The Transformation of American Jewry and Men's Headgear: The Story of the Yarmulke from 1945 to 1975

On September 13th of 1970, the New York Times marveled that “New York is probably the only state where candidates campaign with yarmulkes in their pockets–if they’re not already on their heads– and with good reason.” In the city with the largest Jewish population in the world, the yarmulke was the identifying religious and cultural symbol marking one as a Jew and displaying identification with the Jewish community. According to the Times report, even gentile politicians would don this uniquely Jewish garment. Yet, until just a few years earlier American Jews shunned yarmulkes, avoiding wearing them in public for fear of ridicule, violence, or unwanted attention, leading most Jewish men to go bareheaded or wear a hat instead. Over the course of the years from 1945, marking the end of World War II, to the early 1970s, American Jews began wearing yarmulkes openly in much greater numbers and contesting policies across public life that restricted or prohibited male headgear. This thesis considers the change between the early period of the twentieth century where the yarmulke was rarely worn in public or written about in the media and the postwar years from 1945 through the 1970s, when there was a minor eruption of writing about Jewish head covering followed by gradual acceptance in general public institutions. What inspired American Jews to challenge the status quo and stand up for a practice that would differentiate them from their peers and colleagues? Why did Jews across the religious spectrum take up instruments of advocacy and legal action to ensure protection for those who opted to wear yarmulkes, when they believed, at most, that male head covering was not a religious obligation, but rather a “pious practice,” custom or symbol? Finally, considering that according to Jewish tradition, any head covering is sufficient, why was it the yarmulke that became the overwhelming favorite

Corporate Control around the World

We study corporate control tracing controlling shareholders for thousands of listed firms from 127 countries over 2004-2012. Government and family control is pervasive in civil-law countries. Blocks are commonplace, but less so in common-law countries. These patterns apply to large, medium, and small firms. In contrast, the development - control nexus is heterogeneous; strong for large but absent for small firms. Control correlates strongly with shareholder protection, the stringency of employment contracts and unions power. Conversely, the correlations with creditor rights, legal formalism, and entry regulation appear weak. These patterns support both legal origin and political theories of financial development

Testate amoeba communities of the drained Hula wetland (Israel): Implications for ecosystem development and conservation management

This study investigates the testate amoeba communities of semi-aquatic environments in two anthropogenic wetland ecosystems within an extensive drained wetland complex in northern Israel. Aims are to add to the species record for the region, test the similarity in amoeba communities and ecology to more studied sites and regions and investigate processes of wetland development and the implications of this for conservation management. The testate amoeba community is predominantly composed of cosmopolitan taxa but the community composition is distinct from that of previous studies. Redundancy analyses show that much the strongest environmental control is hydrology (depth to water table). Surprisingly, strontium (Sr) is an important secondary control, probably representing the trophic gradient. With a few exceptions the autecology of taxa identified here agrees with their preferences indicated by previous studies. There are significant differences in species richness and community structure between the amoeba communities of the two sites. Partly the difference may be due to differences in nutrient state, although some of the difference is independent of all environmental variables tested here. The lower species richness of the more recently created site suggests the testate amoeba community may be at an earlier successional stage

Lithica Ivanoviana : Quelques remarques autour du cycle Prozračnost'

Aminadav DYKMAN, Lithica Ivanoviana. Some remarks about the cycle Prozrachnost'. This article presents the literary tradition that serves as a background to Viacheslav Ivanov 's poetical cycle Prozrachnost' (The kingdom of transparency). The author endeavours to demonstrate the deliberate synthetism of this cycle, evoking texts of Greek and Latin lapidaries, the famous medieval Marbode 's lapidary, as well as several poetic texts belonging to the baroque period or the symbolist poets. This article supports the thesis according to which a global appreciation of Ivanov's text can be obtained only after confrontation of its various literary sources.Aminadav DYKMAN, Lithica Ivanoviana. Quelques remarques autour du cycle Prozračnost'. Cet article traite de la tradition littéraire qui sert d'arrière-plan au cycle poétique de Vjačeslav Ivanov, Prozračnost' (Le royaume de la transparence). L'auteur essaie de démontrer le synthétisme prémédité dudit cycle, en évoquant des textes tels les lapidaires gréco- latins, le célèbre lapidaire médiéval de Marbode, ainsi que plusieurs textes poétiques de I'ép<xjue baroque ou des poètes symbolistes. Cet article se propose de défendre la thèse selon laquelle une appréciation globale du texte d'Ivanov ne peut être obtenue qu'en confrontant ses diverses sources littéraires.Dykman Aminadav. Lithica Ivanoviana : Quelques remarques autour du cycle Prozračnost'. In: Cahiers du monde russe : Russie, Empire russe, Union soviétique, États indépendants, vol. 35, n°1-2, Janvier-juin 1994. Un maître de sagesse au XX e siècle Vjačeslav Ivanov et son temps. pp. 269-283

A study of corporate ownership and control around the world

This thesis is structured around three main chapters which study corporate ownership and control around the world. The first chapter is based on my work with Yoram Bachrach, Konstantin Kosenko, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein and Yoav Wilf in which we provide a nouvelle method for identifying control relations in complex ownership structures. We apply weighted voting games literature as a theoretical framework and use the Shapley-Shubik power index to determine control rights. Our method performs a simultaneous analysis of both the specific ownership map within the corporation and the corporate network in which the firm is embedded. Overcoming hard computational challenges, we implemented our algorithm into a computer program that can effciently analyse big complex datasets of corporate ownership and identify control relations. The second chapter is based on my work with Elias Papaioannou. We describe the patterns of corporate control and ownership in a dataset covering more than 45; 000 listed firms from 127 countries over 2004 - 2012. Employing a plethora of original and secondary sources, big data techniques, and applying the Shapley-Shubik algorithm we trace ultimate controlling shareholders. First, we document considerable and persistent heterogeneity in corporate control and ownership concentration, and that the recent global financial crisis did not affect them much. Second, we find economically large differences in ownership and control patterns across legal families. In particualr, that government and family control are pervasive in civil-law countries, and that equity blocks in widely-held corporations are commonplace, but less so in common-law countries. These patterns apply to large, medium, and small firms. Third, the link between underdevelopment and control applies solely to large firms. Fourth, we examine possible underlying mechanisms, and find that shareholder rights against insiders' self-dealing activities matter crucially to control and ownership concentration, though legal formalism, creditor's rights, or product market regulation do not. Finally, we find that corporate control is strongly related to labour market regulation. In the third chapter I investigate the relation between ownership structure and the presence of informed traders, liquidity and idiosyncratic volatility, focusing on business groups affiliated listed firms. I develop a measure called centrality which intends to capture the potential loss of private benefits of control. My analysis indicates that central firms experience support from the group in bad times, and I argue that this limits the informational advantage of informed investors. I show that centrality is negatively related to the informational content of short sales, to their profitability and to their intensity. Furthermore, the liquidity of central firms is higher, and their idiosyncratic volatility is lower compared to non-central firms