Predicting Friendship Quality in Autism Spectrum Disorders and Typical Development

The role played by social relationship variables (attachment security; mother–child relationship qualities) and social-cognitive capacities (theory of mind) was examined in both observed friendship behaviors and in children’s descriptions of friendships (age 8–12) with high functioning children with autism spectrum disorders (HFASD) (n = 44) and with typical development (TYP) (n = 38). Overall, half of the HFASD sample (54.45%) reported maternal attachment security, corroborating data from younger children with ASD. The hypothesized predictors and their interrelations had both direct and indirect effects on friendship for both groups of children, highlighting the importance of these factors in children’s friendship development and suggesting both compensatory and amplification mechanisms for friendship qualities. Practical and clinical implications are discussed for friendship support in both ASD and TYP

Simple mindreading abilities predict complex theory of mind: developmental delay in autism spectrum disorders

Theory of Mind (ToM) is impaired in individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD). The aims of this study were to: i) examine the developmental trajectories of ToM abilities in two different mentalizing tasks in children with ASD compared to TD children; and ii) to assess if a ToM simple test known as Eyes-test could predict performance on the more advanced ToM task, i.e. Comic Strip test. Based on a sample of 37 children with ASD and 55 TD children, our results revealed slower development at varying rates in all ToM measures in children with ASD, with delayed onset compared to TD children. These results could stimulate new treatments for social abilities, which would lessen the social deficit in ASD

Development of the social brain from age three to twelve years

Human adults recruit distinct networks of brain regions to think about the bodies and minds of others. This study characterizes the development of these networks, and tests for relationships between neural development and behavioral changes in reasoning about others' minds ('theory of mind', ToM). A large sample of children (n = 122, 3-12 years), and adults (n = 33), watched a short movie while undergoing fMRI. The movie highlights the characters' bodily sensations (often pain) and mental states (beliefs, desires, emotions), and is a feasible experiment for young children. Here we report three main findings: (1) ToM and pain networks are functionally distinct by age 3 years, (2) functional specialization increases throughout childhood, and (3) functional maturity of each network is related to increasingly anti-correlated responses between the networks. Furthermore, the most studied milestone in ToM development, passing explicit false-belief tasks, does not correspond to discontinuities in the development of the social brain.National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Award 1122374)National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Award 095518)National Institutes of Health (U.S.) (Award R01-MH096914-05

Interacting with Fictions:The Role of Pretend Play in Theory of Mind Acquisition

Pretend play is generally considered to be a developmental landmark in Theory of Mind acquisition. The aim of the present paper is to offer a new account of the role of pretend play in Theory of Mind development. To this end I combine Hutto and Gallagher’s account of social cognition development with Matravers’ recent argument that the cognitive processes involved in engagement with narratives are neutral regarding fictionality. The key contribution of my account is an analysis of pretend play as interaction with fictions. I argue that my account offers a better explanation of existing empirical data on the development of children’s pretend play and Theory of Mind than the competing theories from Leslie, Perner and Harris

The parent?infant dyad and the construction of the subjective self

Developmental psychology and psychopathology has in the past been more concerned with the quality of self-representation than with the development of the subjective agency which underpins our experience of feeling, thought and action, a key function of mentalisation. This review begins by contrasting a Cartesian view of pre-wired introspective subjectivity with a constructionist model based on the assumption of an innate contingency detector which orients the infant towards aspects of the social world that react congruently and in a specifically cued informative manner that expresses and facilitates the assimilation of cultural knowledge. Research on the neural mechanisms associated with mentalisation and social influences on its development are reviewed. It is suggested that the infant focuses on the attachment figure as a source of reliable information about the world. The construction of the sense of a subjective self is then an aspect of acquiring knowledge about the world through the caregiver's pedagogical communicative displays which in this context focuses on the child's thoughts and feelings. We argue that a number of possible mechanisms, including complementary activation of attachment and mentalisation, the disruptive effect of maltreatment on parent-child communication, the biobehavioural overlap of cues for learning and cues for attachment, may have a role in ensuring that the quality of relationship with the caregiver influences the development of the child's experience of thoughts and feelings