Energy only, capacity market and security of supply. A stochastic equilibrium analysis

Former generation capacity expansion models were formulated as optimization problems. These included a reliability criterion and hence guaranteed security of supply. The situation is different in restructured markets where investments need to be incentivised by the margin resulting from electricity sales after accounting for fuel costs. The situation is further complicated by the payments and charges on the carbon market. We formulate an equilibrium model of the electricity sector with both investments and operations. Electricity prices are set at the fuel cost of the last operating unit when there is no curtailment, and at some regulated price cap when there is curtailment. There is a CO2 market and different policies for allocating allowances. Todays situation is quite risky for investors. Fuel prices are more volatile than ever; the total amount of CO2 allowances and the allocation method will only be known after investments has been decided. The equilibrium model is thus one under uncertainty. Agents can be risk neutral or risk averse. We model risk aversion through a CVaR of the net margin of the industry. The CVaR induces a risk neutral probability according to which investors value their plants. The model is formulated as a complementarity problem (including the CVaR valuation of investment). An illustration is provided on a small problem that captures the essence of today electricity world: a choice restricted to coal and gas, a peaky load curve because of wind penetration, uncertain fuel prices and an evolving carbon market (EU-ETS). We show that we might have problem of security of supply if we do not implement a capacity market.capacity adequacy, risk functions, stochastic equilibrium models

Stochastic equilibrium models for generation capacity expansion

Capacity expansion models in the power sector were among the first applications of operations research to the industry. The models lost some of their appeal at the inception of restructuring even though they still offer a lot of possibilities and are in many respect irreplaceable provided they are adapted to the new environment. We introduce stochastic equilibrium versions of these models that we believe provide a relevant context for looking at the current very risky market where the power industry invests and operates. We then take up different questions raised by the new environment. Some are due to developments of the industry like demand side management: an optimization framework has difficulties accommodating them but the more general equilibrium paradigm offers additional possibilities. We then look at the insertion of risk related investment practices that developed with the new environment and may not be easy to accommodate in an optimization context. Specifically we consider the use of plant specific discount rates that we derive by including stochastic discount rates in the equilibrium model. Linear discount factors only price systematic risk. We therefore complete the discussion by inserting different risk functions (for different agents) in order to account for additional unpriced idiosyncratic risk in investments. These different models can be cast in a single mathematical representation but they do not have the same mathematical properties. We illustrate the impact of these phenomena on a small but realistic example.capacity adequacy, risk functions, stochastic equilibrium models, stochastic discount factors

Structural basis for the activation and ligand recognition of the human oxytocin receptor

The small cyclic neuropeptide hormone oxytocin (OT) and its cognate receptor play a central role in the regulation of social behaviour and sexual reproduction. Here we report the single-particle cryo-electron microscopy structure of the active oxytocin receptor (OTR) in complex with its cognate ligand oxytocin. Our structure provides high-resolution insights into the OT binding mode, the OTR activation mechanism as well as the subtype specificity within the oxytocin/vasopressin receptor family

Structures of neurokinin 1 receptor in complex with Gq and Gs proteins reveal substance P binding mode and unique activation features

The neurokinin 1 receptor (NK1R) is involved in inflammation and pain transmission. This pathophysiologically important G protein–coupled receptor is predominantly activated by its cognate agonist substance P (SP) but also by the closely related neurokinins A and B. Here, we report cryo–electron microscopy structures of SP-bound NK1R in complex with its primary downstream signal mediators, Gq and Gs. Our structures reveal how a polar network at the extracellular, solvent-exposed receptor surface shapes the orthosteric pocket and that NK1R adopts a noncanonical active-state conformation with an interface for G protein binding, which is distinct from previously reported structures. Detailed comparisons with antagonist-bound NK1R crystal structures reveal that insurmountable antagonists induce a distinct and long-lasting receptor conformation that sterically blocks SP binding. Together, our structures provide important structural insights into ligand and G protein promiscuity, the lack of basal signaling, and agonist- and antagonist-induced conformations in the neurokinin receptor family

Directed evolution of G protein-coupled receptors in yeast for higher functional production in eukaryotic expression hosts

Despite recent successes, many G protein-coupled receptors (GPCRs) remained refractory to detailed molecular studies due to insufficient production yields, even in the most sophisticated eukaryotic expression systems. Here we introduce a robust method employing directed evolution of GPCRs in yeast that allows fast and efficient generation of receptor variants which show strongly increased functional production levels in eukaryotic expression hosts. Shown by evolving three different receptors in this study, the method is widely applicable, even for GPCRs which are very difficult to express. The evolved variants showed up to a 26-fold increase of functional production in insect cells compared to the wild-type receptors. Next to the increased production, the obtained variants exhibited improved biophysical properties, while functional properties remained largely unaffected. Thus, the presented method broadens the portfolio of GPCRs accessible for detailed investigations. Interestingly, the functional production of GPCRs in yeast can be further increased by induced host adaptation

Energy only, capacity market and security of supply.A stochastic equilibrium analysis

Former generation capacity expansion models were formulated as optimization problems. These included a reliability criterion and hence guaranteed security of supply. The situation is different in restructured markets where investments need to be incentivised by the margin resulting from electricity sales after accounting for fuel costs. The situation is further complicated by the payments and charges on the carbon market. We formulate an equilibrium model of the electricity sector with both investments and operations. Electricity prices are set at the fuel cost of the last operating unit when there is no curtailment, and at some regulated price cap when there is curtailment. There is a CO2 market and different policies for allocating allowances. Todays situation is quite risky for investors. Fuel prices are more volatile than ever; the total amount of CO2 allowances and the allocation method will only be known after investments has been decided. The equilibrium model is thus one under uncertainty. Agents can be risk neutral or risk averse. We model risk aversion through a CVaR of the net margin of the industry. The CvaR induces a risk neutral probability according to which investors value their plants. The model is formulated as a complementarity problem (including the CVaR valuation of investment). An illustration is provided on a small problem that captures the essence of today electricity world: a choice restricted to coal and gas, a peaky load curve because of wind penetration, uncertain fuel prices and an evolving carbon market (EU-ETS). We show that we might have problem of security of supply if we do not implement a capacity market

Endogenizing long-term contracts in gas market models

Up to now, the European natural gas trade was dominated by bilateral long-term upstream agreements between producers and midstreamers that fixed a minimum volume to be exchanged (Take Or Pay) and a price formula that was usually indexed on oil products prices. These arrangements were believed to allow: i) market risk sharing between the producer (who takes the price risk) and the midstreamer (who takes the volume risk) as well as ii) risk hedging since oil is considered as a trusted commodity by investors. The fall of the European demand combined with the increase of the oil price favored the emergence of a gas volume bubble that caused net losses for most of the European midstreamers who were bound by long-term agreements. As a result, some energy economists brought forward the idea of indexing contracts on gas spot prices. In this paper, we present an equilibrium model that endogenously captures the contracting behavior of both the producer and the midstreamer who strive to hedge their profit-related risk. The players choose between gas forward and oil-indexed contracts. Using the model we show that i) contracting can reduce the trade risk of both the producer and midstreamer, ii) oil-indexed contracts should be signed only when oil and gas spot prices are well correlated, otherwise, these contracts hold less interest for risk mitigation, iii) contracts are more needed when the upstream cost structure is CAPEX driven and iv) a too risk-averse behavior of the midstreamer might deprive upstream investments and the downstream consumer surplus