18 research outputs found

    Risk of poultry compartments for transmission of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza.

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    When outbreaks of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) occur in OIE member countries with until then disease-free status, member countries can use 'compartmentalisation'. A compartment may be defined as a subset of farms under a common management system, complying with certain stringent surveillance, control and biosecurity measures, and based on that may receive a disease-free status. Based on this disease-free status the compartment is exempted from certain transport restrictions coming into force in case of outbreaks occurring in the country. For deciding whether a candidate compartment is granted official compartment status, it is relevant to assess the additional HPAI transmission risks that would arise due to the exemptions granted. These risks consist of both additional local transmission risks as well as the additional risk of a 'jump' of HPAI infection from one poultry area, via the compartment, to another area. Here such risk assessment is carried out using a spatial mathematical model for between-farm transmission in the Netherlands, yielding insight in the roles of compartment composition and contact structure and identify relevant evaluation criteria for granting HPAI compartment status. At the core of this model are transmission probabilities associated with indirect between-farm contacts, e.g. through feed delivery, egg collection and professional visitors. These probabilities were estimated from Dutch epidemic outbreak data in earlier work. The additional risk of a jump of HPAI from one area, via the compartment, to another area is calculated relative to the direct jump risk. The results show that additional transmission risks caused by a compartment to other farms are mainly dependent on the distance of densely populated poultry areas (DPPAs) to the nearest compartment farm. Apart from conditions on these distances, we also recommend specific routing requirements for transport and other movements within the compartment

    Controlling highly pathogenic avian influenza outbreaks: An epidemiological and economic model analysis

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    Outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) can cause large losses for the poultry sector and for animal disease controlling authorities, as well as risks for animal and human welfare. In the current simulation approach epidemiological and economic models are combined to compare different strategies to control highly pathogenic avian influenza in Dutch poultry flocks. Evaluated control strategies are the minimum EU strategy (i.e., culling of infected flocks, transport regulations, tracing and screening of contact flocks, establishment of protection and surveillance zones), and additional control strategies comprising pre-emptive culling of all susceptible poultry flocks in an area around infected flocks (1. km, 3. km and 10. km) and emergency vaccination of all flocks except broilers around infected flocks (3. km).Simulation results indicate that the EU strategy is not sufficient to eradicate an epidemic in high density poultry areas. From an epidemiological point of view, this strategy is the least effective, while pre-emptive culling in 10. km radius is the most effective of the studied strategies. But these two strategies incur the highest costs due to long duration (EU strategy) and large-scale culling (pre-emptive culling in 10. km radius). Other analysed pre-emptive culling strategies (i.e., in 1. km and 3. km radius) are more effective than the analysed emergency vaccination strategy (in 3. km radius) in terms of duration and size of the epidemics, despite the assumed optimistic vaccination capacity of 20 farms per day. However, the total costs of these strategies differ only marginally. Extending the capacity for culling substantially reduces the duration, size and costs of the epidemic.This study demonstrates the strength of combining epidemiological and economic model analysis to gain insight in a range of consequences and thus to serve as a decision support tool in the control of HPAI epidemics

    A risk governance approach to mitigating food system risks in a crisis: Insights from the COVID-19 pandemic in five low- and middle-income countries

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    Research on food system responses to COVID-19 has remained largely disconnected from the broader risk governance scholarship. We connect both literatures by adopting a risk governance lens to study how governments have dealt with COVID-19 induced food system risks across different phases of the crisis. Studying responses in five low- and middle-income countries – Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Mexico, Nigeria and Vietnam – we find that food system risks and actors related to the food system were largely absent from initial risks assessment and policy responses, leading to growing food insecurity risks for vulnerable groups. Feedback and involvement from local governments and societal actors improved the capacities to assess and mitigate food system risks. We suggest developing future arrangements that involve actors with knowledge on food system risks to allow for more adequate responses
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