41 research outputs found
Prolonged higher dose methylprednisolone vs. conventional dexamethasone in COVID-19 pneumonia: a randomised controlled trial (MEDEAS)
Dysregulated systemic inflammation is the primary driver of mortality in severe COVID-19 pneumonia. Current guidelines favor a 7-10-day course of any glucocorticoid equivalent to dexamethasone 6 mg·day-1. A comparative RCT with a higher dose and a longer duration of intervention was lacking
Leveraged buybacks of sovereign debt: a model and an application to Greece
The model presented in this paper shows that the outcome of a leveraged buyback of sovereign debt depends on the priority structure of the deal. If the institution lending the funds needed for the buyback is senior, the debtor country benefits from the deal: the government debt is reduced, implying a lower probability of default; at the same time, the deal makes the price of outstanding bonds go down, since their recovery rate declines. The opposite holds if the lending institution is junior. If the loan is under-priced, the implied subsidy is shared between the borrowing country and its bondholders, who can benefit from a price increase of their bonds. This is actually what happened with the buyback of Greek sovereign bonds in 2012, as it is shown in the empirical section. Those results do not depend on the share of country's endowment devoted to debt repayment, which instead plays a crucial role in shaping the outcome of unlevered buybacks
Shareholders' agreements and voting power: evidence from Italian listed firms
This work provides an empirical investigation of shareholders\u2019 agreements
signed in Italy over the past decade. The evidence shows that agreements
produce a remarkable reshuffling of voting power (Shapley value) among
participants. In particular, the first owner gains much voting power at low
levels of ownership concentration, and his gain is decreasing in his
ownership stake; the opposite happens for the other participants. In
addition, the likelihood that a supermajority rule is included in an
agreement contract is increasing in the first owner\u2019s share of equity. These
findings are consistent with the hypothesis that agreements are used to
correct situations where the first owner\u2019s power is at one of the two
extremes: either too low (leading to insufficient monitoring over managers
and gridlocks in decision-making) or too high (enabling him to extract
large private benefits of control)
La rete bucata. Le regole e i controlli sulla finanza
Questo libro parte da una domanda: a dieci anni dallo scoppio della crisi finanziaria, cosa \ue8 stato fatto perch\ue9 i problemi delle banche venissero risolti? Risponde proponendo un percorso tra le nuove regole sulla finanza: dai farraginosi requisiti di capitale ai deboli vincoli sui compensi milionari dei manager, dall\u2019unione bancaria europea alla tutela dei risparmiatori, dalla tristemente famosa cartolarizzazione al sistema bancario \u201combra\u201d. La risposta non \ue8 consolante. Le autorit\ue0 si sono lanciate in una produzione di norme di cui hanno perso il controllo: un fiume in piena fatto di migliaia di pagine. Regole molto complicate ma poco efficaci: la complessit\ue0 nasconde l\u2019incapacit\ue0 di incidere sui comportamenti dei soggetti vigilati. E\u2019 una rete fitta ma piena di buchi: eccezioni, scappatoie, manipolazioni. E cos\uec il sistema non \ue8 stato messo in sicurezza
The European Banking Union. A critical Assesment
The book provides a description and a critical analysis of the European Banking Unio
Strumenti di gestione della crisi
Il capitolo analizza le istituzioni europee, comprese la BCE, intervenute nella gestione della crisi finanziaria, in particolare della crisi del debito sovrano nella zona euro
MULTIPLE BANKING RELATIONSHIPS: COMPETITION AMONG "INSIDE" BANKS
Why firms apply for credit at several banks? The model presented here provides an answer, based on the customer relationships approach. A bank makes an initial investment in information production on a borrowing firm; such an investment must later be compensated: the firm has to share its profits (if any) with the bank. The bank may be able to impose this sharing, when the firm asks for the roll-over of a short term loan, thanks to the informational advantage she has over other lenders; but this "informational rent" lowers the firm owner's incentives to exert effort. Therefore, the firm needs a way to minimize such a rent: this may be done by applying for credit at more than one bank, thus building up competition among "inside" (informed) banks. On the other hand, it is crucial that this competition does not drive the informational rent to zero: in such a case, no bank would be willing to lend. The alternative of a long term loan is also examined, showing that it creates some incentive distortion as well