The Evolution of Language Groups among Cooperating Digital Predators

Many species of animals have evolved complex means for communicating with one another. Oftentimes, communication is essential for the execution of tasks that require cooperation between individuals, such as group hunting and mate selection. As a result, communication itself becomes essential for survival. While these facts are readily observed, the evolutionary processes underlying them are less understood, in large part because observational - much less controlled - studies of these processes are impossible. Both the timescales and population sizes required for such studies are simply too great. To address these problems, this thesis uses simulated predators to study the evolution of language in animals. These digital predators evolve to perform two cooperative tasks: hunting and mate selection. After the populations of predators have evolved to perform both tasks successfully, the population is decomposed into both language groups and cooperative groups. Spectral clustering identifies predators that speak similar languages, while merge clustering is used to find those groups of predators that are the most successful when working together. Analysis of the groups generated by these two different methods shows that the most successful pairings are not necessarily those in which the two individuals are speaking the same language. Rather, organisms can evolve to speak a different language than the one to which they respond. Moreover, even though one task -- mate selection -- evolves earlier in evolutionary history, the language diversity it produces counteracts any head-start provided for the evolution of the second task. Thus, not only is language important for the evolution of cooperative task success, but the appearance of language groups can also play a determinant role in the evolution of cooperation.Computer Science

Using problem frames with distributed architectures: a case for cardinality on interfaces

Certain classes of problems amenable to description using Problem Frames, in particular ones intended to be implemented using a distributed architecture, can benefit by the addition of a cardinality specification on the domain interfaces. This paper presents an example of such a problem, demonstrates the need for relationship cardinality, and proposes a notation to represent cardinality on domain interfaces

Using Problem Frames and projections to analyze requirements for distributed systems

Subproblems in a problem frames decomposition frequently make use of projections of the complete problem context. One specific use of projec-tions occurs when an eventual implementation will be distributed, in which case a subproblem must interact with (use) the machine in a projection that represents another subproblem. We refer to subproblems used in this way as services, and propose an extension to projections to represent services as a spe-cial connection domain between subproblems. The extension provides signifi-cant benefits: verification of the symmetry of the interfaces, exposure of the machine-to-machine interactions, and prevention of accidental introduction of shared state. The extension’s usefulness is validated using a case study

Arguing satisfaction of security requirements

This chapter presents a process for security requirements elicitation and analysis, based around the construction of a satisfaction argument for the security of a system. The process starts with the enumeration of security goals based on assets in the system, then uses these goals to derive security requirements in the form of constraints. Next, a satisfaction argument for the system is constructed, using a problem-centered representation, a formal proof to analyze properties that can be demonstrated, and structured informal argumentation of the assumptions exposed during construction of the argument. Constructing the satisfaction argument can expose missing and inconsistent assumptions about system context and behavior that effect security, and a completed argument provides assurances that a system can respect its security requirements

Arguing security: validating security requirements using structured argumentation

This paper proposes using both formal and structured informal arguments to show that an eventual realized system can satisfy its security requirements. These arguments, called 'satisfaction arguments', consist of two parts: a formal argument based upon claims about domain properties, and a set of informal arguments that justify the claims. Building on our earlier work on trust assumptions and security requirements, we show how using satisfaction arguments assists in clarifying how a system satisfies its security requirements, in the process identifying those properties of domains that are critical to the requirements

A framework for security requirements engineering

This paper presents a framework for security requirements elicitation and analysis, based upon the construction of a context for the system and satisfaction arguments for the security of the system. One starts with enumeration of security goals based on assets in the system. These goals are used to derive security requirements in the form of constraints. The system context is described using a problem-centered notation, then this context is validated against the security requirements through construction of a satisfaction argument. The satisfaction argument is in two parts: a formal argument that the system can meet its security requirements, and a structured informal argument supporting the assumptions expressed in the formal argument. The construction of the satisfaction argument may fail, revealing either that the security requirement cannot be satisfied in the context, or that the context does not contain sufficient information to develop the argument. In this case, designers and architects are asked to provide additional design information to resolve the problems