539 research outputs found
On staying grounded and avoiding Quixotic dead ends
The 15 articles in this special issue on The Representation of Concepts illustrate the rich variety of theoretical positions and supporting research that characterize the area. Although much agreement exists among contributors, much disagreement exists as well, especially about the roles of grounding and abstraction in conceptual processing. I first review theoretical approaches raised in these articles that I believe are Quixotic dead ends, namely, approaches that are principled and inspired but likely to fail. In the process, I review various theories of amodal symbols, their distortions of grounded theories, and fallacies in the evidence used to support them. Incorporating further contributions across articles, I then sketch a theoretical approach that I believe is likely to be successful, which includes grounding, abstraction, flexibility, explaining classic conceptual phenomena, and making contact with real-world situations. This account further proposes that (1) a key element of grounding is neural reuse, (2) abstraction takes the forms of multimodal compression, distilled abstraction, and distributed linguistic representation (but not amodal symbols), and (3) flexible context-dependent representations are a hallmark of conceptual processing
Moving beyond the distinction between concrete and abstract concepts
From the perspective of the situated conceptualization framework, the primary purpose of concepts is for categorizing and integrating elements of situations to support goal-directed action (including communication and social interaction). To the extent that important situational elements are categorized and integrated properly, effective goal-directed action follows. Over time, frequent patterns of co-occurring concepts within situations become established in memory as situated conceptualizations, conditioning the conceptual system and producing habitual patterns of conceptual processing. As a consequence, individual concepts are most basically represented within patterns of concepts that become entrained with specific kinds of physical situations. In this framework, the concrete versus abstract distinction between concepts is no longer useful, with two other distinctions becoming important instead: (i) external versus internal situational elements, (ii) situational elements versus situational integrations. Whereas concepts for situational elements originate in distributed neural networks that provide continual feeds about components of situations, concepts for situational integrations originate in association areas that establish temporal co-occurrence relations between situational elements, both external and internal. We propose that studying concepts in the context of situated action is necessary for establishing complete accounts of them, and that continuing to study concepts in isolation is likely to provide relatively incomplete and distorted accounts.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use and representation in the brain’
A sharp image or a sharp knife: norms for the modality-exclusivity of 774 concept-property items
According to recent embodied cognition theories, mental concepts are represented by modality-specific sensory-motor systems. Much of the evidence for modality-specificity in conceptual processing comes from the property-verification task. When applying this and other tasks, it is important to select items based on their modality-exclusivity. We collected modality ratings for a set of 387 properties, each of which was paired with two different concepts, yielding a total of 774 concept-property items. For each item, participants rated the degree to which the property could be experienced through five perceptual modalities (vision, audition, touch, smell, and taste). Based on these ratings, we computed a measure of modality exclusivity, the degree to which a property is perceived exclusively through one sensory modality. In this paper, we briefly sketch the theoretical background of conceptual knowledge, discuss the use of the property-verification task in cognitive research, provide our norms and statistics, and validate the norms in a memory experiment. We conclude that our norms are important for researchers studying modality-specific effects in conceptual processing
Higher Height, Higher Ability: Judgment Confidence as a Function of Spatial Height Perception
Based on grounded cognition theories, the current study showed that judgments about ability were regulated by the subjects' perceptions of their spatial height. In Experiment 1, we found that after seeing the ground from a higher rather than lower floor, people had higher expectations about their performance on a knowledge test and assigned themselves higher rank positions in a peer comparison evaluation. In Experiment 2, we examined the boundary conditions of the spatial height effects and showed that it could still occur even if we employed photos rather than actual building floors to manipulate the perceptions of spatial heights. In addition, Experiment 2 excluded processing style as an explanation for these observations. In Experiment 3, we investigated a potential mechanism for the spatial height effect by manipulating the scale direction in the questionnaire. Consequently, consistent with our representational dependence account, the effect of spatial heights on ability judgments was eliminated when the mental representation of ability was disturbed by a reverse physical representation. These results suggest that people's judgments about their ability are correlated with their spatial perception
Reporting conditionals with modals
Conditionals and modals work in tandem in some instances of practical reasoning, or decision making. Consider the following example (from Kratzer 2012):
a. I want to become a mayor.
b. (q) I will become a mayor only if (p) I go to the pub.
c. Therefore, I should go to the pub.
Given what the cogniser wants (a) and the relevant circumstances (b), the conclusion that the cogniser goes to the pub comes out as necessary. Hence, the presence of the necessity modal should in (c). Indeed, given the context of (a), the necessity modal in (c) is simply a reflection of the necessity of p for q, which is overtly represented by the use of the ‘only if p, q’ construction. This chapter looks into whether indirect reports of conditionals – in particular, indirect reports which involve the use of a modal verb – are sensitive to the necessity of p for q in cases where necessity is not overtly represented in a conditional, as in ‘if p, q’ formulations.
We report on two online experiments into the relation between (i) perceived necessity or sufficiency of the truth of a conditional antecedent for the truth of the consequent, and (ii) the formulation of an indirect report of a conditional with necessity or possibility modals (have to, should, could). In Experiment 1, the ‘necessity/sufficiency of p for q’ variable was manipulated by contextually altering the number of alternative antecedents (e.g. Cummins et al. 1991; Thompson 1994; Politzer 2003). It was found that modals used in indirect reports of ‘if p, q’ conditionals co-vary with the number of alternative antecedents in predictable ways. This suggests that modals used in indirect reports of ‘if p, q’ conditionals may be a diagnostic for biconditional versus material interpretations of conditionals. The aim of Experiment 2 was to find out whether the results of Experiment 1 could be replicated in contexts which lower/eliminate the believability of the conditionals. It was found that manipulating the believability variable has no reliable effect on the results
Indirect Reports in Modern Eastern Armenian
In this work we consider the distribution of complementizers in Modern
Eastern Armenian. There are two complementizers: wor and t‘e. They
both introduce complement clauses, but t‘e also expresses a dubitative
value, implying that the speaker has doubts on the content following the
complementizer. Moreover, t‘e, when embedded under verbs of saying,
shifts the anchoring of indexicals, moving the anchor from the speaker
– better called utterer – to the subject of the saying predicate. On the
basis of this and further evidence coming from the analysis of sequence
of tense and if-clauses, we will argue that the position of t‘e in the left
periphery of the clause occupies a high position in the syntactic hierarchy.
The aim of this work is on one hand, a better understanding of indirect
reports and their syntax and, on the other, a more precise characterization
of indexicals across languages
To dash or to dawdle: verb-associated speed of motion influences eye movements during spoken sentence comprehension
In describing motion events verbs of manner provide information about the speed of agents or objects in those events. We used eye tracking to investigate how inferences about this verb-associated speed of motion would influence the time course of attention to a visual scene that matched an event described in language. Eye movements were recorded as participants heard spoken sentences with verbs that implied a fast (“dash”) or slow (“dawdle”) movement of an agent towards a goal. These sentences were heard whilst participants concurrently looked at scenes depicting the agent and a path which led to the goal object. Our results indicate a mapping of events onto the visual scene consistent with participants mentally simulating the movement of the agent along the path towards the goal: when the verb implies a slow manner of motion, participants look more often and longer along the path to the goal; when the verb implies a fast manner of motion, participants tend to look earlier at the goal and less on the path. These results reveal that event comprehension in the presence of a visual world involves establishing and dynamically updating the locations of entities in response to linguistic descriptions of events
A sense of embodiment is reflected in people's signature size
BACKGROUND: The size of a person's signature may reveal implicit information about how the self is perceived although this has not been closely examined. METHODS/RESULTS: We conducted three experiments to test whether increases in signature size can be induced. Specifically, the aim of these experiments was to test whether changes in signature size reflect a person's current implicit sense of embodiment. Experiment 1 showed that an implicit affect task (positive subliminal evaluative conditioning) led to increases in signature size relative to an affectively neutral task, showing that implicit affective cues alter signature size. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated increases in signature size following experiential self-focus on sensory and affective stimuli relative to both conceptual self-focus and external (non-self-focus) in both healthy participants and patients with anorexia nervosa, a disorder associated with self-evaluation and a sense of disembodiment. In all three experiments, increases in signature size were unrelated to changes in self-reported mood and larger than manipulation unrelated variations. CONCLUSIONS: Together, these findings suggest that a person's sense of embodiment is reflected in their signature size
Rich Situated Attitudes
We outline a novel theory of natural language meaning, Rich
Situated Semantics [RSS], on which the content of sentential utterances
is semantically rich and informationally situated. In virtue of its situatedness,
an utterance’s rich situated content varies with the informational
situation of the cognitive agent interpreting the utterance. In virtue of its
richness, this content contains information beyond the utterance’s lexically
encoded information. The agent-dependence of rich situated content
solves a number of problems in semantics and the philosophy of language
(cf. [14, 20, 25]). In particular, since RSS varies the granularity of utterance
contents with the interpreting agent’s informational situation, it
solves the problem of finding suitably fine- or coarse-grained objects for
the content of propositional attitudes. In virtue of this variation, a layman
will reason with more propositions than an expert
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