Spinoza on Activity in Sense Perception

There can be little disagreement about whether ideas of sense perception are, for Spinoza, to be classed as passions or actions—the former is obviously the correct answer. All this, however, does not mean that sense perception would be, for Spinoza, completely passive. In this essay I argue argues that there is in the Ethics an elaborate—and to my knowledge previously unacknowledged—line of reasoning according to which sense perception of finite things never fails to contain a definite active component. This argument for activity in sense perception consists of two main parts: first, that ideas we form through sense perception have something adequate in them; second, that the adequate component is actively brought about. Discerning this line of thought connects to—and sheds some new light on—Spinoza’s general way of understanding ideas as entities involving activity

European “freedoms”: a critical analysis

Faced with the present migrant crisis and the dismal record of Europe in protecting vulnerable refugees’ and migrants’ rights, what could be the view of the moral philosopher? The contrast between the principles enshrined in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and the reality of present policies is shocking, but more scrutiny will show that it is the result of a larger trend towards an understanding of freedom mostly in economic terms, at a time when economists such as Amartya Sen have revised their approach to economic growth and prosperity, noting the central role played by a much richer conception of freedom. The paper will scrutinize these inconsistencies and the conception of the person from which they derive and will provide an alternative and more coherent moral vision that could strengthen the legitimacy of the European Charter, at a time of growing dissatisfaction and so-called democratic deficit. Such a vision could help reconnect the Charter with a conception of the human person as in need not solely of passive legal protection, but also of active promotion of her self-respect and capabilities, and of her aspiration to a valuable life

Emotion and ethics: an inter-(en)active approach

The original publication is available at www.springerlink.comIn this paper we start exploring the affective and ethical dimension of what De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007) have called ‘participatory sense-making’. In the first part, we distinguish various ways in which we are, and feel, affectively inter-connected in interpersonal encounters. In the second part, we discuss the ethical character of this affective interconnectedness, as well as the implications that taking an ‘inter-(en)active approach’ has for ethical theory itself

Concentration or representation : the struggle for popular sovereignty

There is a tension in the notion of popular sovereignty, and the notion of democracy associated with it, that is both older than our terms for these notions themselves and more fundamental than the apparently consensual way we tend to use them today. After a review of the competing conceptions of 'the people' that underlie two very different understandings of democracy, this article will defend what might be called a 'neo-Jacobin' commitment to popular sovereignty, understood as the formulation and imposition of a shared political will. A people's egalitarian capacity to concentrate both its collective intelligence and force, from this perspective, takes priority over concerns about how best to represent the full variety of positions and interests that differentiate and divide a community

Ecuador's experiment in living well:Sumak kawsay, Spinoza and the inadequacy of ideas

In April 2017 Ecuador halted the continental drift to the conservative right in Latin America by electing leftist Lenín Moreno to the Presidency. Attention has turned, therefore, to the legacy of outgoing President Rafael Correa’s decade in power. To that end, this paper examines one of Correa’s signature programmes, ‘Buen Vivir’ (Living Well), a strategic plan for development underscored by the indigenous Kichwa cosmology of ‘sumak kawsay’. Sumak kawsay is a notion that has been co-opted into policy mechanisms in an attempt to both challenge neoliberal modes of governance, and to disrupt the ontological bifurcation of nature and society. Given the emphasis placed on ecological sensibility in sumak kawsay and Buen Vivir, critics have been quick to highlight the contradictory relations between Ecuador’s mode of environmental governance and its extractivist agenda. Such critiques are as staid as they are well rehearsed. Acknowledging the precarious composition of sumak kawsay, the paper questions the extent to which the ethos of experimentalism in politics can be sustained, eliding stymied technocratic forms of the political. It turns, therefore, to Baruch Spinoza’s treatise on adequate and inadequate ideas. In so doing, the paper examines how one can critique an idea without perpetuating a moral economy in judgment. Consequently, the paper considers the way in which Spinoza’s thought can be charged to recuperate imperilled political ideas