9 research outputs found
(Philosophizing about) Gender-Open Children
Iâm at the playground with my baby, and a smiling adult inquires, âIs it a boy or a girl?â Scientific studies show that if I say X, they will see my baby as doing A, being A, feeling Aâversus if I say Y.1 Theyâll likely make different assumptions about whether my baby is able to climb up the playground structures and sit without support, and theyâll encourage my baby to engage in different activities.2 And of course, theyâll respond to them differently depending on whether they think the baby is a boy or a girl. What do I do if I donât want that to happen? One way to respond to the question is not to reveal the gender, or rather, to reject the assumption that my baby already has a gender, which is arguably a weird move, breaking out of a smoothly functioning, well-oiled social exchange. Here I want to talk about this weird move: How weird it is? What are some of the reasons to make the move anyway, and what are some of the concerns
Philosophy and the Non-Native Speaker Condition
In this note, my aim is to point out a phenomenon that has not received much attention; a phenomenon that, in my opinion, should not be overlooked in the professional practice of philosophy, especially within feminist efforts for social justice. I am referring to the way in which being a non-native speaker of English interacts with the practice of philosophy.1 There is evidence that non-native speakers are often perceived in prejudiced ways. Such prejudiced perception causes harm and, more importantly, constitutes wrongdoing. As in other cases of prejudiced perception and biased behavior, it would be pretentious and misguided to expect philosophers and the philosophy profession to be free from this vice. There are good reasons to think that this prejudiced perception is bad not only for the persons who are perceived in such a way, but also for the profession, for it might make us miss important things that could improve philosophy in general. I claim we should be more sensitive to this phenomenon, both out of concern for justice, and for the sake of doing better philosophy
Explaining Injustice: Structural Analysis, Bias, and Individuals
Why does social injustice exist? What role, if any, do implicit biases play in the perpetuation of social inequalities? Individualistic approaches to these questions explain social injustice as the result of individualsâ preferences, beliefs, and choices. For example, they explain racial injustice as the result of individuals acting on racial stereotypes and prejudices. In contrast, structural approaches explain social injustice in terms of beyond-the-individual features, including laws, institutions, city layouts, and social norms. Often these two approaches are seen as competitors. Framing them as competitors suggests that only one approach can win and that the loser offers worse explanations of injustice. In this essay, we explore each approach and compare them. Using implicit bias as an example, we argue that the relationship between individualistic and structural approaches is more complicated than it may first seem. Moreover, we contend that each approach has its place in analyses of injustice and raise the possibility that they can work togetherâsynergisticallyâto produce deeper explanations of social injustice. If so, the approaches may be complementary, rather than competing
Diferencias, discriminaciĂłn, cerebro y sexo: controversias cientĂficas de lo social y lo biolĂłgico
Ciencia OdontolĂłgica
Es para los integrantes de la Red de InvestigaciĂłn en EstomatologĂa (RIE) una enorme alegrĂa presentar el primero de una serie de 5 libros sobre casos clĂnicos, revisiones de la literatura e investigaciones. La RIE estĂĄ integrada por cuerpos acadĂ©micos de la Universidad AutĂłnoma del Estado de Hidalgo, Universidad AutĂłnoma del Estado de MĂ©xico, Universidad AutĂłnoma de Campeche y Universidad de Guadalajara