Power Dependence and Power Paradoxes in Bargaining

[Excerpt] What this article (and our larger program of work) is designed to demonstrate is that these very simple ideas represent a particularly suitable starting point for understanding the power struggle between parties who regularly engage in negotiation. Specifically, in this article we show that the approach contains certain paradoxes regarding the acquisition and use of power in an ongoing bargaining relationship. The dependence framework treats the ongoing relationship as a power struggle in which each party tries to maneuver itself into a favorable power position

Reconsidering theoretical progress in organizational and management research

Theory development is a high priority in organizational and management research. However, theory development is often equated with building new theory, a practice that is rewarded in the publication process and encouraged by norms that pervade the field. This practice has produced a proliferation of theories, most of which are not exposed to rigorous empirical research that probes core propositions and puts theories at risk. In the interest of theory development, management and organizational research would make better progress if we devoted more attention to theoretical refinement, conducting research that identifies the boundaries and limitations of theories, stages competitive tests between rival theories, and increases the precision of theories so they yield strong predictions that can be falsified. These issues are addressed by the articles that constitute this feature topic, with the goal of enhancing theoretical progress in management and organizational research

"Bargaining Power in the European Council"

What resources grant heads of state and government influence in the European Council? Despite its political importance, the European Council has only been subject to limited research. Part of the explanation is the difficulties of conducting research on a political body that convenes behind closed doors, whose proceedings are undocumented, and whose participants are unusually hard to gain access to. This paper reports the results of a project designed to overcome the problems of previous research through a unique series of elite interviews with European heads of state and government. Drawing on general theories of negotiation, it isolates and illustrates three complementary sources of bargaining power in the European Council: state sources of power, institutional sources of power, and individual sources of power. Elite testimonies suggest that the state dimension of power is most fundamental, whereas the institutional and individual dimensions of power play a secondary role and mainly mediate the impact of structural power asymmetries