Limited transmission of emergent H7N9 influenza A virus in a simulated live animal market: Do chickens pose the principal transmission threat?

Emergent H7N9 influenza A virus has caused multiple public health and financial hardships. While some epidemiological studies have recognized infected chickens as an important bridge for human infections, the generality of this observation, the minimum infectious dose, and the shedding potential of chickens have received conflicting results. We experimentally tested the ability of domestic chickens (Gallus gallus domesticus) to transmit H7N9 to co-housed chickens and to several other animal species in an experimental live animal market. Results indicated that an infected chicken failed to initiate viral shedding of H7N9 to naIve co-housed chickens. The infected chicken did, however, successfully transmit the virus to quail (Cotumix sp.) located directly below the infected chicken cage. Oral shedding by indirectly infected quail was, on average, greater than ten-fold that of directly inoculated chickens. Best management practices in live animal market systems should consider the position of quail in stacked-cage settings

Viral shedding of clade 2.3.4.4 H5 highly pathogenic avian influenza A viruses by American robins

American robins (Turdus migratorius) are commonly associated with farmsteads in the United States and have shown previous evidence of exposure to an H5 avian influenza A virus (IAV) near a poultry production facility affected by a highly pathogenic (HP) H5 virus in Iowa, USA during 2015. We experimentally infected American robins with three clade 2.3.4.4 HP H5 viruses (H5N2 and H5N8). A total of 22/24 American robins shed virus, and all three strains were represented. The highest virus titres shed were 104.3, 104.3 and 104.8 PFU/ml, associated respectively with viruses isolated from poultry, a captive gyrfalcon (Falco rusticolus), and a Northern pintail (Anas acuta). Of those birds that shed, viral shedding was initiated 1 or 2 days post‐infection (DPI) and shedding ceased in all birds by 7 DPI. This study adds an additional synanthropic wildlife species to a growing list of animals that can successfully replicate and shed IAVs

Cottontail rabbits shed clade 2.3.4.4 H5 highly pathogenic avian influenza A viruses

During 2014-2015, clade 2.3.4.4 H5Nx highly pathogenic (HP) avian influenza A viruses (IAV) were first detected in North America and subsequently caused one of the largest agricultural emergencies in U.S. history. Recent evidence has suggested that cottontail rabbits can shed multiple IAV subtypes. We experimentally infected cottontail rabbits with three HP H5Nx IAVs. All rabbits tested shed virus on at least one day by at least one route. Cottontail rabbits appear to be an exception to the limited capacity for replication that has been previously reported for certain other mammalian species inoculated with clade 2.3.4.4 HP H5Nx avian influenza A viruses

Viral shedding of clade 2.3.4.4 H5 highly pathogenic avian influenza A viruses by American robins

American robins (Turdus migratorius) are commonly associated with farmsteads in the United States and have shown previous evidence of exposure to an H5 avian influenza A virus (IAV) near a poultry production facility affected by a highly pathogenic (HP) H5 virus in Iowa, USA during 2015. We experimentally infected American robins with three clade 2.3.4.4 HP H5 viruses (H5N2 and H5N8). A total of 22/24 American robins shed virus, and all three strains were represented. The highest virus titres shed were 104.3, 104.3 and 104.8 PFU/ml, associated respectively with viruses isolated from poultry, a captive gyrfalcon (Falco rusticolus), and a Northern pintail (Anas acuta). Of those birds that shed, viral shedding was initiated 1 or 2 days post‐infection (DPI) and shedding ceased in all birds by 7 DPI. This study adds an additional synanthropic wildlife species to a growing list of animals that can successfully replicate and shed IAVs

Computação no Ensino Fundamental na Escola Pública

Relatório final,em forma de artigo.Este artigo mostra a experiencia de se ensinar computação no ensino fundamental, a partir de um projeto de extensao do Departamento de Informatica e Estatística da Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina/UFSC e realizado na´ Escola Basica Municipal Intendente Aricomedes da Silva (EBIAS). Os funda-´ mentos que balizaram os conteudos da formação abordaram algoritmos, lógica´ proposicional ensinada de forma ludica e programação do computador em uma˜ linguagem imperativa e uma linguagem multiparadigma que introduziram conceitos de computação. A EBIAS, em 2010, foi uma das duas escolas da rede˜ municipal que recebeu o Projeto XO, despertando o interesse da comunidade escolar para a temática da inclusão digital. Em 2011, com recursos da DEB-˜ CAPES, o projeto ”Computação no Ensino Fundamental” foi realizado no contexto do Programa Novos Talentos da CAPES, e concluiu que: (1) Começar a ensinar a Ciência da Computacão nos últimos anos do ensino fundamental é possível, antecipando-se ao ensino medio. (2) O Projeto XO não foi uma˜ condição necessária para os bons alunos da escola, mas para ser melhor, o projeto proposto pode ser baseado em algum projeto educativo piloto, como o Projeto XO ocorreu na escola para as series anteriores. (3) As dificuldades dos alunos em se acostumar a pensar com o computador foi a mesma encontrada nos alunos iniciantes na universidade. (4) Trabalhar o raciocínio lógico´ no ensino fundamental, no tempo do projeto, tem facilitado o entendimento de novos conceitos na continuidade do aprendizado de programação nos cursos subsequentes. (5) Mas, para se alcancçar, um nível de ensino sustentavel, de boa qualidade, seria conveniente a formação de professores em licenciatura em Ciência da Computacão.DEB-CAPES, EDITAL CAPES/DEB No 033/201

H7N9 influenza A virus transmission in a multispecies barnyard model

Influenza A viruses are a diverse group of pathogens that have been responsible for millions of human and avian deaths throughout history. Here, we illustrate the transmission potential of H7N9 influenza A virus between Coturnix quail (Coturnix sp.), domestic ducks (Anas platyrhynchos domesticus), chickens (Gallus gallus domesticus), and house sparrows (Passer domesticus) co-housed in an artificial barnyard setting. In each of four replicates, individuals from a single species were infected with the virus. Quail shed virus orally and were a source of infection for both chickens and ducks. Infected chickens transmitted the virus to quail but not to ducks or house sparrows. Infected ducks transmitted to chickens, resulting in seroconversion without viral shedding. House sparrows did not shed virus sufficiently to transmit to other species. These results demonstrate that onward transmission varies by index species, and that gallinaceous birds are more likely to maintain H7N9 than ducks or passerines

Susceptibility of Wild Canids to SARS-CoV-2

We assessed 2 wild canid species, red foxes (Vulpes vulpes) and coyotes (Canis latrans), for susceptibility to SARS-CoV-2. After experimental inoculation, red foxes became infected and shed infectious virus. Conversely, experimentally challenged coyotes did not become infected; therefore, coyotes are unlikely to be competent hosts for SARS-CoV-2. Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, multiple instances of natural infections with SARS-CoV-2 have been reported in pet dogs, likely after exposure to an infected human (1–3). Domestic dogs appear to be minimally susceptible to SARS-CoV-2, as indicated by experimental inoculations resulting in reverse transcription PCR–positive samples and low titer antibody responses but no clinical disease nor shedding of infectious virus (4,5). The ability of SARS-CoV-2 to infect domestic dogs, in addition to several other species of carnivores, suggests that additional members of the canid family might be susceptible to infection. Wild canids, such as red foxes (Vulpes vulpes) and coyotes (Canis latrans), are of particular interest given how widely distributed these animals are, their frequent proximity to humans, and that they prey, scavenge upon, or otherwise interact with species demonstrated to be susceptible to SARS-CoV-2, including felids, skunks, rodents, and white-tailed deer (6,7). Foxes (species not specified) have been included in modeling efforts and serosurveillance studies aiming to predict animal hosts of SARS-CoV-2, but their ability to serve as hosts for SARS-CoV-2 remains unclear