17 research outputs found
Appropriate Belief Without Evidence
ABSTRACT
In this paper I defend a version of Wittgensteininan contextualism. This is a view about justification on which some beliefs are epistemically appropriate because evidence cannot be adduced in their favour. I trace the history of the view from Wittgenstein and Ortega to the present day, defend one version from the charge of relativism, and suggest some applications of the view both within and without philosophy
Undercutting UnderdeterminationâBased Scepticism
According to Duncan Pritchard, there are two kinds of radical sceptical problem; the closure-based problem, and the underdetermination-based problem. He argues that distinguishing these two problems leads to a set of desiderata for an anti-sceptical response, and that the way to meet all of these desiderata is by supplementing a form of Wittgensteinian contextualism with disjunctivist views about factivity. I agree that an adequate response should meet most of the initial desiderata Pritchard puts forward, and that some version of Wittgensteinian contextualism shows the most promise as a starting point for this, but I argue, contra Pritchard, that the addition of disjunctivism is unnecessary and potentially counter-productive. If we draw on lessons from Michael Williams's inferential contextualism then it is both possible, and preferable, to meet the most important of Pritchard's desiderata, undercutting both closure-based and underdetermination-based sceptical problems in a unified way, without the need to resort to disjunctivis
Feminist Epistemology as Mainstream
Mainstream epistemologists donât tend to discuss feminist epistemologies. They often donât mention them in introductory courses or textbooks, and they almost invariably donât take themselves to work on them. This is probably due to a suspicion that âfeministâ epistemologies are clouded by political motivations. In this paper I will argue two things. First, that this suspicion is misguided â a number of âmainstreamâ epistemologists (specifically, hinge epistemologists), are in fact doing work which is entirely compatible with feminist epistemologies, and the âextra ingredientâ required to turn a hinge epistemology into a feminist epistemology neednât involve political motivations. And second, that bringing feminist epistemologies into the mainstream can benefit hinge epistemologies â by adding the extra ingredient which turns a hinge epistemology into a feminist epistemology, hinge epistemologists increase the motivations they can appeal to in support of their responses to scepticism
Social media regulation: why we must ensure it is democratic and inclusive
First paragraph: News that the worldâs richest man, Elon Musk, is buying Twitter has sent the world into a spin, dividing those who advocate for unfettered free speech â like Musk â and those who believe that some platforms wield too much power and influence. But the ultimate outcome for Twitter may depend heavily on social media regulation
Rethinking the Post-Truth Polarisation Narrative: Social Roles and Hinge Commitments in the Plural Public Sphere
This article critically evaluates what we call the âpopular narrativeâ about the state of the public sphere. We identify three elements of this popular narrative (the post-truth element, the polarisation element and the new technology element), and draw on philosophical work on hinge epistemology and social roles to challenge each one. We propose, instead, that public debate has always depended on non-evidential commitments, that it has always been home to significant, deep division, and that social media, rather than causing these phenomena, has just made them more visible. Finally, we recommend some changes to traditional and social media which we believe would help foster a healthier, more inclusive, public sphere
Social media regulation: why we must ensure it is democratic and inclusive
First paragraph: News that the worldâs richest man, Elon Musk, is buying Twitter has sent the world into a spin, dividing those who advocate for unfettered free speech â like Musk â and those who believe that some platforms wield too much power and influence. But the ultimate outcome for Twitter may depend heavily on social media regulation.https://theconversation.com/social-media-regulation-why-we-must-ensure-it-is-democratic-and-inclusive-17981
Receptive Publics
It is widely accepted that public discourse as we know it is less than ideal from an epistemological point of view. In this paper, we develop an underappreciated aspect of the trouble with public discourse: what we call the Listening Problem. The listening problem is the problem that public discourse has in giving appropriate uptake and reception to ideas and concepts from oppressed groups. Drawing on the work of JĂŒrgen Habermas and Nancy Fraser, we develop an institutional response to the listening problem: the establishment of what we call Receptive Publics, discursive spaces designed to improve listening skills and to give space for counterhegemonic ideas