Against Market Insularity: Market, Responsibility, and Law

In this Article, I take stock of some leading attempts to drive a wedge between distinctively market reasoning and practical (including moral) reasoning. Although these attempts focus on different normative foundations-the epistemology of market interaction, the autonomy of its participants, the stability-enhancing quality of markets, and the authority of democratic decision-making-they are of a piece insofar as they seek to trivialize the role of private responsibility for realizing the demands of morality and justice. Essentially, they seek to insulate, at least to an important extent, the market practice of doing well from the demands of doing right. I argue that they each fail, and that their respective failures motivate the pursuit of a more successful conception of the interaction between markets and morality. I argue that the key to developing this conception is law and, in particular, the legal forms of interaction that lie at the center of economic markets. Rather than merely facilitating any number of desirable goals, these legal forms construct the moral landscape within which market participants act. This observation opens the door for a better account of the ineliminable place of moral responsibility in and around the market

The Limited Case for Discrimination’s Legality

This study has focused development and management strategies at different levels within the school system in four Swedish municipalities. The overall aim of the study was to gain knowledge about how development is staged in municipalities where changes emerge without incentives, such as financial support from the state. The questions cancern how school development is conceived of at different levels in the school system, what role ICT plays in school development, and what strategies of management that prevail as regards the connection between ICT and school development. School development in the four municipalities has been analysed by using 1) Englund's three conceptions of school development over time; 2) Berg, Nytell & Söderberg's four types of management in Swedish schools that have been brought to the före <luring the 1990's; and 3) . House's three perspectives on school development. The study demonstrates that conceptions of school development vary in the four municipalities among administrators and school leaders, from interpreting development in a technological/scientific, rational perspective, to interpreting it in a political/cultural and democratic perspective. The philosophy behind management also varies between municipalities, and different pattems bave emerged, i.e., management may be directed by goals, rules, results, or"'frame factors. However, the teachers in all four municipalities demonstrate, with few exceptions, a common view about school change, irrespective of what philosophy of management is represented at administration and school leader leve!. In House's terms, the teachers seem to have a political/cultural perspective. One explanation rnight be that teachers are independent in their choice of instructional contents and methods

Substantive Remedies

Often, private law remedies enforce or vindicate infringed underlying rights. Substantive remedies are different. Substantive remedies do not aim at restoring these rights; nor do they seek to change them. Instead, substantive remedies adjust the remedial response for a right violation so as to ensure post-wrong justice. They require the law of remedies not merely to look back, but rather to take a second look at the parties’ post-wrong situation. At times, such a second look affects the type of remedy awarded (damages in lieu of injunctive relief); in other cases—for instance, the tort doctrine of crushing liability—it imposes a ceiling on the plaintiff’s compensation; and in yet other cases, dealing with loss of earning capacity or with the thin-skull rule, remedies law’s second-look sets a compensatory floor below which compensation should not go. This Article shows that these seemingly disparate rules and doctrines are not embarrassing deviations from a traditional make-whole rule. Rather, they all manifest a distinctively liberal conception of remedies in private law, founded on the twin commitments to substantive freedom and equality. These commitments serve as the regulative ideals for the construction of respectful interactions at the remedy stage between plaintiffs and defendants. Highlighting the irreducible role of substantive remedies in a liberal system of remedies law not only helps explain important pockets of the law and demonstrate their coherence. It also points to doctrinal confusions and failings. To this extent, our account provides a source of internal critique that can allow the law of remedies to make good on its latent affirmation of the ideal of relational justice whereby participants at the remedial stage relate as genuinely, rather than merely formally, free and equal persons