Competition policy, regulation and the institutional design of industry supervision

We study the welfare impact of enforcing a competitive behavior from an unregulated fringe competing with a regulated dominant operator with imperfectly differentiated goods. The fringe is potentially collusive but may be supervised by a competition authority. We show that the complementarity/substitutability between regulation and competition policy strongly depends on the nature of the market interaction. Forcing the fringe to adopt a competitive behavior always benefits consumers. However, it also affects the amount of subsidy that must be provided to the regulated firm for cost-reimbursement purposes, which has a social cost when public funds are costly. With complements, antitrust intervention is always welfare-improving. It is also preferable with weak substitutes but is detrimental to welfare for strong substitutes.Regulation, Competition policy

Subsidizing National Champions: An Evolutionary Perspective

A national-champions-related industrial policy has become (again) en vogue among European politicians. Against this background, our work orders different types of national champions along the industry lifecycle. Different types of locally bound externalities appear along the lifecycle. In a simple model, we show that it may be efficient to subsidize innovative firms in their early stages or to protect mature firms from competition to appropriate these externalities. However, non-benevolent politicians may not choose efficient policies. Real-world examples indicate that politicians tend to concentrate on externalities at the mature stage of the lifecycle. These externalities may be transitory or at the expense of foreign country consumers.national champions, industrial policy, industry lifecycle, externalities

Voter conformism and inefficient policies

A reelection-seeking politician makes a policy decision that can reveal her private information on whether her political orientation and capabilities will be a good fit to future circumstances. We study how she may choose inappropriate policies to hide her information, even in the absence of specific conflicts of interests, and how voters’ conformism affects her incentives to do so. Conformism is independent from policies and from voters’ perceptions; yet we identify a ‘conformism advantage’ for the incumbent that exists only when there is also an incumbency advantage. Conformism changes the incentives of the incumbent and favors the emergence of an efficient, separating equilibrium. It may even eliminate the pooling equi-librium (that can consist in inefficient persistence). Conformism has a mixed impact on social welfare however: it improves policy choices and the information available to independent vot-ers, but fosters inefficient reelection in the face of a stronger opponent. When the incumbent is ‘altruistic’ and values social welfare even when not in power, she partly internalizes this latter effect. The impact of conformism is then non monotonous

Proceedings of the international colloquium photosynthesis and remote sensing

The in vivo specific absorption coefficient of phytoplankton a*ph (lambda) was measured along an equatorial transect in the Pacific Ocean during the JGOFS-cruise in Octobre 1994 in order to validate bio-optical models of primary production. The fiber filter technique was used on board, as well as spectrofluorometry for pigment determination and flow cytometry for cells counting. The a*ph (435-441 nm) walues strongly decreased from oligotrophic to mesotrophic waters (between 170°E and 153°W). This zonal variation reflected a change in phytoplankton composition, dominated by #Prochlorococcus$ in the oligotrophic zone and by picoeucaryotes in the mesotrophic one. Such variations in a*ph have to be taken into account for estimating primary production of the equatorial Pacific Ocean from ocean colour imagery. (Résumé d'auteur