFRAGE: Virtually all male citizens are allowed to vote in national elections. Legal restrictions pertaining to age, criminal conviction, incompetence, and local residency are not considered. Informal restrictions such as those obtaining in the American South prior to 1965 are also not considered. FEMALE SUFFRAGE: Virtually all female citizens are allowed to vote in national elections. Similar coding rules apply. COMPETITION: The chief executive offices and seats in the effective legislative body are filled by elections characterized by uncertainty, meaning that the elections are, in principle, sufficiently free to enable the opposition to gain power if they were to attract sufficient support from the electorate. This presumes that control over key executive and legislative offices is determined by elections, the executive and members of the legislature have not been unconstitutionally removed, and the legislature has not been dissolved. With respect to the electoral process, this presumes that the constitutional timing of elections has not been violated (in a more than marginal fashion), non-extremist parties are not banned, opposition candidates are generally free to participate, voters experience little systematic coercion in exercising their electoral choice, and electoral fraud does not determine who wins. With respect to the outcome, this presumes that the declared winner of executive and legislative elections reflects the votes cast by the electorate, as near as can be determined from extant sources. Incumbent turnover (as a result of multi-party elections) is regarded as a strong indicator of competition, but is neither necessary nor sufficient. In addition, we rely on reports from outside observers (as reported in books, articles, and country reports) about whether the foregoing conditions have been met in a given election. Coding for this variable does not take into account whether there is a level playing field, whether all contestants gain access to funding and media, whether media coverage is unbiased, whether civil liberties are respected, or other features associated with fully free and fair elections. COMPETITION thus sets a modest threshold. Although we employ PIPE as an initial source for coding LEGSELEC, EXSELEC, OPPOSITION, MALE SUFFRAGE, and FEMALE SUFFRAGE, we deviate from PIPE, based on our reading of country-specific sources, ”in several ways. First, with respect to executive elections, in the PIPE dataset, œPrime ministers are always coded as elected if the legislature is open. However, for our purposes we need an indicator that also takes into account whether the government is responsible to an elected parliament if the executive is not directly elected, a situation generated by a number of European monarchies prior to World War I, by episodes of international supervision such as Bosnia-Herzegovina in the first years following the civil war, and by some monarchies in the Middle East and elsewhere (e.g., Liechtenstein, Monaco, and Tonga) in the contemporary era. To illustrate, PIPE codes Denmark as having executive elections from 1849 to 1900 although the parliamentary principle was not established until 1901. Before then, the government was accountable to the king. Among the current cases with elected multiparty legislatures not fulfilling this condition, we find Jordan and Morocco. In order to achieve a higher level of concept-measure consistency, we have thus recoded all country-years (based on country-specific accounts) for this variable where our sources suggested doing so. We also conduct original coding for countries whose coding is incomplete in PIPE and for additional countries such as the German principalities that are not covered in PIPE. In this fashion, we generate a complete dataset for all six variables covering all independent countries of the world in the period under study (1800 to “2013). Whereas the numbers of observations for the PIPE variables range between 14,465 and 15,302, our dataset provides 18,142 observations for all variables. Except for minor adjustments regarding executive elections (mentioned above), this additional coding follows the rules laid out in the PIPE c odebook. Coding decisions are based on country-specific sources that are too numerous to specify. In rare instances we stumbled upon information that required a re-coding of PIPE variables, so the two datasets do not correspond exactly. To generate the lexical index from these six binary variables, a country-year is assigned the highest score (L0 to L“6) for which it fulfills all requisite criteria, as follows: L0: LEGSELEC=0 & EXSELEC=0. L1: LEGSELEC=1 or EXSELEC=1. L2: LEGSELEC=1 & OPPOSITION=1. L3: LEGSELEC=1 & OPPOSITION=1 & EXSELEC=1. L4: LEGSELEC=1 & OPPOSITION=1 & EXSELEC=1 & COMPETITION=1. L5: LEGSELEC=1 & OPPOSITION=1 & EXSELEC=1 & COMPETITION=1 & (MALE SUFFRAGE=1 or FEMALE SUFFRAGE=1) L6: LEGSELEC=1 & OPPOSITION=1 & EXSELEC=1 & COMPETITION=1 & MALE SUFFRAGE=1 & FEMALE SUFFRAGE=1. Countries are coded across these conditions for the length of their sovereign existence within the 1800 to “2013 timespan, generating a dataset with 221 countries. To identify independent countries we rely on the list of independent countries created by Gleditsch and Ward and the Correlates of War dataset, supplemented from 1800 to 1815 by various country-specific sources. Scores for each indicator reflect the status of a country on the last day of the calendar year (31 December) and are not intended to reflect the mean value of an indicator across the previous 364 days

Political repression motivates antigovernment violence

We examined whether political repression deters citizens from engaging in antigovernment behavior (its intended goal), or in fact motivates it. Analyses of 101 nationally representative samples from three continents (N = 139,266) revealed a positive association between perceived levels of repression and intentions to engage in antigovernment violence. Additional analyses of fine-grained data from three countries characterized by widespread repression and antigovernment violence (N = 2,960) identified a positive association between personal experience with repression and intentions to engage in antigovernment violence. Randomized experiments revealed that memories about repression also motivate participation in antigovernment violence. These results suggest that political repression, aside from being normatively abhorrent, motivates anti-repressor violence

Dominance-driven autocratic political orientations predict political violence in non-WEIRD and WEIRD samples

Given the costs of political violence, scholars have long sought to identify its causes. We examined individual differences related to participation in political violence, emphasizing the central role of political orientations. We hypothesized, specifically, that individuals with dominance-driven autocratic political orientations are prone to political violence. Multilevel analysis of survey data from 34 African countries (N = 51,587) indicated that autocracy-oriented individuals, compared to democracy-oriented individuals, are considerably more likely to participate in political violence. As a predictor of violence (indexed with attitudinal, action intent, and behavioral measures), autocratic orientation outperformed other variables highlighted in existing research, including socioeconomic status and group-based injustice. Additional analyses of original data from South Africa (N = 2,170), Denmark (N = 1,012), and the United States (N = 1,539) indicated that the autocratic orientation-political violence link reflects individual differences in dominance orientations, and that the findings generalize to societies extensively socialized to democratic values