Chess players' performance beyond 64 squares: A case study on the limitations of cognitive abilities transfer

In a beauty contest experiment with over 6,000 chess players, ranked from amateur to world class, we found that Grandmasters act very similar to other humans. This even holds true when they play exclusively against players of approximately their own strength. In line with psychological research on chess players' thinking, we argue that they are not more rational in a game theoretic sense per se. Their skills are rather specific for their game.chess, beauty contest, cognitive transfer

The Trophy Effect

By extending a typical endowment effect experiment with the possibility to win the endow-ment in a real effort contest, we found two enforcing effects that led to a complete market failure. Subjects who won the item in the competition had an extremely high willingness to accept (trophy effect). By contrast, subjects who were not successful had an extremely low willingness to pay for the same item (reverse trophy effect). We disentangle the different components of the trophy effect, compare it to similar experiments, and discuss its important economic implications.

Do not incentivize eco-friendly behavior– Go for a competition to go green!

Which behavior-based interventions are more appropriate to induce energy saving: energy saving goals with or without incentive, energy saving products, environmentally related information, social comparison or competition? We try to answer this question in a comprehensive study. First, we designed energy bills with different behavioral interventions. Second, we evaluated their appropriateness in an empirical survey with 457 participants. Third, we tested behavioral consequences in real effort lab experiments with 550 subjects in 11 treatments and one baseline. Our results indicate that monetary incentives to save energy might foster the intention to invest effort in energy saving but backfire if factual performance is required. Instead, fostering non-incentivized self-set goals and providing social comparison induced substantial effort to protect the environment. Non-incentivized competition to save energy provided the best results. Our study concludes with implications for practical policy design and further need of research

Worker or Shirker – Who Evades More Taxes? A Real Effort Experiment

With the help of a real effort experiment, we analyze if tax evasion depends on the amount of effort invested to generate income. In three treatments, subjects were either endowed with income or had to work moderately or hard to earn it. In line with prospect theory, subjects evaded more taxes when they worked hard for their income. We find little evidence for the prediction that tax evasion in the endowed treatment is higher than in the moderate work treatment

Chess players' performance beyond 64 squares: A case study on the limitations of cognitive abilities transfer

In a beauty contest experiment with over 6,000 chess players, ranked from amateur to world class, we found that Grandmasters act very similar to other humans. This even holds true when they play exclusively against players of approximately their own strength. In line with psychological research on chess players' thinking, we argue that they are not more rational in a game theoretic sense per se. Their skills are rather specific for their game

A Historical Note on the Beauty Contest

Alain Ledoux, who was one of over 6,000 chess players taking part in Bühren and Frank´s (2012) online Beauty Contest experiment, turned out to be the forgotten inventor of that game. We reconstruct the birth of the Beauty Contest. In section 1 of our note, its first two authors outline the history of the game that metamorphosed into the famous guessing game experiment which was first run in the lab by Rosemarie Nagel. In section 2, Rosemarie Nagel adds further remarks and thoughts about the development of the experimental Beauty Contest.

A Historical Note on the Beauty Contest

Alain Ledoux, who was one of over 6,000 chess players taking part in Bühren and Frank´s (2012) online Beauty Contest experiment, turned out to be the forgotten inventor of that game. We reconstruct the birth of the Beauty Contest. In section 1 of our note, its first two authors outline the history of the game that metamorphosed into the famous guessing game experiment which was first run in the lab by Rosemarie Nagel. In section 2, Rosemarie Nagel adds further remarks and thoughts about the development of the experimental Beauty Contest

IKEA Effect vs. Trophy Effect – An Experimental Comparison

mer’s valuation of the product. These phenomena are called the IKEA and the trophy effect. We test both of them separately as well as combined and find that the trophy winner effect looms larger than the IKEA effect for inexpensive items, in our case paper planes. For more expensive products, in our case 3-D-puzzles, we find a trophy loser effect. Positive emotions of trophy winners drive our result for inexpensive products, whereas negative emotions of trophy losers drive our result for more expensive products. We discuss the implications of our findings

Experimental Evidence on Forecaster (anti-) Herding in Sports Markets

We experimentally analyzed whether (anti-)herding behavior of forecasters in sport-betting markets is influenced by the incentive structure of the market (winner-takes-all vs. equal payment of most accurate forecasts) and by personal traits of forecasters. We found evidence of anti-herding in forecasts of the German Bundesliga. Self-reported knowledge and, more surprisingly, winner-takes-all incentives reduced anti-herding. On average, forecasts were less accurate with stronger anti-herding. Winner-takes-all incentives and self-reported knowledge improved forecasts

Rating Agencies – An Experimental Analysis of their Remuneration Model

Does it matter who pays for ratings? Yes, but not for the rating agencies’ behavior. These are the findings of our experiment where we analyze the effect of the remuneration model of rating agencies on their assessments as well as on investors’ and issuers’ behavior. First, we find that rating agencies’ assessments are comparable whether the agency is (partially) paid by issuers, investors, or solely by the experimenter. Issuers, on the other hand, more often do not return investor’s trust when they or investors pay for ratings. Further, investors more often act according to the agencies’ recommendations when they have to pay for this information