COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN ENGINEERING DESIGN

Metadata merged with duplicate record (http://hdl.handle.net/10026.1/2519) on 20.12.2016 by CS (TIS).This is a digitised version of a thesis that was deposited in the University Library. If you are the author please contact PEARL Admin ([email protected]) to discuss options.The central aim of the current research programme was to gain an understanding of the cognitive processes involved in engineering design. Since little previous empirical research has investigated this domain, two major exploratory studies were undertaken here. Study One monitored seven final-year students tackling extended design projects. Diary and interview data were used to construct detailed design behaviour graphs that decomposed activities into structured representations reflecting the goals and subgoals that were pursued. Study Two involved individual observation (using video) of six professional engineers "thinking-aloud" as they tackled a small-scale design problem in a laboratory setting. A taxonomic scheme was developed to classify all verbal protocol units and other observable behaviours. In interpreting the data extensive use was made of theoretical concepts (e. g. schemas and mental models) deriving from current research on human problem solving and thinking. Evidence indicated that the engineers studied had many similar methods of working which could be described at a high level of abstraction in terms of a common "design schema". A central aspect of this schema was a problem reduction strategy which was used to break down complex design problems into more manageable subproblems. The data additionally revealed certain differences in design strategy between engineers' solution modelling activities and also showed up tendencies toward error and suboptimal performance. In this latter respect a particularly common tendency was for designers to "satisfice", that is to focus exclusively on initial solution concepts rather than comparing alternatives with the aim of optimising choices. The general implications of the present findings are discussed in relation to both the training of design skills and the development of intelligent computer systems to aid or automate the design process. A final, smaller scale of experimental study is also reported which investigated the possibility of improving design processes via subtle interventions aimed at imposing greater structure on design behaviours.The Department of Computer Science, University of Reading and Plessey Semiconductors, Roboroug

Matching bias in syllogistic reasoning: Evidence for a dual-process account from response times and confidence ratings

We examined matching bias in syllogistic reasoning by analysing response times, confidence ratings, and individual differences. Roberts’ (2005) “negations paradigm” was used to generate conflict between the surface features of problems and the logical status of conclusions. The experiment replicated matching bias effects in conclusion evaluation (Stupple & Waterhouse, 2009), revealing increased processing times for matching/logic “conflict problems”. Results paralleled chronometric evidence from the belief bias paradigm indicating that logic/belief conflict problems take longer to process than non-conflict problems (Stupple, Ball, Evans, & Kamal-Smith, 2011). Individuals’ response times for conflict problems also showed patterns of association with the degree of overall normative responding. Acceptance rates, response times, metacognitive confidence judgements, and individual differences all converged in supporting dual-process theory. This is noteworthy because dual-process predictions about heuristic/analytic conflict in syllogistic reasoning generalised from the belief bias paradigm to a situation where matching features of conclusions, rather than beliefs, were set in opposition to logic

When distraction helps: Evidence that concurrent articulation and irrelevant speech can facilitate insight problem solving

We report an experiment investigating the “special-process” theory of insight problem solving, which claims that insight arises from non-conscious, non-reportable processes that enable problem re-structuring. We predicted that reducing opportunities for speech-based processing during insight problem solving should permit special processes to function more effectively and gain conscious awareness, thereby facilitating insight. We distracted speech-based processing by using either articulatory suppression or irrelevant speech, with findings for these conditions supporting the predicted insight facilitation effect relative to silent working or thinking aloud. The latter condition was included to investigate the currently contested effect of “verbal overshadowing” on insight, whereby thinking aloud is claimed to hinder the operation of special, non-reportable processes. Whilst verbal overshadowing was not evident in final solution rates, there was nevertheless support for verbal overshadowing up to and beyond the mid-point of the available problem solving time. Overall our data support a special-process theory of insight, whilst also pointing to the role of moderator variables (e.g., available time for solution) in determining the presence or absence of effects predicted by the special-process account

Dimensions of Creative Evaluation: Distinct Design and Reasoning Strategies for Aesthetic, Functional and Originality Judgments

The datasets provided as part of DTRS-10 all relate to what may broadly be labeled as ‘design critiques’ in an educational context. As such, we chose to center our theoretical analysis on the evaluative reasoning taking place during expert appraisals of the design concepts that were being produced by industrial design students throughout the design process. This overall framing for our research allowed us to pursue a series of research questions concerning the dimensions of creative evaluation in design and their consequences for reasoning strategies and suggestions for moving further in the creative progress. Our transcript coding and analysis focused on three key dimensions of creativity, that is, originality, functionality and aesthetics. Each dimension was associated with a particular underpinning ‘logic’ that determined the distinctive ways in which these dimensions were seen to be evaluated in practice. In particular, our analysis clarified the way in which design dimensions triggered very different reasoning strategies such as running mental simulations, or making suggestions for design improvement, ranging from definitive ‘go/kill’ decisions right through to loose recommendations to continue to work on a concept for a period of time without any further directional steer beyond this general appraisal. Overall, we believe that our findings not only advance a theoretical understanding of evaluation behaviour that arises in design critiques, but also have important practical implications in terms of alerting expert design evaluators to the nature and consequences of their critical appraisals

The role of answer fluency and perceptual fluency in the monitoring and control of reasoning: Reply to Alter, Oppenheimer, and Epley

In this reply, we provide an analysis of Alter et al. (2013) response to our earlier paper (Thompson et al., 2013). In that paper, we reported difficulty in replicating Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, and Eyre’s (2007) main finding, namely that a sense of disfluency produced by making stimuli difficult to perceive, increased accuracy on a variety of reasoning tasks. Alter, Oppenheimer, and Epley (2013) argue that we misunderstood the meaning of accuracy on these tasks, a claim that we reject. We argue and provide evidence that the tasks were not too difficult for our populations (such that no amount of “metacognitive unease” would promote correct responding) and point out that in many cases performance on our tasks was well above chance or on a par with Alter et al.’s (2007) participants. Finally, we reiterate our claim that the distinction between answer fluency (the ease with which an answer comes to mind) and perceptual fluency (the ease with which a problem can be read) is genuine, and argue that Thompson et al. (2013) provided evidence that these are distinct factors that have different downstream effects on cognitive processe

Can intrinsic and extrinsic metacognitive cues shield against distraction in problem solving?

We investigated the capacity for two different forms of metacognitive cue to shield against auditory distraction in problem solving with Compound Remote Associates Tasks (CRATs). Experiment 1 demonstrated that an intrinsic metacognitive cue in the form of processing disfluency (manipulated using an easy-to-read vs. difficult-to-read font) could increase focal task engagement so as to mitigate the detrimental impact of distraction on solution rates for CRATs. Experiment 2 showed that an extrinsic metacognitive cue that took the form of an incentive for good task performance (i.e., 80% or better CRAT solutions) could likewise eliminate the negative impact of distraction on CRAT solution rates. Overall, these findings support the view that both intrinsic and extrinsic metacognitive cues have remarkably similar effects. This suggests that metacognitive cues operate via a common underlying mechanism whereby a participant applies increased focal attention to the primary task so as to ensure more steadfast task engagement that is not so easily diverted by task-irrelevant stimuli