Virtue, Skill and Vice

It is widely accepted among philosophers and developmental psychologists that the acquisition of a virtue of an Aristotelian type can be illuminated by the acquisition of a practical skill. This model does not seem to fit the acquisition of a vice. The paper examines the issues involved and ways in which the skill model does and does not fit the acquisition of vice

Aristotle on Virtue and Happiness

Twice in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle strongly rejects the idea that virtue is sufficient for happiness. At 1,5, 1095b32-1096a2 he says, it seems to be possible to be asleep while possessing virtue, or to be inactive all one\u27s life, and also to suffer evils and the greatest misfortunes; and someone with a life like that no-one would call happy, unless they were defending a thesis at all costs. And at VII 13, 1153b14-25 Aristotle says that everyone thinks the happy life must be pleasant, since happiness cannot be hampered or impeded. Hence the happy person needs the goods of the body and the external goods and fortune, so as not to be hampered in these ways. Those who assert that the person broken on the wheel and falling into great misfortunes is happy, provided that he is virtuous are, willingly or unwillingly, talking nonsense

Virtue and Heroism

This is the text of the Lindley Lecture for 2015 given by Julia Annas, an American philosopher

Epicurus on Pleasure and Happiness

I concentrate on Epicurus\u27 attempt to show that pleasure is complete, not just one aim we have for its own sake but ultimately the only non-instrumental aim we have. Epicurus tells us that we will be happy, have the best overall life, by having pleasure as our final aim, and that we shall achieve this by living according to the virtues, by becoming a certain kind of person

Intelligent virtue

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.189 pp

Does virtue ethics allow us to make better judgments of the actions of others?

Virtue ethics encourages us to judge the actions of others, not merely as right or wrong, but as virtuous (kind, courageous, just, compassionate, etc.) or vicious (cruel, cowardly, unjust, selfish, etc.). In doing so, however, we risk acting viciously ourselves. That is, our judgments of others can be unfair, unkind, insensitive, uncharitable, or hypocritical, even while being accurate. I argue that in order to make good judgments of the actions of others we should turn to virtue ethics for action guidance. That is, our primary aim should not be to make accurate judgments but to act virtuously when judging others