Intergenerational transfers in rural households: A game theoretical approach

The household membership decision is viewed as a “research project” where the offspring invests in human and non human capital to influence the probability of finding an alternative to the parental household. The problem is formulated as a differential game between a selfish offspring and altruistic parents. The solution is consistent with facts” such as the “flexibility of inheritance systems” and the “generational fragmentation” of the family property when the economic opportunities expand outside the parental household.intergenerational transfers, rural households, game theory

Forest owners’ collective action against the risk of forest fire: a game theoretical approach

This paper is a follow up on a earlier one (Mendes, 1998) where I proposed a series of models for forest owners associations represented as organisation made up of two groups of strategically interacting players: the forest owners who are members of the association and the board of directors they have elected. The directors decide on the amount of services provided by the association which can be public goods (collective representation of the members, promotion of their common interests, diffusion of general information about forest programmes and best forest management practices, etc.) and private goods and services (silvicultural works preventive of forest fires, technical advice, etc.). The models were set up as games in strategic form with complete information and no payoff uncertainty. Here I pick up the second of, what is called in that previous paper, the "Portuguese" models and extend it in the following directions: - there is payoff risk for the forest owners due to exogenous hazards (forest fires or others); - forest owners can buy private services from the owners which contribute to reduce the losses resulting from those hazards. The main focus in this paper is to derive the comparative static results about the demand of these private services by the forest owners.forest owners’ associations, public and private goods joint supply, game theory

Participation of non-industrial private forest owners in National Forest Programmes: a discrete choice model for Northern Portugal

In countries where private forest ownership is very important, knowledge of the behaviour of private forest owners is useful for the design and implementation of successful forest policies. This applies to Portugal where 86 % of the forest lands are private property. This paper presents a study carried out in a region of the Northern part of the country covered by a local forest owners’ association. Based on individual data about the members of this association concerning some of their characteristics (implementation of publicly subsidised afforestation projects, size of the forest holdings, number of forest holdings belonging to the same owner and distance between the permanent residence of the owner and his forest holdings), a multinomial logit model is estimated for the probabilities of participation on public incentive schemes to finance individual and grouped afforestation projects.non industrial private forest owners, afforestation projects, public incentives

A Game Theoretical Model of Land Contract Choice

In most of the land tenancy literature the type of contract is exogenous. Also even though these contracts vary a lot among farms, between regions and over time, the theoretical literature has not always acknowledged this idiosyncrasy. Building on the strategic bargaining theory initiated by Rubinstein, this model not only makes the type of contract endogenous, but also provides the surplus sharing rules and the conditions giving rise to each type of contract, showing how the type and terms of the contract are tailored to fit the characteristics of the parties and their economic environment. Pairwise bargaining is embedded into a market context by putting “competitive pressure” on the players through the opportunity they have to break up bargaining and look for alternative partners. Because of this threat of opting out, the outcome of the bargaining process depends not only on the characteristics of the players, but also on events outside their match and the information they have about them. The model departs from price-taking assumptions. Type and terms of the contract result from negotiation and are shaped by the “relative bargaining powers” of the players whose relevant components are identified in a precise way in the model.land tenancy, sharecropping, land contract choice, game theory

Values, norms, transactions and organizations

This paper may be considered an essay on metaeconomics, since it deals with the meaning of several concepts often left undefined, or very briefly defined in economic theories. These concepts are the following: value including the values of things and moral values, social norms or institutions, social power, goods and services, transactions and organizations (firms, and others). The paper starts by proposing a general concept of value, encompassing both the value of things and moral values. From this concept it proceeds to the definition of six different types of values of things and moral values and to the concept of value transformation process of things which includes all the operations dealt with in economic theory as well as many other human actions. The last part of the paper starts with the distinction between moral values and social norms (or institutions) and the roles of social power and human organization in connecting the domains of morality and social normativity. The paper proceeds by distinguishing different types of norms, including possession norms which are important for defining the concepts of goods and services and transaction processes.

Luzes e sombras da globalização

O autor versa aqui sobre o fenómeno da globalização, centrando a sua atenção sobretudo no plano económico (predomínio da economia de mercado), decorrente da sua natureza expansionista. Além disso, tem em conta o efeito das novas tecnologias da informação e a expansão das democracias e da inerente afirmação dos direitos humanos. Analisa a potencialidade de conflitos decorrente das tensões entre democracia e economia de mercado. Aponta algumas pistas de actuação, em face da situação analisada

Organizações de Economia Social: O que as distingue e como podem ser sustentáveis

This paper starts with a critical analysis of the concept of "non-profit organizations" and the concept of "social economy sector". It proposes an alternative concept of social economy organizations as based on an economic definition of their outputs and inputs. This definition is expanded by identifying the economic specificities of these organizations relevant for their sustainability. To end, the paper reviews various factors that may contribute for such sustainability.Neste artigo começa-se por fazer uma análise crítica do conceito de "organizações sem fins lucrativos" e do conceito de "sector da economia social". Em alternativa propõe-se um conceito de organizações de economia social fundado numa definição económica dos seus produtos e dos fatores utilizados na sua produção. Esta definição é, depois, desenvolvida identificando várias especificidades económicas desta organizações com relevância para a sua sustentabilidade. Na parte final do artigo passam-se em revista vários fatores que podem contribuir para essa sustentabilidade