Does the increase in house prices influence the creation of business startups?: the case of Sweden

Entrepreneurs are at the core of economic development in that they start new businesses or make existing firms grow. To fulfill this important role, entrepreneurs need access to finance. Owing to information asymmetry and the relatively high risk associated with business start-ups, many financiers shy away from engaging in relationships with firms during the early stages of their development. Based on the existing body of knowledge on the financing of entrepreneurship, we know that insider finance is of paramount importance in the early stages of firms’ development. We expand this knowledge base by analyzing the influence of house prices on business start-ups across municipalities in Sweden. In our analysis, we include data from all municipalities in Sweden. Our data on house prices and control variables are collected in period one, and our data on the frequency of start-ups are collected in period two. We find that rising house prices in a municipality lead to a higher frequency of start-ups. In our regression analysis, we find that a 1% increase in house prices leads to a 0.14% increase in start-ups. Our findings are in line with the limited international research that has been previously conducted, and for this reason, they could be seen as a vital addition to the existing body of knowledge within the area of entrepreneurship and regional development.

Myosin VI regulates the spatial organisation of mammalian transcription initiation.

During transcription, RNA Polymerase II (RNAPII) is spatially organised within the nucleus into clusters that correlate with transcription activity. While this is a hallmark of genome regulation in mammalian cells, the mechanisms concerning the assembly, organisation and stability remain unknown. Here, we have used combination of single molecule imaging and genomic approaches to explore the role of nuclear myosin VI (MVI) in the nanoscale organisation of RNAPII. We reveal that MVI in the nucleus acts as the molecular anchor that holds RNAPII in high density clusters. Perturbation of MVI leads to the disruption of RNAPII localisation, chromatin organisation and subsequently a decrease in gene expression. Overall, we uncover the fundamental role of MVI in the spatial regulation of gene expression

Mentoring the CEO or monitoring the ROI? : The business angel’s interrole in the venture relationship

In its normal context, a mentor is a trusted senior person who provides guidance and support to the protégé by keeping the best interest of the protégé in mind at all times. Earlier research has indicated that business angels are perceived as mentors by venture members, especially CEOs. An argument put forward in this paper is that an investor does not always have the protégé’s best interests in mind and, at times, prioritizes the return on investment instead. In some situations, this role conflict might become severe. If the business angel continues in the mentor role, the protégé might take the venture on a very costly and risky course of action, whereas if the business angel switches to the investor role and simply vetoes the idea of the CEO through the authority of being a major owner, the venture might be saved from the same costly adventures, but the protégé can be severely dismayed. Presumably, switching from the role of mentor to that of investor in this fashion would destroy the trust held by the protégé that the business angel really had the protégé’s best interests in mind, and would have repercussions on the relationship for a long time afterwards. This role conflict between being both an investor and a mentor is explored in the paper. Based on information gathered from semi-structured face-to-face interviews with 9 business angels, an image emerges wherein the business angel remains in the mentoring role for as long as possible, given the perceived costs. The paper suggests that in order to understand what perceived costs mean for an investor, the concept of affordable loss (Sarasvathy, 2001) is of great use.One of the implications of affordable loss for an entrepreneur is envisioning the worst-case scenario and the money lost in that case (Dew, Sarasvathy, Read, &amp; Wiltbank, 2009). For a business angel, affordable loss could mean the same: the business angel could picture the cost of the worst-case scenario by studying the current course of action and decide whether it is affordable or not. As long as the worst-case cost associated with a certain course of action is lower than the affordable loss, the business angel will continue to fulfill the role of mentor in support of the venture chief executive officer (CEO). However, if the cost exceeds the affordable loss limit, the business angel will switch to the monitoring role, thereby prohibiting this course of action.QC 20141029</p

Mentoring the CEO or monitoring the ROI? : The business angel’s interrole in the venture relationship

In its normal context, a mentor is a trusted senior person who provides guidance and support to the protégé by keeping the best interest of the protégé in mind at all times. Earlier research has indicated that business angels are perceived as mentors by venture members, especially CEOs. An argument put forward in this paper is that an investor does not always have the protégé’s best interests in mind and, at times, prioritizes the return on investment instead. In some situations, this role conflict might become severe. If the business angel continues in the mentor role, the protégé might take the venture on a very costly and risky course of action, whereas if the business angel switches to the investor role and simply vetoes the idea of the CEO through the authority of being a major owner, the venture might be saved from the same costly adventures, but the protégé can be severely dismayed. Presumably, switching from the role of mentor to that of investor in this fashion would destroy the trust held by the protégé that the business angel really had the protégé’s best interests in mind, and would have repercussions on the relationship for a long time afterwards. This role conflict between being both an investor and a mentor is explored in the paper. Based on information gathered from semi-structured face-to-face interviews with 9 business angels, an image emerges wherein the business angel remains in the mentoring role for as long as possible, given the perceived costs. The paper suggests that in order to understand what perceived costs mean for an investor, the concept of affordable loss (Sarasvathy, 2001) is of great use.One of the implications of affordable loss for an entrepreneur is envisioning the worst-case scenario and the money lost in that case (Dew, Sarasvathy, Read, &amp; Wiltbank, 2009). For a business angel, affordable loss could mean the same: the business angel could picture the cost of the worst-case scenario by studying the current course of action and decide whether it is affordable or not. As long as the worst-case cost associated with a certain course of action is lower than the affordable loss, the business angel will continue to fulfill the role of mentor in support of the venture chief executive officer (CEO). However, if the cost exceeds the affordable loss limit, the business angel will switch to the monitoring role, thereby prohibiting this course of action.QC 20141029</p

Noncontractual Governance Strategies of Business Angels in the Post-Investment Venture Relationship

Business angels fulfil an important economic role in society by getting involved in early-stage ventures. This dissertation aspires to advance our knowledge of the governance strategies used by business angels in the venture relationship, based on the idea that the choice of governance strategies depends on the individual venture but is also shaped by the strategies adopted by any business angel network (BAN) the business angel is part of. Major findings are twofold. First, the analysis suggests that governance strategies are role-contingent. The role of the business angel vis-a-vis the venture changes, typically from outsider to insider, as the relationship transitions through different stages. Business angels should only use governance strategies that are perceived as legitimate for their role. Moreover, all strategies do not mix well and some may even neutralize each other when used together. The impact of the BAN on the action of the individual business angel is not straightforward: the formalization of a BAN will certainly restrict individual action, but, on the other hand, it seems that the BAN can also be useful for managing conflicts. Second, results indicate that conceptualizing the long-term dynamic of the investor-venture relationship in terms of any single theoretical perspective, be it agency theory, procedural justice, or norm-based influence, is too simplistic. The utility of each theoretical perspective is role-contingent: a business angel in the outsider role is better understood with agency theory, whereas a business angel in the insider role is better understood with norm-based influence theory. The empirical data on individual business angels comes mainly from 30 interviews with 21 business angels, and some supplementary data. The analysis of BANs is made differently and based on a different data set consisting of approximately 150 interviews with BAN members, civil servants, politicians, banks, accountants, and entrepreneurs.QC 20141104</p

Noncontractual Governance Strategies of Business Angels in the Post-Investment Venture Relationship

Business angels fulfil an important economic role in society by getting involved in early-stage ventures. This dissertation aspires to advance our knowledge of the governance strategies used by business angels in the venture relationship, based on the idea that the choice of governance strategies depends on the individual venture but is also shaped by the strategies adopted by any business angel network (BAN) the business angel is part of. Major findings are twofold. First, the analysis suggests that governance strategies are role-contingent. The role of the business angel vis-a-vis the venture changes, typically from outsider to insider, as the relationship transitions through different stages. Business angels should only use governance strategies that are perceived as legitimate for their role. Moreover, all strategies do not mix well and some may even neutralize each other when used together. The impact of the BAN on the action of the individual business angel is not straightforward: the formalization of a BAN will certainly restrict individual action, but, on the other hand, it seems that the BAN can also be useful for managing conflicts. Second, results indicate that conceptualizing the long-term dynamic of the investor-venture relationship in terms of any single theoretical perspective, be it agency theory, procedural justice, or norm-based influence, is too simplistic. The utility of each theoretical perspective is role-contingent: a business angel in the outsider role is better understood with agency theory, whereas a business angel in the insider role is better understood with norm-based influence theory. The empirical data on individual business angels comes mainly from 30 interviews with 21 business angels, and some supplementary data. The analysis of BANs is made differently and based on a different data set consisting of approximately 150 interviews with BAN members, civil servants, politicians, banks, accountants, and entrepreneurs.QC 20141104</p