Urine Complement Proteins and the Risk of Kidney Disease Progression and Mortality in Type 2 Diabetes.

ObjectiveWe examined the association of urine complement proteins with progression to end-stage renal disease (ESRD) or death in people with type 2 diabetes and proteinuric diabetic kidney disease (DKD).Research design and methodsUsing targeted mass spectrometry, we quantified urinary abundance of 12 complement proteins in a predominantly Mexican American cohort with type 2 diabetes and proteinuric DKD (n = 141). The association of urine complement proteins with progression to ESRD or death was evaluated using time-to-event analyses.ResultsAt baseline, median estimated glomerular filtration rate (eGFR) was 54 mL/min/1.73 m2 and urine protein-to-creatinine ratio 2.6 g/g. Sixty-seven participants developed ESRD or died, of whom 39 progressed to ESRD over a median of 3.1 years and 40 died over a median 3.6 years. Higher urine CD59, an inhibitor of terminal complement complex formation, was associated with a lower risk of ESRD (hazard ratio [HR] [95% CI per doubling] 0.50 [0.29-0.87]) and death (HR [95% CI] 0.56 [0.34-0.93]), after adjustment for demographic and clinical covariates, including baseline eGFR and proteinuria. Higher urine complement components 4 and 8 were associated with lower risk of death (HR [95% CI] 0.57 [0.41-0.79] and 0.66 [0.44-0.97], respectively); higher urine factor H-related protein 2, a positive regulator of the alternative complement pathway, was associated with greater risk of death (HR [95% CI] 1.61 [1.05-2.48]) in fully adjusted models.ConclusionsIn a largely Mexican American cohort with type 2 diabetes and proteinuric DKD, urine abundance of several complement and complement regulatory proteins was strongly associated with progression to ESRD and death

Share Repurchases and Pay-Performance Sensitivity of Employee Compensation Contracts

I show that share repurchases increase pay-performance sensitivity of employee compensation and lead to greater employee effort and higher stock prices. Consistent with the model, I find that after repurchases, employees and managers receive fewer stock option and equity grants, and that the market reacts favorably to repurchase announcements when employees have many unvested stock options. Managers are more likely to initiate share repurchases when employees hold a large stake in the firm. Moreover, since employees are forced to bear more risk in firms that repurchase shares, they exercise their stock options earlier and receive higher compensation. Copyright (c) 2009 The American Finance Association.

Money Left on the Table: An Analysis of Participation in Employee Stock Purchase Plans

We analyze participation decisions in employee stock purchase plans. These plans allow employees to buy company stock at a discount from the market price and resell it immediately for a sure profit. Although an average employee stands to gain $3,079 annually, only 30% of individuals take advantage of this risk-free opportunity. Participation is more likely among employees who are familiar with stocks, are more educated, are less financially constrained, and make fewer errors in valuing financial securities. Our results suggest that compensation plans requiring active decisions by individuals can result in poor financial outcomes for employees of lower socioeconomic status. © 2014 The Author

Do CEOs affect employees' political choices?

We study the relation between CEO and employee campaign contributions and find that CEO-supported political candidates receive three times more money from employees than the candidates not supported by the CEO. This relation holds around CEO departures, including plausibly exogenous departures due to retirement or death. Equity returns are significantly higher when CEO-supported candidates win elections than when employee-supported candidates win, suggesting that CEOs’ campaign contributions are more aligned with the interests of shareholders than are employee contributions. Finally, employees whose donations are misaligned with the political preferences of their CEOs are more likely to leave their employer