34,376 research outputs found

    Causation, Probability, and the Continuity Bind

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    Analyses of singular (token-level) causation often make use of the idea that a cause increases the probability of its effect. Of particular salience in such accounts are the values of the probability function of the effect, conditional on the presence and absence of the putative cause, analysed around the times of the events in question: causes are characterized by the effect’s probability function being greater when conditionalized upon them. Put this way, it becomes clearer that the ‘behaviour’ (continuity) of probability functions in small intervals about the times in question ought to be of concern. In this article, I make an extended case that causal theorists employing the ‘probability raising’ idea should pay attention to the continuity question. Specifically, if the probability functions are ‘jumping about’ in ways typical of discontinuous functions, then the stability of the relevant probability increase is called into question. The rub, however, is that sweeping requirements for either continuity or discontinuity are problematic and, as I argue, this constitutes a ‘continuity bind’. Hence more subtle considerations and constraints are needed, two of which I consider: (1) utilizing discontinuous first derivatives of continuous probability functions, and (2) abandoning point probability for imprecise (interval) probability

    Imprecise Probability and Chance

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    Understanding probabilities as something other than point values (e.g., as intervals) has often been motivated by the need to find more realistic models for degree of belief, and in particular the idea that degree of belief should have an objective basis in “statistical knowledge of the world.” I offer here another motivation growing out of efforts to understand how chance evolves as a function of time. If the world is “chancy” in that there are non-trivial, objective, physical probabilities at the macro-level, then the chance of an event e that happens at a given time is e goes to one continuously or not is left open. Discontinuities in such chance trajectories can have surprising and troubling consequences for probabilistic analyses of causation and accounts of how events occur in time. This, coupled with the compelling evidence for quantum discontinuities in chance’s evolution, gives rise to a “(dis)continuity bind” with respect to chance probability trajectories. I argue that a viable option for circumventing the (dis)continuity bind is to understand the probabilities “imprecisely,” that is, as intervals rather than point values. I then develop and motivate an alternative kind of continuity appropriate for interval-valued chance probability trajectories

    There is Nothing It is Like to See Red: Holism and Subjective Experience

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    The Nagel inspired “something-it-is-like” (SIL) conception of conscious experience remains a dominant approach in philosophy. In this paper I criticize a prevalent philosophical construal of SIL consciousness, one that understands SIL as a property of mental states rather than entities as a whole. I argue against thinking of SIL as a property of states, showing how such a view is in fact prevalent, under-warranted, and philosophically pernicious in that it often leads to an implausible reduction of conscious experience to qualia. I then develop a holistic conception of SIL for entities (not states) and argue that it has at least equal pre-empirical warrant, is more conservative philosophically in that it decides less from the a priori “armchair,” and enjoys a fruitful two-way relationship with empirical work

    Blurring Two Conceptions of Subjective Experience: Folk versus Philosophical Phenomenality

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    Philosophers and psychologists have experimentally explored various aspects of people\u27s understandings of subjective experience based on their responses to questions about whether robots “see red” or “feel frustrated,” but the intelligibility of such questions may well presuppose that people understand robots as experiencers in the first place. Departing from the standard approach, I develop an experimental framework that distinguishes between “phenomenal consciousness” as it is applied to a subject (an experiencer) and to an (experiential) mental state and experimentally test folk understandings of both subjective experience and experiencers. My findings (1) reveal limitations in experimental approaches using “artificial experiencers” like robots, (2) indicate that the standard philosophical conception of subjective experience in terms of qualia is distinct from that of the folk, and (3) show that folk intuitions do support a conception of qualia that departs from the philosophical conception in that it is physical rather than metaphysical. These findings have implications for the “hard problem” of consciousness

    Consciousness as Integrated Information: A Provisional Philosophical Critique

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    Giulio Tononi (2008) has offered his integrated information theory of consciousness (IITC) as a ‘provisional manifesto’. I critically examine how the approach fares. I point out some (relatively) internal concerns with the theory and then more broadly philosophical ones; finally I assess the prospects for IITC as a fundamental theory of consciousness. I argue that the IITC’s scientific promise does carry over to a significant extent to broader philosophical theorizing about qualia and consciousness, though not as directly as Tononi suggests, since the account is much more focused on the qualitative character of experience rather than on consciousness itself. I propose understanding it as ‘integrated information theory of qualia’(IITQ), rather than of consciousness

    Ocean time-series near Bermuda: Hydrostation S and the US JGOFS Bermuda Atlantic time-series study

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    Bermuda is the site of two ocean time-series programs. At Hydrostation S, the ongoing biweekly profiles of temperature, salinity and oxygen now span 37 years. This is one of the longest open-ocean time-series data sets and provides a view of decadal scale variability in ocean processes. In 1988, the U.S. JGOFS Bermuda Atlantic Time-series Study began a wide range of measurements at a frequency of 14-18 cruises each year to understand temporal variability in ocean biogeochemistry. On each cruise, the data range from chemical analyses of discrete water samples to data from electronic packages of hydrographic and optics sensors. In addition, a range of biological and geochemical rate measurements are conducted that integrate over time-periods of minutes to days. This sampling strategy yields a reasonable resolution of the major seasonal patterns and of decadal scale variability. The Sargasso Sea also has a variety of episodic production events on scales of days to weeks and these are only poorly resolved. In addition, there is a substantial amount of mesoscale variability in this region and some of the perceived temporal patterns are caused by the intersection of the biweekly sampling with the natural spatial variability. In the Bermuda time-series programs, we have added a series of additional cruises to begin to assess these other sources of variation and their impacts on the interpretation of the main time-series record. However, the adequate resolution of higher frequency temporal patterns will probably require the introduction of new sampling strategies and some emerging technologies such as biogeochemical moorings and autonomous underwater vehicles

    Universities Scale Like Cities

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    Recent studies of urban scaling show that important socioeconomic city characteristics such as wealth and innovation capacity exhibit a nonlinear, particularly a power law scaling with population size. These nonlinear effects are common to all cities, with similar power law exponents. These findings mean that the larger the city, the more disproportionally they are places of wealth and innovation. Local properties of cities cause a deviation from the expected behavior as predicted by the power law scaling. In this paper we demonstrate that universities show a similar behavior as cities in the distribution of the gross university income in terms of total number of citations over size in terms of total number of publications. Moreover, the power law exponents for university scaling are comparable to those for urban scaling. We find that deviations from the expected behavior can indeed be explained by specific local properties of universities, particularly the field-specific composition of a university, and its quality in terms of field-normalized citation impact. By studying both the set of the 500 largest universities worldwide and a specific subset of these 500 universities -- the top-100 European universities -- we are also able to distinguish between properties of universities with as well as without selection of one specific local property, the quality of a university in terms of its average field-normalized citation impact. It also reveals an interesting observation concerning the working of a crucial property in networked systems, preferential attachment.Comment: 16 pages, 17 figure
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