1,369 research outputs found
The cybernetic Bayesian brain: from interoceptive inference to sensorimotor contingencies
Is there a single principle by which neural operations can account for perception, cognition, action, and even consciousness? A strong candidate is now taking shape in the form of “predictive processing”. On this theory, brains engage in predictive inference on the causes of sensory inputs by continuous minimization of prediction errors or informational “free energy”. Predictive processing can account, supposedly, not only for perception, but also for action and for the essential contribution of the body and environment in structuring sensorimotor interactions. In this paper I draw together some recent developments within predictive processing that involve predictive modelling of internal physiological states (interoceptive inference), and integration with “enactive” and “embodied” approaches to cognitive science (predictive perception of sensorimotor contingencies). The upshot is a development of predictive processing that originates, not in Helmholtzian perception-as-inference, but rather in 20th-century cybernetic principles that emphasized homeostasis and predictive control. This way of thinking leads to (i) a new view of emotion as active interoceptive inference; (ii) a common predictive framework linking experiences of body ownership, emotion, and exteroceptive perception; (iii) distinct interpretations of active inference as involving disruptive and disambiguatory—not just confirmatory—actions to test perceptual hypotheses; (iv) a neurocognitive operationalization of the “mastery of sensorimotor contingencies” (where sensorimotor contingencies reflect the rules governing sensory changes produced by various actions); and (v) an account of the sense of subjective reality of perceptual contents (“perceptual presence”) in terms of the extent to which predictive models encode potential sensorimotor relations (this being “counterfactual richness”). This is rich and varied territory, and surveying its landmarks emphasizes the need for experimental tests of its key contributions
M94 As A Unique Testbed for Black Hole Mass Estimates and AGN Activity At Low Luminosities
We discuss the peculiar nature of the nucleus of M94 (NGC 4736) in the
context of new measurements of the broad H_alpha emission from HST-STIS
observations. We show that this component is unambiguously associated with the
high-resolution X-ray, radio, and variable UV sources detected at the optical
nucleus of this galaxy. These multi-wavelength observations suggest that NGC
4736 is one of the least luminous broad-line (type 1) LINERs, with Lbol = 2.5
\times 10^40 erg/s. This LINER galaxy has also possibly the least luminous
broad line region known (LH_alpha =2.2\times10^37 erg/s). We compare black hole
mass estimates of this system to the recently measured ~7 \times 10^6 M_sun
dynamical black hole mass measurement. The fundamental plane and M-sigma
relationship roughly agree with the measured black hole mass, while other
accretion based estimates (the M-FWHM(H_alpha) relation, empirical correlation
of BH mass with high-ionization mid IR emission lines, and the X-ray excess
variance) provide much lower estimates (~10^5 M_sun). An energy budget test
shows that the AGN in this system may be deficient in ionizing radiation
relative to the observed emission-line activity. This deficiency may result
from source variability or the superposition of multiple sources including
supernovae.Comment: 11 pages, 4 figures, accepted for publication in Advances in
Astronom
Modes and models in disorders of consciousness science
The clinical assessment of non-communicative brain damaged patients is extremely difficult and there is a need for paraclinical diagnostic markers of the level of consciousness. In the last few years, progress within neuroimaging has led to a growing body of studies investigating vegetative state and minimally conscious state patients, which can be classified in two main approaches. Active neuroimaging paradigms search for a response to command without requiring a motor response. Passive neuroimaging paradigms investigate spontaneous brain activity and brain responses to external stimuli and aim at identifying neural correlates of consciousness. Other passive paradigms eschew neuroimaging in favour of behavioural markers which reliably distinguish conscious and unconscious conditions in healthy controls. In order to furnish accurate diagnostic criteria, a mechanistic explanation of how the brain gives rise to consciousness seems desirable. Mechanistic and theoretical approaches could also ultimately lead to a unification of passive and active paradigms in a coherent diagnostic approach. In this paper, we survey current passive and active paradigms available for diagnosis of residual consciousness in vegetative state and minimally conscious patients. We then review the current main theories of consciousness and see how they can apply in this context. Finally, we discuss some avenues for future research in this domai
An interoceptive predictive coding model of conscious presence
We describe a theoretical model of the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying conscious presence and its disturbances. The model is based on interoceptive prediction error and is informed by predictive models of agency, general models of hierarchical predictive coding and dopaminergic signaling in cortex, the role of the anterior insular cortex (AIC) in interoception and emotion, and cognitive neuroscience evidence from studies of virtual reality and of psychiatric disorders of presence, specifically depersonalization/derealization disorder. The model associates presence with successful suppression by top-down predictions of informative interoceptive signals evoked by autonomic control signals and, indirectly, by visceral responses to afferent sensory signals. The model connects presence to agency by allowing that predicted interoceptive signals will depend on whether afferent sensory signals are determined, by a parallel predictive-coding mechanism, to be self-generated or externally caused. Anatomically, we identify the AIC as the likely locus of key neural comparator mechanisms. Our model integrates a broad range of previously disparate evidence, makes predictions for conjoint manipulations of agency and presence, offers a new view of emotion as interoceptive inference, and represents a step toward a mechanistic account of a fundamental phenomenological property of consciousness
Consciousness: the last 50 years(and the next)
The mind and brain sciences began with consciousness as a central concern. But for much of the 20th century, ideological and methodological concerns relegated its empirical study to the margins. Since the 1990s, studying consciousness has regained a legitimacy and momentum befitting its status as the primary feature of our mental lives. Nowadays, consciousness science encompasses a rich interdisciplinary mixture drawing together philosophical, theoretical, computational, experimental, and clinical perspectives, with neuroscience its central discipline. Researchers have learned a great deal about the neural mechanisms underlying global states of consciousness, distinctions between conscious and unconscious perception, and self-consciousness. Further progress will depend on specifying closer explanatory mappings between (first-person subjective) phenomenological descriptions and (third-person objective) descriptions of (embodied and embedded) neuronal mechanisms. Such progress will help reframe our understanding of our place in nature and accelerate clinical approaches to a wide range of psychiatric and neurological disorders
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Least Squares Ranking on Graphs
Given a set of alternatives to be ranked, and some pairwise comparison data,
ranking is a least squares computation on a graph. The vertices are the
alternatives, and the edge values comprise the comparison data. The basic idea
is very simple and old: come up with values on vertices such that their
differences match the given edge data. Since an exact match will usually be
impossible, one settles for matching in a least squares sense. This formulation
was first described by Leake in 1976 for rankingfootball teams and appears as
an example in Professor Gilbert Strang's classic linear algebra textbook. If
one is willing to look into the residual a little further, then the problem
really comes alive, as shown effectively by the remarkable recent paper of
Jiang et al. With or without this twist, the humble least squares problem on
graphs has far-reaching connections with many current areas ofresearch. These
connections are to theoretical computer science (spectral graph theory, and
multilevel methods for graph Laplacian systems); numerical analysis (algebraic
multigrid, and finite element exterior calculus); other mathematics (Hodge
decomposition, and random clique complexes); and applications (arbitrage, and
ranking of sports teams). Not all of these connections are explored in this
paper, but many are. The underlying ideas are easy to explain, requiring only
the four fundamental subspaces from elementary linear algebra. One of our aims
is to explain these basic ideas and connections, to get researchers in many
fields interested in this topic. Another aim is to use our numerical
experiments for guidance on selecting methods and exposing the need for further
development.Comment: Added missing references, comparison of linear solvers overhauled,
conclusion section added, some new figures adde
Learning action-oriented models through active inference
Converging theories suggest that organisms learn and exploit probabilistic models of their environment. However, it remains unclear how such models can be learned in practice. The open-ended complexity of natural environments means that it is generally infeasible for organisms to model their environment comprehensively. Alternatively, action-oriented models attempt to encode a parsimonious representation of adaptive agent-environment interactions. One approach to learning action-oriented models is to learn online in the presence of goal-directed behaviours. This constrains an agent to behaviourally relevant trajectories, reducing the diversity of the data a model need account for. Unfortunately, this approach can cause models to prematurely converge to sub-optimal solutions, through a process we refer to as a bad-bootstrap. Here, we exploit the normative framework of active inference to show that efficient action-oriented models can be learned by balancing goal-oriented and epistemic (information-seeking) behaviours in a principled manner. We illustrate our approach using a simple agent-based model of bacterial chemotaxis. We first demonstrate that learning via goal-directed behaviour indeed constrains models to behaviorally relevant aspects of the environment, but that this approach is prone to sub-optimal convergence. We then demonstrate that epistemic behaviours facilitate the construction of accurate and comprehensive models, but that these models are not tailored to any specific behavioural niche and are therefore less efficient in their use of data. Finally, we show that active inference agents learn models that are parsimonious, tailored to action, and which avoid bad bootstraps and sub-optimal convergence. Critically, our results indicate that models learned through active inference can support adaptive behaviour in spite of, and indeed because of, their departure from veridical representations of the environment. Our approach provides a principled method for learning adaptive models from limited interactions with an environment, highlighting a route to sample efficient learning algorithms
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