35 research outputs found
Autonomous Statistical Explanations and Natural Selection
Shapiro and Sober ([2007]) claim that Walsh, Ariew, Lewens, and Matthen (henceforth WALM) give a mistaken, a priori defense of natural selection and drift as epiphenomenal. Contrary to Shapiro and Soberâs claims, we first argue that WALMâs explanatory doctrine does not require a defense of epiphenomenalism. We then defend WALMâs explanatory doctrine by arguing that the explanations provided by the modern genetical theory of natural selection are âautonomous-statistical explanationsâ analogous to Galtonâs explanation of reversion to mediocrity and an explanation of the diffusion ofgases. We then argue that whereas Soberâs theory of forces is an adequate description of Darwinâs theory, WALMâs explanatory doctrine is required to understand how themodern genetical theory of natural selection explains large-scale statistical regularities
Autonomous Statistical Explanations and Natural Selection
Shapiro and Sober ([2007]) claim that Walsh, Ariew, Lewens, and Matthen (henceforth WALM) give a mistaken, a priori defense of natural selection and drift as epiphenomenal. Contrary to Shapiro and Soberâs claims, we first argue that WALMâs explanatory doctrine does not require a defense of epiphenomenalism. We then defend WALMâs explanatory doctrine by arguing that the explanations provided by the modern genetical theory of natural selection are âautonomous-statistical explanationsâ analogous to Galtonâs explanation of reversion to mediocrity and an explanation of the diffusion ofgases. We then argue that whereas Soberâs theory of forces is an adequate description of Darwinâs theory, WALMâs explanatory doctrine is required to understand how themodern genetical theory of natural selection explains large-scale statistical regularities
The Trials of Life: Natural Selection and Random Drift
We distinguish dynamical and statistical interpretations of evolutionary theory. We argue that only the statistical interpretation preserves the presumed relation between natural selection and drift. On these grounds we claim that the dynamical conception of evolutionary theory as a theory of forces is mistaken. Selection and drift are not forces. Nor do selection and drift explanations appeal to the (subâpopulationâlevel) causes of population level change. Instead they explain by appeal to the statistical structure of populations. We briefly discuss the implications of the statistical interpretation of selection for various debates within the philosophy of biologyâthe âexplananda of selectionâ debate and the âunits of selectionâ debate
Four Pillars of Statisticalism
Over the past fifteen years there has been a considerable amount of debate concerning what theoretical population dynamic models tell us about the nature of natural selection and drift. On the causal interpretation, these models describe the causes of population change. On the statistical interpretation, the models of population dynamics models specify statistical parameters that explain, predict, and quantify changes in population structure, without identifying the causes of those changes. Selection and drift are part of a statistical description of population change; they are not discrete, apportionable causes. Our objective here is to provide a definitive statement of the statistical position, so as to allay some confusions in the current literature. We outline four commitments that are central to statisticalism. They are: 1. Natural Selection is a higher order eïŹect; 2. Trait fitness is primitive; 3. Modern Synthesis (MS)-models are substrate neutral; 4. MS-selection and drift are model-relative
The Varieties of Darwinism: Explanation, Logic, and Worldview
Ever since its inception, the theory of evolution has been reified into an â-ismâ: Darwinism. While biologists today tend to shy away from the term in their research, the term is still actively used in the broader academic and societal contexts. What exactly is Darwinism, and how precisely are its various uses and abuses related to the scientific theory of evolution? Some call for limiting the meaning of the term âDarwinismâ to its scientific context; others call for its abolition; yet others claim the term refers to a myth-like story. In this paper we propose a conceptually grounded overview of the term. We show how the scientific dimension of Darwinism feeds into, and is influenced by, guises of Darwinism as a methodology and as an ethically and politically charged âworldviewâ. The full meaning of Darwinism, as well as how this meaning has changed over time, can only be understood through the complex interaction between these three dimensions
The Varieties of Darwinism: Explanation, Logic, and Worldview
Ever since its inception, the theory of evolution has been reified into an â-ismâ: Darwinism. While biologists today tend to shy away from the term in their research, the term is still actively used in the broader academic and societal contexts. What exactly is Darwinism, and how precisely are its various uses and abuses related to the scientific theory of evolution? Some call for limiting the meaning of the term âDarwinismâ to its scientific context; others call for its abolition; yet others claim the term refers to a myth-like story. In this paper we propose a conceptually grounded overview of the term. We show how the scientific dimension of Darwinism feeds into, and is influenced by, guises of Darwinism as a methodology and as an ethically and politically charged âworldviewâ. The full meaning of Darwinism, as well as how this meaning has changed over time, can only be understood through the complex interaction between these three dimensions