Skepticism about Ought Simpliciter

There are many different oughts. There is a moral ought, a prudential ought, an epistemic ought, the legal ought, the ought of etiquette, and so on. These oughts can prescribe incompatible actions. What I morally ought to do may be different from what I self-interestedly ought to do. Philosophers have claimed that these conflicts are resolved by an authoritative ought, or by facts about what one ought to do simpliciter or all-things-considered. However, the only coherent notion of an ought simpliciter has preposterous first-order normative commitments. It is more reasonable to reject the ought simpliciter in favor of the form of normative pluralism advocated in (Tiffany 2007)

Intuitions about Disagreement Do Not Support the Normativity of Meaning

Allan Gibbard () argues that the term ‘meaning’ expresses a normative concept, primarily on the basis of arguments that parallel Moore's famous Open Question Argument. In this paper I argue that Gibbard's evidence for normativity rests on idiosyncrasies of the Open Question Argument, and that when we use related thought experiments designed to bring out unusual semantic intuitions associated with normative terms we fail to find such evidence. These thought experiments, moreover, strongly suggest there are basic requirements for a theory of meaning incompatible with Gibbard's ultimate goal of providing an expressivist account of meaning-related concepts. I conclude by considering a possible way in which meaning could be normative, consistent with the intuitions about disagreement; but this form of normativism about meaning appears incompatible with Gibbard's expressivis

Quasirealism as semantic dispensability

I argue that standard explanationist solutions to the problem of creeping minimalism are largely on the right track, but they fail to correctly specify the kind of explanation that is relevant to distinguishing realism from quasirealism. Quasirealism should not be distinguished from realism in terms of the explanations it gives of why a normative judgment—a normative sentence or attitude—has the semantic content that it has. Rather, it should be distinguished in terms of the explanations it offers of what the semantic content of a normative judgment is

Demand for livestock products in developing countries with a focus on quality and safety attributes: Evidence from case studies

The case studies and the synthesis papers were presented at a mini-symposium at the International Association of Agricultural Economists conference held in Beijing, Peoples Republic of China, on 18–24 August 2009.demand, livestock products, quality, safety, developing countries, Consumer/Household Economics, Livestock Production/Industries,

The Use of Brands in Food Marketing - Results from a Survey of Danish Food Industry Firms

The paper tests a number of hypotheses concerning branding behaviour of the food industry found in the literature. Based on a survey of 109 Danish food industry firms conducted in 2004, three aspects of branding strategies are analysed, i) the number of brands owned by the firm, ii) the number of brands introduced by the firm during the past year and iii) the percentage of sales obtained from production under private labels. Firms' branding behaviour is related to structural variables including firm size, degree of vertical integration, value added as well as firms' views on food chain organisation and competitiveness.Brands, Private labels, Food industry, Survey, Marketing, Q13,

Smart OA Examples

European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program grant agreement No 85661

Deliberators Must Be Imperfect

This paper argues that, with certain provisos, predicting one's future actions is incompatible with rationally deliberating about whether to perform those actions. It follows that fully rational omniscient agents are impossible, since an omniscient being could never rationally deliberate about what to do . Consequently, theories that explain practical reasons in terms of the choices of a perfectly rational omniscient agent must fail. The paper considers several ways of defending the possibility of an omniscient agent, and concludes that while some of these may work, they are inconsistent with the aim of explaining practical normativity by appeal to such an agent

Why transparency undermines economy

Byrne offers a novel interpretation of the idea that the mind is transparent to its possessor, and that one knows one’s own mind by looking out at the world. This paper argues that his attempts to extend this picture of self-knowledge force him to sacrifice the theoretical parsimony he presents as the primary virtue of his account. The paper concludes by discussing two general problems transparency accounts of self-knowledge must address