On strategy and the likelihood of success in marital matchmaking under uncertainty

Individuals wishing to get married have made increasing use of matchmakers. This notwithstanding, economists have paid scant attention to the strategies employed by matchmakers and to the likelihood of success arising from the use of these strategies. Consequently, we first specify a ââ¬Ålocalâ⬠and then a ââ¬Åglobalâ⬠strategy for matching male and female clients and then we compute the expected total cost to a matchmaker from the use of these strategies. Next, we calculate the mean number of successes that our matchmaker can hope for. Finally, we provide an upper bound on the probability that the number of matching successes is at least 1+ θ times the mean number, where θ is any positive number.

A probabilistic analysis of a scheduling problem in the economics of tourism

The scheduling problem faced by a firm (or by a government agency) that is responsible for providing transportation to tourists who would like to visit a particular location has received scant theoretical attention in the tourism literature. Therefore, we conduct a probabilistic analysis of the scheduling problem in this paper. Specifically, we first delineate a generic model that accounts for the common features of visits to many locations such as fiords, game parks, lakes, and wildlife reserves. Next, we derive the transportation providing firm's long run expected profit per unit time function. Finally, we show that the optimal frequency with which transportation ought to be provided to tourists is the solution to our firm's long run expected profit maximization problem.

A game model of dowry determination in an arranged marriage context

In many arranged marriage contexts, a mediator assists the bride and the groom's families in determining the actual amount of the dowry. Although social scientists in general and economists in particular have studied many aspects of dowries, to the best of our knowledge, the nature of the interaction between a mediator and the two concerned parties has not been analyzed previously in the literature. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to analyze a simple game model of dowry determination. Specifically, we first solve for the Nash equilibrium pair of final dowry offers from the two concerned parties. Next, we show how the equilibrium dowry offers optimally trade off the desire to make an assertive offer with the likelihood that this offer will be selected by the mediator.

An independence result concerning the arrival rate of and the provision of transport to tourists

What is the relationship between the arrival rate of tourists at a transport providing firm's depot and the long run expected wait time experienced by individual tourists in this depot? We use a renewal theoretic framework in this note to answer this question. Our analysis yields two results. First, we show that the long run expected wait time is independent of the arrival rate of the tourists. Second, we explain why this long run expected wait time is equal to the average residual life of a particular renewal process.

On bribing and balking in a simple queuing model of resource allocation

We analyze two versions of a simple queuing model of resource allocation in which an impatient citizen of a transition economy or a developing country wishes to purchase a scarce good, namely, bread. In the first version of the model, our citizen must pay a bribe to obtain bread immediately from a government shop. In the second version of the model, when the government shop is too crowded, our citizen refuses to join the crowd. In other words, he balks and goes instead to a private shop to purchase bread. In this setting, we study three questions from the standpoint of resource allocation. First, in the presence of bribery, what is the expected monetary benefit per citizen to a corrupt government official? Second, in the presence of balking, what proportion of all citizens eventually get bread? Finally, and once again in the presence of balking, what is the expected amount of time a citizen spends waiting to get bread?Balking

On the allocation of commodities by queuing and the prevention of violence

In times of acute scarcity, demand for a commodity greatly exceeds its supply. In such situations, queuing mechanisms are frequently used to allocate scarce goods to citizens. However, inordinately long queues lead to excessive wait times and this can lead to violence. As such, the general purpose of this paper is to theoretically analyze the problem of preventing violence in a queuing context. To this end, we first formulate a queuing model with a finite capacity. Next, we determine the smallest capacity that will keep the likelihood of violence below an exogenously specified value. Finally, we illustrate the working of our model with a simple numerical example.Optimal Capacity

CONSISTENCY AND OPTIMALITY IN A DYNAMIC GAME OF POLLUTION CONTROL I: COMPETITION

I model the interaction between a regulator and polluting firms as a Stackelberg differential game in which the regulator leads. The firms create pollution, which results in a stock externality. I analyze the intertemporal effects of alternate pollution control measures in a competitive industry. The principal issue here concerns the dynamic inconsistency of the optimal solution. Inter alia, I compare the steady state levels of pollution under optimal and under time consistent policies. Forthcoming in Environmental and Resource Economicsenvironmental, regulation, tax, dynamic, game, Environmental Economics and Policy, Q25, H32, D62,

THE QUEUING THEORETIC APPROACH TO GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT

In this paper I propose and develop a new framework for modeling groundwater management issues. Specifically, I apply the methods of queuing theoryfor the first time, to the best of my knowledgeto model a groundwater management problem from a long-run perspective. I characterize two simple management regimes as two different kinds of queues and then show how to pose a manager's decision problem as an optimization problem using queuing theoretic techniques. I solve for certain fundamental quantities, such as the expected system size, and then discuss the economic meaning and relevance of the queuing concepts being used. I close by discussing possible extensions to my basic models. Published in Ecological Modelling 85 (2-3, 1996):219-27.groundwater, management, stochastic, queuing, theory, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

THE IMPACT OF INFORMATION ON LAND DEVELOPMENT: A DYNAMIC AND STOCHASTIC ANALYSIS

In a two-period model, economists such as K.J. Arrow, A.C. Fisher, and C. Henry, have shown that when development is both indivisible and irreversible, a developer who ignores the possibility of obtaining new information about the outcome of such development will invariably underestimate the benefits of preservation and hence favor development. In this note, I extend the AFH analysis in two directions. I model the land development problem in a dynamic framework, explicitly specifying an information production function. In such a setting, I then ask and answer the question concerning when development should take place. Forthcoming in Journal of Environmental Managementdevelopment, dynamic, information, uncertainty, Land Economics/Use, D82, Q20,

ON SOME ASPECTS OF THE MANAGEMENT OF A STOCHASTICALLY DEVELOPING FOREST

In this paper I focus on some important biological aspects of the forest management problem. I model a stochastically developing forest as a multidimensional, continuous-time Markov chain. Next, I pose three questions concerning the long-run characteristics of a stationary forest, the stochastic process followed by dying species, and the age of an arbitrary species in the forest. I then (a) characterize a stationary forest probabilistically, (b) describe the stochastic process governing the demise of species in this forest, and (c) provide a method for determining the age of an arbitrary species in the forest. Finally, I discuss the forest management implications of the issues raised in this paper. Note: Published in Ecological Modelling 89(1-3, 1996):67-72.forest, management, continuous-time Markov chain, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,