35 research outputs found
A plea for minimally biased naturalistic philosophy
Naturalistic philosophers rely on literature search and review in a number of ways and for different purposes. Yet this article shows how processes of literature search and review are likely to be affected by widespread and systematic biases. A solution to this problem is offered here. Whilst the tradition of systematic reviews of literature from scientific disciplines has been neglected in philosophy, systematic reviews are important tools that minimize bias in literature search and review and allow for greater reproducibility and transparency. If naturalistic philosophers wish to reduce bias in their research, they should then supplement their traditional tools for literature search and review by including systematic methodologies
New Issues for New Methods: Ethical and Editorial Challenges for an Experimental Philosophy
This paper examines a constellation of ethical and editorial issues that have arisen since philosophers started to conduct, submit and publish empirical research. These issues encompass concerns over responsible authorship, fair treatment of human subjects, ethicality of experimental procedures, availability of data, unselective reporting and publishability of research findings. This study aims to assess whether the philosophical community has as yet successfully addressed such issues. To do so, the instructions for authors, submission process and published research papers of 29 main journals in philosophy have been considered and analyzed. In light of the evidence reported here, it is argued that the philosophical community has as yet failed to properly tackle such issues. The paper also delivers some recommendations for authors, reviewers and editors in the field
A Plea for Minimally Biased Empirical Philosophy
Naturalistic philosophers rely on literature search and review in a number of ways and for different purposes. Yet this article shows how processes of literature search and review are likely to be affected by widespread and systematic biases. A solution to this problem is offered here. Whilst the tradition of systematic reviews of literature from scientific disciplines has been neglected in philosophy, systematic reviews are important tools that minimize bias in literature search and review and allow for greater reproducibility and transparency. If naturalistic philosophers wish to reduce bias in their research, they should then supplement their traditional tools for literature search and review by including systematic methodologies
The uses and abuses of the coherence – correspondence distinction
Kenneth Hammond introduced a distinction between coherence and correspondence criteria of rationality as a tool in the study of judgment and decision-making. This distinction has been widely used in the field. Yet, as this paper seeks to show, the relevant notions of coherence and correspondence have been progressively considered to be too narrow and have undergone non-trivial conceptual changes since their original introduction. I try to show, first, that the proliferation of conceptualizations of coherence and correspondence has created confusion in the literature and that appealing to such notions has not helped to elucidate discussions over the nature of rational judgment and decision-making. Nevertheless, I also argue for a reframing of the debate. In fact, what seems to underlie several contemporary appeals to the notions of coherence and correspondence is best explained in terms of a contrast between what I call here rule-based and goal-based rationality. Whilst these categories do need further refinement, they do seem to be useful in organizing and understanding research on rational judgment and decision-making
A Plea for Minimally Biased Empirical Philosophy
Naturalistic philosophers rely on literature search and review in a number of ways and for different purposes. Yet this article shows how processes of literature search and review are likely to be affected by widespread and systematic biases. A solution to this problem is offered here. Whilst the tradition of systematic reviews of literature from scientific disciplines has been neglected in philosophy, systematic reviews are important tools that minimize bias in literature search and review and allow for greater reproducibility and transparency. If naturalistic philosophers wish to reduce bias in their research, they should then supplement their traditional tools for literature search and review by including systematic methodologies
Recent Trends in Neuroethics: A Selected Bibliography
This article is concerned with major current developments in moral psychology, deriving
from the study of the neurobiological bases of our responses to moral dilemmas. I briefly
illustrate the most important research programs and outline the burning issues in
neuroethics, both empirical and conceptual
Towards a theory of adaptive rationality?
The idea that humans are prone to widespread and systematic biases has dominated
the psychological study of thinking and decision-making. The conclusion that has
often been drawn is that people are irrational. In recent decades, however, a number
of psychologists have started to call into question key claims and findings in research
on human biases. In particular, a body of research has come together under the
heading of adaptive rationality (henceforth AR). AR theorists argue that people
should not be assessed against formal principles of rationality but rather against the
goals they entertain. Moreover, AR theorists maintain that the conclusion that people
are irrational is unsupported: people are often remarkably successful once assessed
against their goals and given the cognitive and external constraints imposed by the
environment. The growth of literature around AR is what motivates the present
investigation, and assessing the plausibility of the AR challenge to research on
human biases is the goal of this thesis. My enquiry analyses several aspects of this
suggested turn in the empirical study of rationality and provides one of the first
philosophically-informed appraisals of the prospects of AR. First and foremost, my
thesis seeks to provide a qualified defence of the AR project. On the one hand, I
agree with AR theorists that there is room for a conceptual revolution in the study of
thinking and decision-making: while it is commonly argued that behaviour and
cognition should be assessed against formal principles of rationality, I stress the
importance of assessing behaviour against the goals that people entertain. However, I
also contend that AR theorists have hitherto failed to provide compelling evidence in
support of their most ambitious and optimistic theses about people’s rationality. In
particular, I present a great deal of evidence suggesting that people are often
unsuccessful at achieving prudential and epistemic goals and I argue that AR
theorists have not made clear how, in light of this evidence, optimistic claims about
human rationality could be defended