167 research outputs found
The evolution of strategic timing in collective-risk dilemmas
In collective-risk dilemmas, a group needs to collaborate over time to avoid a catastrophic event. This gives rise to a coordination game with many equilibria, including equilibria where no one contributes, and thus no measures against the catastrophe are taken. In this game, the timing of contributions becomes a strategic variable that allows individuals to interact and influence one another. Herein, we use evolutionary game theory to study the impact of strategic timing on equilibrium selection. Depending on the risk of catastrophe, we identify three characteristic regimes. For low risks, defection is the only equilibrium, whereas high risks promote equilibria with sufficient contributions. Intermediate risks pose the biggest challenge for cooperation. In this risk regime, the option to interact over time is critical; if individuals can contribute over several rounds, then the group has a higher chance to succeed, and the expected welfare increases. This positive effect of timing is of particular importance in larger groups, where successful coordination becomes increasingly difficul
Time scales and wave formation in non-linear spatial public goods games
The co-evolutionary dynamics of competing populations can be strongly affected by frequency-dependent selection and spatial population structure. As co-evolving populations grow into a spatial domain, their initial spatial arrangement and their growth rate differences are important factors that determine the long-term outcome. We here model producer and free-rider co-evolution in the context of a diffusive public good (PG) that is produced by the producers at a cost but evokes local concentration-dependent growth benefits to all. The benefit of the PG can be non-linearly dependent on public good concentration. We consider the spatial growth dynamics of producers and free-riders in one, two and three dimensions by modeling producer cell, free-rider cell and public good densities in space, driven by the processes of birth, death and diffusion (cell movement and public good distribution). Typically, one population goes extinct, but the time-scale of this process varies with initial conditions and the growth rate functions. We establish that spatial variation is transient regardless of dimensionality, and that structured initial conditions lead to increasing times to get close to an extinction state, called Īµ-extinction time. Further, we find that uncorrelated initial spatial structures do not influence this Īµ-extinction time in comparison to a corresponding well-mixed (non-spatial) system. In order to estimate the Īµ-extinction time of either free-riders or producers we derive a slow manifold solution. For invading populations, i.e. for populations that are initially highly segregated, we observe a traveling wave, whose speed can be calculated. Our results provide quantitative predictions for the transient spatial dynamics of cooperative traits under pressure of extinction
Neighborhood size-effects shape growing population dynamics in evolutionary public goods games
An evolutionary game emerges when a subset of individuals incur costs to provide benefits to all individuals. Public goods games (PGG) cover the essence of such dilemmas in which cooperators are prone to exploitation by defectors. We model the population dynamics of a non-linear\ua0PGG and consider density-dependence on the global level, while the game occurs within local neighborhoods. At low cooperation, increases in the public good provide increasing returns. At high cooperation, increases provide diminishing returns. This mechanism leads to diverse evolutionarily stable strategies, including monomorphic and polymorphic populations, and neighborhood-size-driven state changes, resulting in hysteresis between equilibria. Stochastic or strategy-dependent variations in neighborhood sizes favor coexistence by destabilizing monomorphic states. We integrate our model with experiments of cancer cell growth and confirm that our framework describes PGG dynamics observed in cellular populations. Our findings advance the understanding of how neighborhood-size effects in PGG shape the dynamics of growing populations. \ua9 2019, The Author(s)
Autocrine signaling can explain the emergence of Allee effects in cancer cell populations
In many human cancers, the rate of cell growth depends crucially on the size of the tumour cell population. Low, zero, or negative growth at low population densities is known as the Allee effect; this effect has been studied extensively in ecology, but so far lacks a good explanation in the cancer setting. Here, we formulate and analyze an individual-based model of cancer, in which cell division rates are increased by the local concentration of an autocrine growth factor produced by the cancer cells themselves. We show, analytically and by simulation, that autocrine signaling suffices to cause both strong and weak Allee effects. Whether low cell densities lead to negative (strong effect) or reduced (weak effect) growth rate depends directly on the ratio of cell death to proliferation, and indirectly on cellular dispersal. Our model is consistent with experimental observations from three patient-derived brain tumor cell lines grown at different densities. We propose that further studying and quantifying population-wide feedback, impacting cell growth, will be central for advancing our understanding of cancer dynamics and treatment, potentially exploiting Allee effects for therapy
Stochastic slowdown in evolutionary processes
We examine birth--death processes with state dependent transition
probabilities and at least one absorbing boundary. In evolution, this describes
selection acting on two different types in a finite population where
reproductive events occur successively. If the two types have equal fitness the
system performs a random walk. If one type has a fitness advantage it is
favored by selection, which introduces a bias (asymmetry) in the transition
probabilities. How long does it take until advantageous mutants have invaded
and taken over? Surprisingly, we find that the average time of such a process
can increase, even if the mutant type always has a fitness advantage. We
discuss this finding for the Moran process and develop a simplified model which
allows a more intuitive understanding. We show that this effect can occur for
weak but non--vanishing bias (selection) in the state dependent transition
rates and infer the scaling with system size. We also address the Wright-Fisher
model commonly used in population genetics, which shows that this stochastic
slowdown is not restricted to birth-death processes.Comment: 8 pages, 3 figures, accepted for publicatio
The edge of neutral evolution in social dilemmas
The functioning of animal as well as human societies fundamentally relies on
cooperation. Yet, defection is often favorable for the selfish individual, and
social dilemmas arise. Selection by individuals' fitness, usually the basic
driving force of evolution, quickly eliminates cooperators. However, evolution
is also governed by fluctuations that can be of greater importance than fitness
differences, and can render evolution effectively neutral. Here, we investigate
the effects of selection versus fluctuations in social dilemmas. By studying
the mean extinction times of cooperators and defectors, a variable sensitive to
fluctuations, we are able to identify and quantify an emerging 'edge of neutral
evolution' that delineates regimes of neutral and Darwinian evolution. Our
results reveal that cooperation is significantly maintained in the neutral
regimes. In contrast, the classical predictions of evolutionary game theory,
where defectors beat cooperators, are recovered in the Darwinian regimes. Our
studies demonstrate that fluctuations can provide a surprisingly simple way to
partly resolve social dilemmas. Our methods are generally applicable to
estimate the role of random drift in evolutionary dynamics.Comment: 17 pages, 4 figure
Sphinx measurements of the 2009 solar minimum x-ray emission
The SphinX X-ray spectrophotometer on the CORONAS-PHOTON spacecraft measured
soft X-ray emission in the 1-15 keV energy range during the deep solar minimum
of 2009 with a sensitivity much greater than GOES. Several intervals are
identified when the X-ray flux was exceptionally low, and the flux and solar
X-ray luminosity are estimated. Spectral fits to the emission at these times
give temperatures of 1.7-1.9 MK and emission measures between 4 x 10^47 cm^-3
and 1.1 x 10^48 cm^-3. Comparing SphinX emission with that from the Hinode
X-ray Telescope, we deduce that most of the emission is from general coronal
structures rather than confined features like bright points. For one of 27
intervals of exceptionally low activity identified in the SphinX data, the
Sun's X-ray luminosity in an energy range roughly extrapolated to that of ROSAT
(0.1-2.4 keV) was less than most nearby K and M dwarfs.Comment: Astrophysical Journal, in press. 14 pp, 3 figure
Large Fluctuations and Fixation in Evolutionary Games
We study large fluctuations in evolutionary games belonging to the
coordination and anti-coordination classes. The dynamics of these games,
modeling cooperation dilemmas, is characterized by a coexistence fixed point
separating two absorbing states. We are particularly interested in the problem
of fixation that refers to the possibility that a few mutants take over the
entire population. Here, the fixation phenomenon is induced by large
fluctuations and is investigated by a semi-classical WKB
(Wentzel-Kramers-Brillouin) theory generalized to treat stochastic systems
possessing multiple absorbing states. Importantly, this method allows us to
analyze the combined influence of selection and random fluctuations on the
evolutionary dynamics \textit{beyond} the weak selection limit often considered
in previous works. We accurately compute, including pre-exponential factors,
the probability distribution function in the long-lived coexistence state and
the mean fixation time necessary for a few mutants to take over the entire
population in anti-coordination games, and also the fixation probability in the
coordination class. Our analytical results compare excellently with extensive
numerical simulations. Furthermore, we demonstrate that our treatment is
superior to the Fokker-Planck approximation when the selection intensity is
finite.Comment: 17 pages, 10 figures, to appear in JSTA
Urban informality and confinement: toward a relational framework
In the 21st century, a growing number of people live āinformalā lives within fissures between legality and informality. Concomitantly, power relations are increasingly expressed through devices of confinement. While urban informality and confinement are on the rise often occurring simultaneously, scholars have so far studied them separately. By contrast, this article proposes a new framework for analysing urban informality and confinement relationally. It generates new insights into the role of informality in the (re)production of confinement and, vice versa, the role of confinement in shaping informal practices. While these insights are valuable for urban studies in general, the article charts new lines of research on urban marginality. It also discusses how the six articles included in this special issue signal the heuristic potential of this relational framework by empirically examining distinct urban configurations of āconfined informalitiesā and āinformal confinementsā across the Global North and the Global South
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