Russia in 2015. Could the former super-power turn into a battle-ground?

Pavel K. Baev describes a Russia that appears as both politically stable and economicallydynamic, compared to a world in crisis and recession. Butwill it continue that way also in the future? Baev points out the weaknesses in the present situation and discusses several scenarios for the Russian future

Russland rüstet seine Marinekräfte auf und streicht sie zusammen

Die russische Führung hegt Ansprüche auf den Status einer »maritimen Großmacht«, doch sieht das Staatliche Rüstungsprogramm bis 2027 beträchtliche Kürzungen bei der Finanzierung von Schiffsbauten vor. Oberste Priorität wird der Vollendung der Serie von acht strategischen U-Booten der »Borej«-Klasse gegeben. Dem neuen Plan zur Entwicklung atomgetriebener U-Boote wird viel politische Aufmerksamkeit gewidmet. U-Boote unterschiedlicher Typen werden die Hauptstreitmacht der russischen Kriegsmarine stellen, doch sind viele Fähigkeiten (amphibische Operationen, Kriegsführung gegen U-Boote) im Niedergang begriffen. Die konstanten strategischen Anforderungen, um den wahrgenommenen Bedrohungen auf den vier potentiellen Kriegsschauplätzen (Nordpolarmeer, Ostsee, Schwarzes Meer und Pazifik) zu begegnen, verlangen hohe Risikobereitschaft und erhöhen die Wahrscheinlichkeit von Unfällen

From European to Eurasian energy security: Russia needs and energy Perestroika

Political attention in Europe and the US to the problem of energy security has significantly diminished, and there is more to this shift that just the impact of financial crisis in the EU and the effect of the ‘shale gas revolution’. In the middle of the past decade, some fundamental decisions were made in the European Commission regarding the liberalization and diversification of the energy supplies, but the economic underpinning of these decisions has vastly changed. The whole set of energy directive is now pointing in the wrong direction, but rethinking of past mistakes is lagging, so the energy policy is left in its bureaucratic ‘box’. Russia is set to remain locked in the European gas market but is very slow in adapting to the changes in it. Both Russia and the EU remain in denial that the time for their energy-geopolitical games is over as the nexus of energy flows is fast shifting to Asia-Pacific

Challenges and Options in the Caucasus and Central Asia

In April 1997, the U.S. Army War College held its Eighth Annual Strategy Conference. This year\u27s topic was Russia\u27s Future as a World Power. Dr. Pavel K. Baev, a senior researcher at the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo, Norway, discusses the disintegration of order along Russia\u27s southern border. Following a brief overview of the evolution of Russian policies in the Caucasus and Central Asia in the immediate post-Soviet period, Dr. Baev evaluates the impact of the Chechen war and then analyzes the growing role that petroleum plays in the political equation. He concludes that the growth of nationalism among the states in the Caucasus and Central Asia has combined with the decline in capability of the Russian Army to encourage many of the states to seek greater autonomy from Russian influence. While Russia is in strategic retreat, the political forces acting upon President Yeltsin are so intense as to increase the possibility that hasty and unwise decisions may be forthcoming. Turbulence in the so-called near abroad and political weakness at home plagued Russia at the turn of the century, forcing Tsar Nicholas II to turn to his more conservative and autocratic advisors for advice and policy. A fledgling move toward democratization was weakened even before Russia found itself embroiled in World War I. As this century turns, the course of Russian democracy again hinges, to a degree, on events on Russia\u27s periphery. This makes Professor Baev\u27s analysis that much more germane to those concerned with Russia\u27s future.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1195/thumbnail.jp

A Matrix for Post-Soviet 'Color Revolutions': Exorcising the Devil from the Details

The spectacular and unexpected explosion of revolutionary energy in the Arab world since the start of 2011 makes it more relevant to re-examine the chain of attempts to depose the quasi-democratic regimes in the states that emerged from the break-up of the USSR. Often called "color revolutions", these attempts brought some remarkable results in the mid-2000s, but-against common perceptions-continue. The analysis shows that the rate of success in the collection of 13 cases is close to 50%, but the track record of post-revolutionary development is rather disappointing. Nothing in the processed data suggests a decline in the dynamics of the revolutionary processes in the former Soviet space, but the diminishing attention from the West and the ageing of autocracies (particularly in Central Asia) could make the forthcoming revolutions uglier as they drive state failure stronger than democratic change. The most complex situation matures in Russia, which has assumed the leadership role in suppressing the wave of revolutions but is experiencing a crisis of its corrupt and un-modernizable authoritarian regime.color revolutions; post-Soviet states; democracy; elections; authoritarianism