2,165 research outputs found
Two reasons why epistemic reasons are not object-given reasons
In this paper I discuss two claims; the ďŹrst is the claim that state-given reasons for belief are of a radically different kind to object-given reasons for belief. The second is that, where this last claim is true, epistemic reasons are object-given reasons for belief (EOG). I argue that EOG has two implausible consequences: (i) that suspension of judgement can never be epistemically justiďŹed, and (ii) that the reason that epistemically justiďŹes a belief that p can never be the reason for which one believes that p
Epistemic justification, rights, and permissibility
Can we understand epistemic justification in terms of epistemic rights? In this paper, we consider two arguments for the claim that we cannot and in doing so, we provide two arguments for the claim that we can. First, if, as many think, William James is right that the epistemic aim is to believe all true propositions and not to believe any false propositions, then there are likely to be situations in which believing (or disbelieving) a proposition serves one of these goals, whereas suspending judgement serves the other, equally important goal. Second, it is in principle always possible to have different epistemic standards for evaluating the evidence for the proposition in question, so that one can have a right to believe (or disbelieve) that proposition and a right to suspend judgement on it. Whereas the first consideration counts in favour of the idea that believing justifiedly is at least sometimes a matter of having an epistemic right, the latter consideration favours the view that believing justifiedly is always a matter of having an epistemic right
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What is extremist belief? An answer from medieval Islamic philosophy
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Advice for infallibilists: DIVORCE & RETREAT!
This paper comprises a defence of Infallibilism about knowledge. In it, I articulate two arguments in favour of Infallibilism, and for each argument show that Infallibilism about knowledge does not lead to an unpalatable Scepticism if justified belief is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge, and if Fallibilism about justified belief is true
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Trust in the guise of belief
What kind of mental state is trust? It seems to have features that can lead one to think that it is a doxastic state (cf. Adler 1994, Baier 1986, Hieronymi 2008, Keren 2014, McMyler 2011) but also features that can lead one to think that it is a non-doxastic state (cf. Baker 1987, Faulkner 2011, Jones 1996, McLeod 2011). This has even lead some philosophers to think that trust is a unique mental state that has both mind-to-world and world-to-mind direction of fit (Holton 1996), or to give up on the idea that there is a univocal analysis of trust to be had (Hardin 2004, Simpson 2012). Here, I propose that âtrustâ is the name we give to mental states that we would think of as beliefs if belief was to be thought of in âpragmatistâ terms (that is, as a state posited primarily to explain agentsâ actions) and belief resists âpragmatistâ treatment. Only such an account, I argue, can univocally account for all the diverse features of trust. As such, I also propose that the explanation of trust provides us with a case for understanding the limitations of a comprehensively âpragmatistâ, or âNeo-Wittgensteinianâ conception of the mental
Belief is contingently involuntary
The debate between âNormativistsâ and âTeleologistsâ about the normativity of belief has been taken to hinge on the question of which of the two views best explains why it is that we cannot (non-contingently) believe at will. Of course, this presupposes that there is an explanation to be had. Here, I argue that this supposition is unwarranted, that Doxastic Involuntarism is merely contingently true. I argue that this is made apparent when we consider that suspended judgement must be involuntary if belief is, that suspended judgment is not a belief (or set of beliefs), and that the aim or norm of suspended judgement cannot be constitutive if suspended judgement is not a belief (or set of beliefs)
Age validation, growth, mortality, and demographic modeling of spotted gully shark (Triakis megalopterus) from the southeast coast of South Africa
This study documents validation of vertebral band-pair formation in spotted gully shark (Triakis megalopterus) with the use of fluorochrome injection and tagging of captive and wild sharks over a 21-year period. Growth and mortality rates of T. megalopterus were also estimated
and a demographic analysis of the species was conducted. Of the 23 OTC (oxytetracycline) -marked vertebrae examined (12 from captive and 11 from wild sharks), seven vertebrae
(three from captive and four from wild sharks) exhibited chelation of the OTC and fluoresced under ultraviolet
light. It was concluded that a single opaque and translucent band pair was deposited annually up to at
least 25 years of age, the maximum age recorded. Reader precision was assessed by using an index of average
percent error calculated at 5%. No significant differences were found between male and female growth patterns (P>0.05), and von Bertalanffy growth model parameters for combined sexes were estimated to be Lâ=1711.07 mm TL, k=0.11/yr and t0=â2.43 yr (n=86). Natural mortality was estimated at 0.17/yr. Age at maturity was estimated at 11 years for males and 15 years for females. Results of the demographic analysis showed that the population, in the
absence of fishing mortality, was stable and not significantly different from zero and particularly sensitive
to overfishing. At the current age at first capture and natural mortality rate, the fishing mortality rate required to result in negative population growth was low at F>0.004/
yr. Elasticity analysis revealed that juvenile survival was the principal factor in explaining variability in
population growth rate
Epistemic justification as a normative concept
There is a way of talking about epistemic justification that involves the notion of our being subject to epistemic obligations the failure to comply with makes us blameworthy, called the deontological conception. In this thesis, I defend the deontological conception against criticisms first levied by William Alston that it (a) implies doxastic voluntarism which is false and thereby violates the principle that ought implies can, and (b) is in tension with what is distinctive about the epistemic domain, namely its connection with the goal of believing truths and avoiding falsehoods. I argue that the extent to which (a) is problematic depends on the extent to which (b) is problematic. Further, that (b) IS not problematic to the deontological conception if we view it not as a way to cash out epistemic justification, but as a way to understand normativity in general. I do this by making a distinction between merely evaluative and deontological levels of appraisal and that it is only in the latter that the notion of an obligation functions. I argue that it is nonsensical to use sortal terms at the level of obligations, (where obligations carry the notion of blameworthiness), i.e. that there cannot be obligations from an epistemic point of view anymore than there can be obligations from an ethical point of view. However, sortal terms can be used to distinguish between differing types of reasons (which, on their own, operate at the merely evaluative level)" but because obligations only emerge out of a network of differing sorts of reasons, it does not make any sense to talk about different sorts of obligation. I strengthen that last claim up by arguing, against the evidentialist, that there are such things as non-epistemic reasons for belie
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Some objections to Peels' combinatorial analysis of belief
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