Why is Behavioral Game a Game for Economists? : The concept of beliefs in equilibrium

The interdisciplinary exchange between economists and psychologists has so far been more active and fruitful in the modifications of Expected Utility Theory than in those of Game Theory. We argue that this asymmetry may be explained by economists' specific way of doing equilibrium analysis of aggregate-level outcomes in their practice, and by psychologists' reluctance to fully engage with such practice. We focus on the notion of belief that is embedded in economists' practice of equilibrium analysis, more specifically Nash equilibrium, and argue that its difference from the psychological counterpart is one of the factors that makes interdisciplinary exchange in behavioral game theory more difficult.Peer reviewe

The Mind’s Eye on Personal Profiles: A Cognitive Perspective on Profile Elements that Inform Initial Trustworthiness Assessments in Virtual Project Teams

Rusman, E., Van Bruggen, J., Sloep, P., Valcke, M., & Koper, R. (2013). The Mind’s Eye on Personal Profiles: A Cognitive Perspective on Profile Elements that Inform Initial Trustworthiness Assessments and Social Awareness in Virtual Project Teams. Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW), 22(2-3), 159-179.Collaboration in virtual project teams heavily relies on interpersonal trust, for which perceived trustworthiness is an important determinant. This study provides insight in the information that trustors value to assess a trustee’s professional trustworthiness in the initial phase of a virtual project team. We expect trustors in virtual teams to value those particular information elements that provide them with relevant cues of trust warranting properties of a trustee. We identified a list of commonly highly valued information elements to inform trustworthiness assessments (n=226). We then analysed explanations for preferences with the help of a theory-grounded coding scheme. Results show that respondents value those particular information elements that provide them with multiple cues to assess the trustworthiness of a trustee. This enables them to become aware of and assess the trustworthiness of another. Information elements that provide unique cues could not be identified. Insight in these information preferences can inform the design of artefacts, such as personal profile templates, to support acquaintanceships in the initial phase of a virtual project team

Team reasoning and the rational choice of payoff-dominant outcomes in games

Standard game theory cannot explain the selection of payoff-dominant outcomes that are best for all players in common-interest games. Theories of team reasoning can explain why such mutualistic cooperation is rational. They propose that teams can be agents and that individuals in teams can adopt a distinctive mode of reasoning that enables them to do their part in achieving Pareto-dominant outcomes. We show that it can be rational to play payoff-dominant outcomes, given that an agent group identifies. We compare team reasoning to other theories that have been proposed to explain how people can achieve payoff-dominant outcomes, especially with respect to rationality. Some authors have hoped that it would be possible to develop an argument that it is rational to group identify. We identify some large—probably insuperable—problems with this project and sketch some more promising approaches, whereby the normativity of group identification rests on morality

Evolutionary Modeling of Rate Shifts Reveals Specificity Determinants in HIV-1 Subtypes

A hallmark of the human immunodeficiency virus 1 (HIV-1) is its rapid rate of evolution within and among its various subtypes. Two complementary hypotheses are suggested to explain the sequence variability among HIV-1 subtypes. The first suggests that the functional constraints at each site remain the same across all subtypes, and the differences among subtypes are a direct reflection of random substitutions, which have occurred during the time elapsed since their divergence. The alternative hypothesis suggests that the functional constraints themselves have evolved, and thus sequence differences among subtypes in some sites reflect shifts in function. To determine the contribution of each of these two alternatives to HIV-1 subtype evolution, we have developed a novel Bayesian method for testing and detecting site-specific rate shifts. The RAte Shift EstimatoR (RASER) method determines whether or not site-specific functional shifts characterize the evolution of a protein and, if so, points to the specific sites and lineages in which these shifts have most likely occurred. Applying RASER to a dataset composed of large samples of HIV-1 sequences from different group M subtypes, we reveal rampant evolutionary shifts throughout the HIV-1 proteome. Most of these rate shifts have occurred during the divergence of the major subtypes, establishing that subtype divergence occurred together with functional diversification. We report further evidence for the emergence of a new sub-subtype, characterized by abundant rate-shifting sites. When focusing on the rate-shifting sites detected, we find that many are associated with known function relating to viral life cycle and drug resistance. Finally, we discuss mechanisms of covariation of rate-shifting sites