Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address the Inevitability of Financial Failure

Unlike many other areas of regulation, financial regulation operates in the context of a complex interdependent system. The interconnections among firms, markets, and legal rules have implications for financial regulatory policy, especially the choice between ex ante regulation aimed at preventing financial failure and ex post regulation aimed at responding to that failure. Regulatory theory has paid relatively little attention to this distinction. Were regulation to consist solely of duty-imposing norms, such neglect might be defensible. In the context of a system, however, regulation can also take the form of interventions aimed at mitigating the potentially systemic consequences of a financial failure. We show that this dual role of financial regulation implies that ex ante regulation and ex post regulation should be balanced in setting financial regulatory policy, and we offer guidelines for achieving that balance

Snatching Legal Victory: LGBTQ Rights Activism and Contestation in the Arab World

This article examines the relationship between emergent LGBTQ movements and the state in the Arab world over the past two decades. Focusing on the efforts of various LGBTQ social movements to confront the criminalization of homosexuality in the Arab region, the article puzzles over a cascade of legal victories for LGBTQ rights advocates in Lebanon in recent years in spite of a hostile justice sector mired with corruption. It interrogates a set of prevalent assumptions about the effect of regime type (democracy v. authoritarianism) on gay rights activism and litigation. This article explains how some LGBTQ Arab movements have successfully relied on strategic litigation to confront criminalization laws while others have had less success in pursuing overtly confrontational approaches. The paired comparison between Tunisia and Lebanon shifts our focus back to the agency of judges and social movement leaders in shaping legal outcomes for LGBTQ citizens

The effect of organization centralization, organization climate, knowledge management and supply chain integration perception on the success of product launch in the U.S. automotive industry

This study examines variables that may affect new product launches in the automotive industry. The automakers need to have capabilities to address product launch issues when converting their efforts into automotive products that meet consumer requirements. The aim of this study was to investigate the effect of organization centralization, organizational climate, knowledge management, and supply chain integration perception on the success and effectiveness of a product launch. The survey samples consisted of 101 respondents from automotive companies. Organization centralization perception, where decisions are made solely by upper management, had no significant correlation to the success of product launch. Analysis of the organizational climate indicated that there was no significant correlation regarding the success of a product launch however; further analysis was performed on organizational climate as a moderator. The results indicated that when organizational climate is favorable, there is a significant correlation with knowledge management, organization centralization, and supply chain. Additionally, the results also showed that when organizational climate is unfavorable, there is no significant correlation to organization centralization; however, there is significant correlation with knowledge management and supply chain. The results also showed significant correlation between knowledge management perception, supply chain integration perception, and the success of a product launch

Arab unity in terms of law

In this thesis an attempt has been made to investigate the extent to which the Concept of Arab unity has been implemented in inter Arab states legal relations.... Zie Forewor

Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders

Corporate law and scholarship generally assume that professional managers control public corporations, while shareholders play only a weak and passive role. As a result, corporate officers and directors are understood to be subject to extensive fiduciary duties, while shareholders traditionally have been thought to have far more limited obligations. Outside the contexts of controlling shareholders and closely held firms, many experts argue shareholders have no duties at all. The most important trend in corporate governance today, however, is the move toward shareholder democracy. Changes in financial markets, in business practice, and in corporate law have given minority shareholders in public companies greater power than they have ever enjoyed before. Activist investors, especially rapidly growing hedge funds, are using this new power to pressure managers into pursuing corporate transactions ranging from share repurchases, to special dividends, to the sale of assets or even the entire firm. In many cases these transactions uniquely benefit the activist while failing to benefit, or even harming, the firm and other shareholders. This Article argues that greater shareholder power should be coupled with greater shareholder responsibility. In particular, it argues that the rules of fiduciary duty traditionally applied to officers and directors and, more rarely, to controlling shareholders should be applied to activist minority investors as well. This proposal may seem a radical expansion of fiduciary doctrine. Nonetheless, the foundations of an expanded shareholder duty have been laid in existing case law. Moreover, there is every reason to believe that newly empowered activist shareholders are vulnerable to the same forces of greed and self-interest widely understood to face corporate officers and directors. Corporate law can, and should, adapt to this reality

Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders

Corporate law and scholarship generally assume that professional managers control public corporations, while shareholders play only a weak and passive role. As a result, corporate officers and directors are understood to be subject to extensive fiduciary duties, while shareholders traditionally have been thought to have far more limited obligations. Outside the contexts of controlling shareholders and closely held firms, many experts argue shareholders have no duties at all. The most important trend in corporate governance today, however, is the move toward shareholder democracy. Changes in financial markets, in business practice, and in corporate law have given minority shareholders in public companies greater power than they have ever enjoyed before. Activist investors, especially rapidly growing hedge funds, are using this new power to pressure managers into pursuing corporate transactions ranging from share repurchases, to special dividends, to the sale of assets or even the entire firm. In many cases these transactions uniquely benefit the activist while failing to benefit, or even harming, the firm and other shareholders. This Article argues that greater shareholder power should be coupled with greater shareholder responsibility. In particular, it argues that the rules of fiduciary duty traditionally applied to officers and directors and, more rarely, to controlling shareholders should be applied to activist minority investors as well. This proposal may seem a radical expansion of fiduciary doctrine. Nonetheless, the foundations of an expanded shareholder duty have been laid in existing case law. Moreover, there is every reason to believe that newly empowered activist shareholders are vulnerable to the same forces of greed and self-interest widely understood to face corporate officers and directors. Corporate law can, and should, adapt to this reality

Macroeconomic Modeling of Money, Credit, and Banking

A supply-and-demand model of deregulated financial markets is compared to deposit-multiplier models, interest-rate reduced forms, the textbook IS-LM model, and a credit-market approach. This model is used to analyze a variety of financial events that simpler models find paradoxical: some events stimulate the economy while contracting M1; open market purchases need not be multiplied by the banking system to be powerful; business-cycle fluctuationg in tax revenue can have strong effects on financial markets; and increased financial intermediation can be contractionary.Credit; M1; Macroeconomics; Money; Multiplier; Supply