Resource curse or not: A question of appropriability

This paper shows that whether natural resources are good or bad for a country’s development crucially depends on the interaction between institutional setting and the type of resources possessed by the country. Some natural resources are, for economical and technical reasons, more likely to cause problems such as rent-seeking and conflicts than others. This potential problem can, however, be countered by good institutional quality. In contrast to the traditional resource curse hypothesis, we show the impact of natural resources on economic growth to be non-monotonic in institutional quality. Countries rich in minerals are cursed only if they have low quality institutions, while the curse is reversed if institutions are sufficiently good.Natural Resources, Appropriability, Property Rights, Institutions, Economic Growth, Development

Resource curse or not: A question of appropriability

This paper shows that whether natural resources are good or bad for a country's development depends crucially on the interaction between institutional setting and the type of resources that the country possesses. Some natural resources are for economical and technical reasons more likely to cause problems such as rent-seeking and conflicts than others (termed technically appropriable resources). This potential problem can, however, be countered by good institutional quality (rendering these resources less institutionally appropriable). In contrast to the traditional resource curse hypothesis we show that the impact of natural resources on economic growth is non-monotonic in institutional quality. Mineral rich countries are cursed only if they have low quality institutions, while the curse is reversed if institutions are good enough. Using new data we find that this is even more stark for countries rich in diamonds and precious metals

Dictator Games: A Meta Study

Over the last 25 years, more than a hundred dictator game experiments have been published. This meta study summarizes the evidence. Exploiting the fact that most experiments had to fix parameters they did not intend to test, the meta study explores a rich set of control variables for multivariate analysis. It shows that Tobit models (assuming that dictators would even want to take money) and hurdle models (assuming that the decision to give a positive amount is separate from the choice of amount, conditional on giving) outperform mere meta-regression and OLS

Learning to Lose a Leg: Casualties of PhD Economics Training in Stockholm

The Swedish Economist Assar Lindbeck has recently expressed concern that PhD programs are not educating enough “two-legged†economists. We surveyed all PhD students enrolled at Stockholm University and the Stockholm School of Economics—strong European graduate programs that have adopted the US-style curriculum. The survey response rate was 73 percent, so we place great confidence in the admittedly limited information that the survey does provide: Students enter with a relatively broad academic background, an interest in the social sciences, and a desire to serve the community. They do not enter graduate school with a primary interest in statistics or mathematical work. They find that incentives within the program do not encourage participation in the policy debate. To the extent that new PhDs are “one-legged†economists, it is not because they entered graduate school that way. Our results are remarkably similar to the results of the 1985 survey conducted by David Colander and Arjo Klamer. We consider the possibility that in each case the process that generates expectations of those entering had not caught up to the changes, resulting in palpable dissatisfaction among the currently enrolled students.Economics education,Ph.D. programs in Economics