48 research outputs found
Particle Creation and Annihilation: Two Bohmian Approaches
This paper reviews and discusses two extensions of Bohmian Mechanics to the phenomena of particle creation and annihilation typically observed in Quantum Field Theory (QFT): the so-called Bell-type Quantum Field Theory and the Dirac Sea representation. These theories have a secure metaphysical basis as they postulate a particle ontology while satisfying the requirements imposed by the Primitive Ontology approach to quantum physics. Furthermore, their methodological perspective intentionally provides a set of rules to immunize physical theories to the conceptual and technical problems plaguing the standard formulation of Quantum Mechanics and QFT. A metaphysical analysis of both theories will be given, emphasizing the relevant features of each proposal. Finally, it will be acknowledged that, despite the metaphysical virtues and niceties of these frameworks, ultimately they do not provide definitive answers to other cogent foundational issues in QFT. Thus, these theories (as well as the other Bohmian extensions to QFT) should be considered as partial solutions to the problems raised by the quantum theory of fields. This situation can be considered incentive for further research
Some remarks on the mentalistic reformulation of the measurement problem. A reply to S. Gao
Gao (2017) presents a new mentalistic reformulation of the well-known measurement problem affecting the standard formulation of quantum mechanics. According to this author, it is essentially a determinate-experience problem, namely a problem about the compatibility between the linearity of the Schrödinger’s equation, the fundamental law of quantum theory, and definite experiences perceived by conscious
observers. In this essay I aim to clarify (i) that the well-known measurement problem is a mathematical consequence of quantum theory’s formalism, and that (ii) its mentalistic variant does not grasp the relevant causes which are responsible for this puzzling issue. The first part of this paper will be concluded claiming that the “physical” formulation of the measurement problem cannot be reduced to its
mentalistic version. In the second part of this work it will be shown that, contrary to the case of quantum mechanics, Bohmian mechanics and GRW theories provide clear explanations of the physical processes responsible for the definite localization of macroscopic objects and, consequently, for well-defined perceptions of measurement outcomes by conscious observers. More precisely, the macro-objectification of
states of experimental devices is obtained exclusively in virtue of their clear ontologies and dynamical laws without any intervention of human observers. Hence, it will be argued that in these theoretical frameworks the measurement problem and the determinate-experience problem are logically distinct issues
Particle Creation and Annihilation: Two Bohmian Approaches
This paper reviews and discusses two extensions of Bohmian Mechanics to the phenomena of particle creation and annihilation typically observed in Quantum Field Theory (QFT): the so-called Bell-type Quantum Field Theory and the Dirac Sea representation. These theories have a secure metaphysical basis as they postulate a particle ontology while satisfying the requirements imposed by the Primitive Ontology approach to quantum physics. Furthermore, their methodological perspective intentionally provides a set of rules to immunize physical theories to the conceptual and technical problems plaguing the standard formulation of Quantum Mechanics and QFT. A metaphysical analysis of both theories will be given, emphasizing the relevant features of each proposal. Finally, it will be acknowledged that, despite the metaphysical virtues and niceties of these frameworks, ultimately they do not provide definitive answers to other cogent foundational issues in QFT. Thus, these theories (as well as the other Bohmian extensions to QFT) should be considered as partial solutions to the problems raised by the quantum theory of fields. This situation can be considered incentive for further research
Is Quantum Mechanics Self-Interpreting?
Fuchs and Peres (2000) claimed that standard Quantum Mechanics needs no interpretation. In this essay, I show the flaws of the arguments presented in support to this thesis. Specifically, it will be claimed that the authors conflate QM with Quantum Bayesianism (QBism) - the most prominent subjective formulation of quantum theory; thus, they endorse a specific interpretation of the quantum formalism. Secondly, I will explain the main reasons for which QBism should not be considered a physical theory, being it concerned exclusively with agents’ beliefs and silent about the physics of the quantum regime. Consequently, the solutions to the quantum puzzles provided by this approach cannot be satisfactory from a physical perspective. In the third place, I evaluate Fuchs and Peres arguments contra the non-standard interpretations of QM, showing again the fragility of their claims. Finally, it will be stressed the importance of the interpretational work in the context of quantum theory
Some remarks on the mentalistic reformulation of the measurement problem. A reply to S. Gao
Gao (2017) presents a new mentalistic reformulation of the well-known
measurement problem affecting the standard formulation of quantum mechanics.
According to this author, it is essentially a determinate-experience problem,
namely a problem about the compatibility between the linearity of the
Schroedinger's equation, the fundamental law of quantum theory, and definite
experiences perceived by conscious observers. In this essay I aim to clarify
(i) that the well-known measurement problem is a mathematical consequence of
quantum theory's formalism, and that (ii) its mentalistic variant does not
grasp the relevant causes which are responsible for this puzzling issue. The
first part of this paper will be concluded claiming that the "physical"
formulation of the measurement problem cannot be reduced to its mentalistic
version. In the second part of this work it will be shown that, contrary to the
case of quantum mechanics, Bohmian mechanics and GRW theories provide clear
explanations of the physical processes responsible for the definite
localization of macroscopic objects and, consequently, for well-defined
perceptions of measurement outcomes by conscious observers. More precisely, the
macro-objectification of states of experimental devices is obtained exclusively
in virtue of their clear ontologies and dynamical laws without any intervention
of human observers. Hence, it will be argued that in these theoretical
frameworks the measurement problem and the determinate-experience problem are
logically distinct issues
No-Go Theorems and the Foundations of Quantum Physics
In the history of quantum physics several no-go theorems have been proved, and many of them have played a central role in the development of the theory, such as Bell’s or the Kochen–Specker theorem. A recent paper by F. Laudisa has raised reasonable doubts concerning the strategy followed in proving some of these results, since they rely on the standard framework of quantum mechanics, a theory that presents several ontological problems. The aim of this paper is twofold: on the one hand, I intend to reinforce Laudisa’s methodological point by critically discussing Malament’s theorem in the context of the philosophical foundation of quantum field theory; secondly, I rehabilitate Gisin’s theorem showing that Laudisa’s concerns do not apply to it
Relational Quantum Mechanics and the PBR Theorem: A Peaceful Coexistence
According to Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) the wave function is
considered neither a concrete physical item evolving in spacetime, nor an
object representing the absolute state of a certain quantum system. In this
interpretative framework, is defined as a computational device encoding
observers' information; hence, RQM offers a somewhat epistemic view of the wave
function. This perspective seems to be at odds with the PBR theorem, a formal
result excluding that wave functions represent knowledge of an underlying
reality described by some ontic state. In this paper we argue that RQM is not
affected by the conclusions of PBR's argument; consequently, the alleged
inconsistency can be dissolved. To do that, we will thoroughly discuss the very
foundations of the PBR theorem, i.e. Harrigan and Spekkens' categorization of
ontological models, showing that their implicit assumptions about the nature of
the ontic state are incompatible with the main tenets of RQM. Then, we will ask
whether it is possible to derive a relational PBR-type result, answering in the
negative. This conclusion shows some limitations of this theorem not yet
discussed in the literature
Particle Creation and Annihilation: Two Bohmian Approaches
This paper reviews and discusses two extensions of Bohmian Mechanics to the phenomena of particle creation and annihilation typically observed in Quantum Field Theory (QFT): the so-called Bell-type Quantum Field Theory and the Dirac Sea representation. These theories have a secure metaphysical basis as they postulate a particle ontology while satisfying the requirements imposed by the Primitive Ontology approach to quantum physics. Furthermore, their methodological perspective intentionally provides a set of rules to immunize physical theories to the conceptual and technical problems plaguing the standard formulation of Quantum Mechanics and QFT. A metaphysical analysis of both theories will be given, emphasizing the relevant features of each proposal. Finally, it will be acknowledged that, despite the metaphysical virtues and niceties of these frameworks, ultimately they do not provide definitive answers to other cogent foundational issues in QFT. Thus, these theories (as well as the other Bohmian extensions to QFT) should be considered as partial solutions to the problems raised by the quantum theory of fields. This situation can be considered incentive for further research