Bank regulation and systemic risk: cross country evidence

Using data for banks from 65 countries for the period 2001–2013, we investigate the impact of bank regulation and supervision on individual banks’ systemic risk. Our cross-country empirical findings show that bank activity restriction, initial capital stringency and prompt corrective action are all positively related to systemic risk, measured by Marginal Expected Shortfall. We use the staggered timing of the implementation of Basel II regulation across countries as an exogenous event and use latitude for instrumental variable analysis to alleviate the endogeneity concern. Our results also hold for various robustness tests. We further find that the level of equity banks can alleviate such effect, while bank size is likely to enhance the effect, supporting our conjecture that the impact of bank regulation and supervision on systemic risk is through bank’s capital shortfall. Our results do not argue against bank regulation, but rather focus on the design and implementation of regulation

Emerging IT risks: insights from German banking

How do German banks manage the emerging risks stemming from IT innovations such as cyber risk? With a focus on process, roles and responsibilities, field data from ten banks participating in the 2014 ECB stress test were collected by interviewing IT managers, risk managers and external experts. Current procedures for handling emerging risks in German banks were identified from the interviews and analysed, guided by the extant literature. A clear gap was found between enterprise risk management (ERM) as a general approach to risks threatening firms’ objectives and ERM’s neglect of emerging risks, such as those associated with IT innovations. The findings suggest that ERM should be extended towards the collection and sharing of knowledge to allow for an initial understanding and description of emerging risks, as opposed to the traditional ERM approach involving estimates of impact and probability. For example, as cyber risks emerge from an IT innovation, the focus may need to switch towards reducing uncertainty through knowledge acquisition. Since individual managers seldom possess all relevant knowledge of an IT innovation, various stakeholders may need to be involved to exploit their expertise

Corporate governance and bank capitalization strategies

This paper examines the relationship between banks’ capitalization strategies and their corporate governance and executive compensation schemes for an international sample of banks over the 2003–2011 period. Shareholder-friendly corporate governance, in the form of a separation of the CEO and chairman of the board roles, intermediate board size, and an absence of anti-takeover provisions, is associated with lower bank capitalization, consistent with shareholder incentives to shift risk towards the financial safety net. Higher values of executive option and stock wealth invested in the bank are associated with higher capitalization as a potential reflection of executive risk aversion, but the risk-taking incentives embedded in executive compensation packages are associated with lower capitalization

How Does Corporate Governance Affect Bank Capitalization Strategies?

JEF Classification: G21, M21.

Corporate governance of banks and financial stability

We find that shareholder-friendly corporate governance is associated with higher stand-alone and systemic risk in the banking sector. Specifically, shareholder-friendly corporate governance results in higher risk for larger banks and for banks that are located in countries with generous financial safety nets as banks try to shift risk toward taxpayers. We confirm our findings by comparing banks to nonfinancial firms and examining changes in bank risk around an exogenous regulatory change in governance. Our results underline the importance of the financial safety net and too-big-to-fail guarantees in thinking about corporate governance reforms at banks