Front-Running Protection for Distributed Exchanges using Tamper-Resistant Round Trip Time Measurements

In this paper we present ODIN, a front-running protection system that uses a novel algorithm to measure Round-Trip-Time (RTT) to untrusted servers. ODIN is the decentralized equivalent of THOR, a RTT-aware front-running protection system for trading on centralized exchanges. Unlike centralized exchanges, P2P exchanges have potentially malicious peers which makes reliable direct RTT measurement impossible. In order to prevent tampering by an arbitrarily malicious peer, ODIN performs an indirect RTT measurement that never interacts directly with the target machine. The RTT to the target is estimated by measuring the RTT to a randomized IP address that is known to be close to the target's IP address in the global routing network. We find that ODIN's RTT estimation algorithm provides an accurate, practical, and generic solution for collecting network latency data in a hostile network environment

Energy Attack Mitigation for Intermittent Computing Devices

Energy attacks against energy-harvesting intermittent devices let a malicious agent shut downthe device without physical or network access. Energy attacks can prevent a sensor device from collecting important sensor data due to being powered down. We present an attack mitigation system for energy harvesting devices that improves quality of service during energy attacks.The attack mitigation system helps prevent or delay the device from running out of energy and powering down, which maximises the device's ability to provide sensor data despite energy attacks. We show that the attack mitigation system is effective by simulating an energyharvesting device in a range of energy conditions

Energy Attack Mitigation for Intermittent Computing Devices

Energy attacks against energy-harvesting intermittent devices let a malicious agent shut downthe device without physical or network access. Energy attacks can prevent a sensor device from collecting important sensor data due to being powered down. We present an attack mitigation system for energy harvesting devices that improves quality of service during energy attacks.The attack mitigation system helps prevent or delay the device from running out of energy and powering down, which maximises the device's ability to provide sensor data despite energy attacks. We show that the attack mitigation system is effective by simulating an energyharvesting device in a range of energy conditions