The Role of the Royal Navy in South America,1920–1970, by Jon Wise

Although arguably not a very enticing title for American naval professionals, this small, hardback book is nonetheless well worth their time. The author’s aim is to illustrate the contribution that the maritime service can make to a nation’s foreign policy in peacetime, and in particular to the health of its shipbuild- ing and defense exports

Battle of Dogger Bank: The First Dreadnought Engagement,by Tobias R. Philbin

This title is the latest work from Ameri- can naval historian Tobias Philbin, who is probably best known for his 1982 biography of Admiral von Hipper. In the author’s words, the book is “designed to provide new insights into the first battle between the largest fighting machines of the early twentieth century.

In All Respects Ready: Australia’s Navy in World War One, by David Stevens

Writing a definitive history of any major conflict from a single nation’s perspec- tive can be an exacting task—and, in the case of the First World War at sea, a thankless one too, when compared with the far better known and better reported situation on land. This notwithstanding, it is hard to imagine a more timely and well-balanced book. David Stevens, as the Royal Australian Navy’s historian, was perhaps in a perfect position to take on this project, but this should in no way diminish what he has achieved

Deterrence through Strength: British Naval Power and Foreign Policyunder Pax Britannica

Historians have long argued about the true mechanism behind a ninety-year period of relative peace in Europe, a period that began with the end of the Napoleonic wars and became known as the Pax Britannica. Over the years critics have questioned both aspects of this term—whether the period was actually as peaceful as its title suggests and whether that peace really was, in large part, due to Great Britain’s overwhelming and imposing com- mercial, industrial, financial, and naval might

Four Lessons That the U.S. Navy Must Learn from the Dreadnought Revolution

Early in the twentieth century the Royal Navy, the world’s dominant naval force, stood at the cusp of fundamental technological and strategic shifts—and failed, as an institution, to respond effectively to them. Why? What can the U.S. Navy, in a similar position today, learn from the experience