Political and institutional drivers of social security universalization in Brazil

This paper discusses the political and institutional factors that shaped the emergence and consolidation of a universal health system (SUS) in Brazil after the transition to democracy in the late 1980s. It argues that a combination of political incentives and political, fiscal and institutional capacities have been at the root of the process of creating such a system. First, the political incentives have been associated with a competitive political system leading a race to serve poor constituencies and to the policy communities and activists within and outside the state. SUS benefitted from this political dynamic and thus became politically sustainable. Second, fiscal capacity and sustainability have been secured by a massive increased taxation and earmarked social expenditures. Third, the system´s success stems from the institutional capacity to run a complex decentralized system. The system appears to reach its limit in terms of the capacity to extend coverage in a context where there is universal formal entitlement to health, but some 30 per cent of the population has access to private insurance. Despite many improvements, many challenges continue to beset the delivery of health care in Brazil, and addressing them adequately will require significant policy changes, not only additional resources. However, finding resources has proven increasingly costly politically and improvements will have to be achieved through efficiency gains. Politically, this is a situation of a zero sum game rather than that of the positive game typical of coverage expansion. Most importantly, the perceived increased personal risks are leading citizens to support creating new resources for the system and for policies to improve the quality of care. A new window of opportunity thus seems to have been opened

Political Institutions, Policymaking Processes and Policy Outcomes in Brazil

We found that the driving force behind policies in Brazil is the strong set of powers given to the President by the Constitution of 1988. To have strong powers does not mean unbridled powers. Several institutions constrain and check the power of the President, in particular the legislature, the judiciary, the public prosecutors, the auditing office, state governors and the Constitution itself. The electorate of Brazil holds the President accountable for economic growth, inflation and unemployment. Because of the electoral connection, and perhaps reputational effects, presidents in Brazil have a strong incentive to pursue stable fiscal and monetary policies as their first priority. At least for the past ten years, and particularly in the new administration of Lula, executive power has been aimed at pushing policy towards macro orthodoxy. Although orthodoxy may not lead to short-term growth, international financial markets provide additional incentives for discipline, as deviations are instantly punished, with unfavorable consequences that are readily recognized by the electorate. Achieving stable macro policies required constitutional amendments as well as considerable legislation. To attain their goals, the past administrations (Cardoso and Lula in particular) used their property rights over pork to trade for policy changes. The rationale for members of Congress to exchange votes on policy for pork is that the electorates reward or punish members of Congress based on the degree to which pork lands in their district. With the exception of the devaluation of 1999, macro policy has become more stable over time. We categorize macro policies in Brazil as `stable but adaptable. `

MODERNIDADE E ESTADO CAPITALISTA

OFFE, Claus. Modernity and the State: East, West (Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought). Massachusets, The MIT Press, 1996. (ISBN 0262150468; hardcover: US$36,00; paperback: US$ 18,00).233-23

The political cost of corruption: scandals, campaign finance, and reelection in the Brazilian chamber of deputies

Políticos notoriamente envolvidos em escândalos de corrupção logram reelegerse apesar da opinião pública em geral condenar a corrupção. Nesse artigo nos debruçamos sobre esse paradoxo examinando o efeito de escândalos de corrupção no comportamento de membros da Câmara dos Deputados. Em particular, focamos em suas estratégias de financiamento de campanha e escolhas de carreira. Para explorar esses temas utilizamos um banco de dados original que contém informações sobre todos os deputados e deputadas federais de 1995 a 2010. Embora muitos parlamentares acusados de corrupção sejam penalizados nas urnas, mostramos que gastos de campanha elevados atenuam o efeito negativo de escândalos. Nossos resultados são robustos para várias especificações e controlando por explicações alternativas. Este artigo apresenta uma discussão original das estratégias utilizadas por políticos corruptos para se manterem no poder. Mostramos que se tornam imunes às consequências eleitorais de escândalos se gastarem acima de patamares específicos. Esses achados são muito relevantes para discussões normativas em termos de reforma política que visam fortalecer accountability eleitoral no Brazil.While corruption is widely disapproved of, some corrupt politicians continue to win elections. We tackle this paradox by examining the effects of malfeasance scandals in politicians' behavior. In particular, we focus on their campaign finance strategies and career choices. We explore these issues empirically with an original dataset that includes all lower-house members of Congress (MCs) in Brazil from 1995 to 2010. Although tainted incumbents tend to be penalized electorally, we show that campaign spending attenuates this effect. These results are robust, controlling for a host of potential confounders and biases. Hence, we offer a first exploration of incumbents' strategies to avoid the electoral cost of their publicized wrongdoings. Above a certain threshold of funding, Brazilian members of Congress become impervious to negative exposure, regardless of the severity of their ethical and/or criminal violations. These results carry important normative consequences in terms of regulating campaign financing as a means of improving accountability

O NEO-INSTITUCIONALISMO DE VOLTA À CENA TEÓRICA

GOODIN, Robert, (ed.). The Theory o f Institutional Design. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. (ISBN 0 521 47119 2; US$ 49, 95 hardback)

Políticas públicas e habitação popular: continuidade e ruptura, 1979-1988

Busca analisar a lógica das mudanças ocorridas no quadro da política de habitação popular no Brasil, nos últimos anos, mostrando a trajetória dos programas reformistas do período 75-84 (PROFILURB, PROMORAR, FICAM, JOÃO DE BARRO) e dos programas alternativos e pouco institucionalizados da Nova República (PPS, Programa Nacional de Mutirões Habitacionais), ressaltando como este quadro aponta para um esgotamento do padrão de financiamento e para um processo acelerado de fragmentação institucional e paralisia decisória