Optimal Water Metering and Pricing

Marginal cost pricing of running water and sewerage services has long been the default recommendation of economists and natural resource specialists to firms and local governments. However, water pricing has never been studied simultaneously with the water metering problem before. The socially optimal number of meters crucially depends on the price of water charged by the Water Company because depending on this will be the fall in consumption and therefore in water production costs and vice versa. This paper breaks the inertia as it combines both issues in one optimization problem. Both in a centralized and in a decentralized way, the optimal number of meters is determined simultaneously with the optimal per unit water rate. The Rateable Value System (RV) (i.e. the “Status Quo” or benchmark regime) is confronted with Universal Metering (UM), Optimal Metering (OM) and Decentralized Metering (DM) in terms of optimal water rates and the socially optimal number of meters. Except for RV, the results of (UM), (OM) and (DM) all recommend setting price equal to marginal cost and the optimal number of meters is hereby endogenously determined by a functional form relating water and metering costs and water demand characteristics. Conclusions and policy recommendations are drawn from the theoretical analysis.water metering, water pricing

An Incentive Mechanism for Decentralized Water Metering Decisions

Metering water consumption has been long advocated by economists in developing countries as a way to curb waste and prevent resource depletion. However, very few of these economists have studied the inefficiencies brought about by universal metering or the conditions under which decentralized water metering decisions are optimal. The decision where to install water meters generally rests on either the consumer or the company providing the service. This paper shows that if left unregulated, both the consumer’s and the company’s decentralized water metering decisions are sub-optimal. This is because the firm when installing meters, does not take into account the fall in consumer surplus and the consumer, when voluntarily installing a meter in his dwelling, does not take into account the effect of his decision on the company’s profits. To solve this externality problem and make the decentralized decision optimal, an incentive mechanism is proposed. The mechanism works through a series of Pigouvian taxes imposed by the regulator on the party creating the externality. By means of these taxes, externalities are internalized and both the consumer and the company reach the socially optimal solution in a decentralized way. The implementation of this mechanism in practice is materialized through a Coasian property rights approach where the parties involved reach the efficient solution by bargaining over welfare gains. The party installing the meter has to buy the “right to meter” from the metered party by fairly compensating him thus internalizing the externality and reaching the efficient outcome. To illustrate the incentives involved in metering water consumption, the rate structure and metering policies of two water concessions in Argentina are studied: Buenos Aires and Córdoba. Conclusions and policy recommendations are drawn from the theory and the two practical cases.water metering, water pricing, water rates

ISP Interconnection and Flat - Rated Internet Pricing

Flat – rated internet pricing is increasingly becoming the most common mode of dial - up access nowadays. However, the debate about whether ISP bound telephone calls should also be unmetered is still open. On the one side, consumers and ISPs complain about the high costs of telephone calls and demand unlimited local calling for a fixed monthly fee as in the U.S (or now in some European countries). On the other side, incumbent LECs complain about the investment they have to make to keep pace with ever increasing traffic and congestion without due compensation. The problem lies in the fact that, as it is always the case, both sides are probably right. This paper addresses an important issue on dial up internet access and pricing: The ISP’s model of interconnection with the incumbent LEC and its implications on market prices and welfare. To that end and assuming flat – rated internet pricing, several interconnection models are studied. Among the metered models, the termination and origination models (the “benchmark” metered models), the free internet model and the 0610 model in Argentina. Among the unmetered models: The standard CLEC – terminating American model, the FCC’s newly proposed C.O.B.A.K model and the British F.R.I.A.C.O model. All arrangements are confronted with each other in terms of equilibrium ISP prices, welfare and consumer and producer surpluses generated. Within that framework the paper tries then to answer the question of whether and under what conditions unmetered telephone calling in addition to flat rated internet use is welfare enhancing. Conclusions and policy recommendations are drawn from the theory and some practical cases.Internet Access, ISP interconnection, access cost

Fourier filter LGS wavefront sensing for ELT size telescopes

International audienc

Universidad Nacional de Cuyo 70 años (1939–2009) : reflexiones, testimonios e imágenes

La Universidad Nacional de Cuyo cumple setenta años de existencia y ha estimado que una de las mejores maneras de recordarlo es creando los medios necesarios para que las voces académicas se expresen con la profundidad y proyección que a toda institución de educación superior le competen. En esta oportunidad, las voces académicas provienen del encuentro de pensadores y educadores procedentes de distintos países latinoamericanos, convocados por la Universidad Nacional de Cuyo el 7 de abril de 2009, en vísperas del Bicentenario. Este importante foro se dio dentro de un programa de actividades encaminadas a conmemorar el cierre del Primer Congreso Nacional de Filosofía llevado a cabo el 9 de abril de 1949 en la ciudad de Mendoza y que fuera organizado por la entonces joven Universidad Nacional de Cuyo. Dicho evento ha sido reconocido por la comunidad científica internacional como de suma trascendencia tanto por las repercusiones en el tiempo como por la calidad y excelencia de los filósofos que participaron. Este libro, entonces, recoge las conferencias dictadas por prestigiosas personalidades del mundo académico, las cuales tratan los temas ya indicados como también los que se refieren al Congreso de Filosofía y al rector Ireneo Fernando Cruz que tuvo la responsabilidad de llevarlo adelante. El volumen se completa con los testimonios de los miembros honorarios de la Comisión del Bicentenario, todos ellos de reconocida trayectoria en nuestra Universidad