185 research outputs found
“Ultimately, the member states decide”: interview with Andrew Moravcsik on the Scottish referendum and European Union politics
"Women's rights, the European Court and Supranational Constitutionalism"
This analysis examines supranational constitutionalism in the European Union. In particular, the study focuses on the role of the European Court of Justice in the creation of women’s rights. I examine the interaction between the Court and member state governments in legal integration, and also the integral role that women’s advocates – both individual activists and groups – have played in the development of EU social provisions. The findings suggest that this litigation dynamic can have the effect of fueling the integration process by creating new rights that may empower social actors and EU organizations, with the ultimate effect of diminishing member state government control over the scope and direction of EU law. This study focuses specifically on gender equality law, yet provides a general framework for examining the case law in subsequent legal domains, with the purpose of providing a more nuanced understanding of supranational governance and constitutionalism
The Formation of Preferences in Two‐Level Games: An Analysis of India’s Domestic and Foreign Energy Policy
Less than a State, More than an International Organization: The Sui Generis Nature of the European Union
The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations.
Do international organizations really do what their creators intend them to do? In the past century the number of international organizations (1Os) has increased exponentially, and we have a variety of vigorous theories to explain why they have been created. Most of these theories explain IO creation as a response to problems of incomplete information, transaction costs, and other barriers to Pareto efficiency and welfare improvement for their members. Research flowing from these theories, however, has paid little attention to how IOs actually behave after they are created. Closer scrutiny would reveal that many IOs stray from the efficiency goals these theories impute and that many IOs exercise power autonomously in ways unintended and unanticipated by states at their creation. Understanding how this is so requires a reconsideration of IOs and what they do. In this article we develop a constructivist approach rooted in sociological institutionalism to explain both the power of IOs and their propensity for dysfunctional, even pathological, behavior. Drawing on long-standing Weberian arguments about bureaucracy and sociological institutionalist approaches to organizational behavior, we argue that the rational-legal authority that IOs embody gives them power independent of the states that created them and channels that power in particular directions. Bureaucracies, by definition, make rules, but in so doing they also create social knowledge. They define shared international tasks (like "development"), create and define new categories of actors (like "refugee"), create new interests for actors (like "promoting human rights"), and transfer models of political organization around the world (like markets and democracy.) However, the same normative valuation on impersonal, generalized rules that defines bureaucracies and makes them powerful in We are grateful t
European Integration, Intergovernmental Bargaining, and Convergence of Party Programmes
Apples and Dragon Fruits: The Determinants of Aid and Other Forms of State Financing from China to Africa
The Fiscal Anatomy of a Regulatory Polity: Tax Policy and Multilevel Governance in the EU
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