Truth and Reconciliation: Comments on Coalescence

In Coalescent Argumentation, Michael Gilbert criticizes the Critical-Logical Model (C-L) which he claims focuses on truth and treats arguments a-contextually; he proposes an alternative theory of coalescent argumentation which focuses on cont ent and consensus. I shall examine the dispute between the C-L and the coalescent models using the coalescent approach, thereby attempting to find which points of contention are real disagreements and which are only peripheral or apparent. Finally, I sh all examine the extent to which this examination, undertaken using the coalescent model, differs from what would have been done using a C-L model

Commentary on: Moira Howes\u27 Does happiness increase the objectivity of arguers?

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Is Argument for Conservatives? or Where do Sparkling New Ideas Come From?

Rorty claims argument is inherently conservative and philosophical progress comes from "sparkling new ideas," not argument. This assumes an untenable opposition between the generation and the evaluation of ideas, with argument relegated to evaluation. New ideas that contribute to progress arise from critical reflection on problems posed by the tradition, and constrained by the criteria governing evaluation. Thinking directed toward the criticism and evaluation of ideas or products is not algorithmic; it has a generative, creative component. An overall assessment in any complex circumstance requires constructing a new view from the questioning, weighing, rejecting, reconciling, and integrating of numerous divergent points of view. Thus, the process of argumentation can issue in new ideas

Drama as Experience: A Critical View

Contemporary drama education theorists tend to justify drama education in terms not of theatrical knowledge and skill but of affective understanding of self and society. Moreover, it is the undergoing of the experience of drama itself that is thought to be of value in engendering the kinds of understandings at issue. I argue that there are significant difficulties with such claims about the educational value of dramatic experience. These difficulties centre on the possibilities for learning from unguided experiences, the role of reflection in dramatic learning, the danger of manipulation of students, and the problems of narrowness of curriculum. Les théoriciens contemporains ont tendance à justifier les cours de théâtre non pas par les connaissances et les compétences qu’ils permettraient d’acquérir dans le domaine, mais plutôt par la compréhension affective de soi et de la société qui en dériveraient. On prétend en outre que l’expérience même du théâtre engendrerait cette compréhension. L’auteure soutient qu’il est très difficile de mettre de l’avant de pareilles affirmations sur la valeur éducative de l’expérience du théâtre, compte tenu des possibilités d’appren- tissage à partir d’expériences non encadrées, du rôle que joue la réflexion dans les cours de théâtre, du danger de manipuler les élèves et des problèmes suscités par les limites d’un programme.

Comments on Developing Critical Thinking with Rhetorical Pedagogy by Elizabeth Ismail

In her paper, Ismail argues that common approaches to teaching critical thinking based on informal logic are inadequate and that equating the ability to think critically with the ability to analyze and evaluate arguments is problematic. To remedy these inadequacies, she proposes a pedagogy based in rhetoric. I first examine her critiques of informal logic, seconding many of her concerns regarding the limitations of equating critical thinking with argument analysis and evaluation. I concur with her judgment that there is a case to be made for broadening the scope of critical thinking instruction and argue that the need for a broader focus has, in fact, been recognized in some theorizing about and educational approaches to critical thinking. Turning to the alternative she proposes of rhetorical pedagogy, I request a clarification of how she understands rhetoric, rhetorical pedagogy, and the relationship between rhetorical pedagogy and critical thinking and ask what a pedagogy which explicitly calls on rhetoric might add to these recent broader approaches

Critical thinking and cognitive biases

We argue that psychological research can enhance the identification of reasoning errors and the development of an appropriate pedagogy to instruct people in how to avoid these errors. In this paper we identify some of the findings of psychologists that help explain some common fallacies, give examples of fallacies identified in the research that have not been typically identified in philosophy, and explore ways in which this research can enhance critical thinking instruction

Inquiry: A dialectical approach to teaching critical thinking

We argue that the central goal of critical thinking is the making of reasoned judgments. Arriving at reasoned judgments in most cases is a dialectical process involving the comparative weighing of a variety of contending positions and arguments. Recognizing this dialectical dimension means that critical thinking pedagogy should focus on the kind of comparative evaluation which we make in actual contexts of disagreement and debate

Beyond the Boundaries: The Epistemological Significance of Differing Cultural Perspectives

This paper explores the issue of the epistemological significance of taking into consideration alternative perspectives, particularly those from other cultures. We have a moral duty to respect the beliefs and practices of other cultures, but do we have an epistemological duty to take these beliefs and practices into consideration in our own deliberations? Are views that are held without exposure to alternatives from other cultures less credible than those that have undergone such exposure

DAMed If You Do; DAMed If You Don’t: Cohen’s “Missed Opportunities”

In his paper, “Missed Opportunities in Argument Evaluation,” Daniel Cohen has in his sights a “curious” asymmetry in how we evaluate arguments: while we criticize arguments for failing to point out obvious objections to the proposed line of reasoning, we do not consider it critically culpable to fail to take into account arguments for the position. Cohen views this omission as a missed opportunity, for which he lays the blame largely at the metaphorical feet of the “Dominant Adversarial Model” of argumentation – the DAM account. We argue here that, while Cohen criticizes the DAM account for conceptualizing arguments as essentially agonistic, he accepts its basic framing and does not follow his critique where it leads. In so doing, he misses the opportunity to develop an alternative, non-adversarial account of argumentation which would avoid his criticism of how we evaluate arguments