Competitive Equilibria in Decentralized Matching with Incomplete Information

This paper shows that all perfect Bayesian equilibria of a decentralized dynamic matching market with two-sided incomplete information of independent private values variety converge to competitive equilibria. Each buyer wants to purchase a bundle of heterogeneous, indivisible goods and each seller owns one unit of a heterogeneous indivisible good (as in Kelso and Crawford (1982) or Gul and Stacchetti (1999)). Buyer preferences and endowments as well as seller costs are private information. Agents engage in costly search and meet randomly. The terms of trade are determined through bilateral bargaining between buyers and sellers. The paper considers a market in steady state. It is shown that as frictions, i.e., discounting and fixed costs of search become small, all equilibria of the market game converge to perfectly competitive equilibria.Bargaining, Search, Matching

Competitive Equilibria in Decentralized Matching with Incomplete Information

This paper shows that all perfect Bayesian equilibria of a dynamic matching game with two-sided incomplete information of independent private values variety are asymptotically Walrasian. Buyers purchase a bundle of heterogeneous, indivisible goods and sellers own one unit of an indivisible good. Buyer preferences and endowments as well as seller costs are private information. Agents engage in costly search and meet randomly. The terms of trade are determined through a Bayesian mechanism proposal game. The paper considers a market in steady state. As discounting and the fixed cost of search become small, all trade takes place at a Walrasian price. However, a robust example is presented where the limit price vector is a Walrasian price for an economy where only a strict subsets of the goods in the original economy are traded, i.e, markets are missing at the limit. Nevertheless, there exists a sequence of equilibria that converge to a Walrasian equilibria for the whole economy where all markets are open.Conditional CAPM

Burnout among surgeons before and during the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic: an international survey

Background: SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has had many significant impacts within the surgical realm, and surgeons have been obligated to reconsider almost every aspect of daily clinical practice. Methods: This is a cross-sectional study reported in compliance with the CHERRIES guidelines and conducted through an online platform from June 14th to July 15th, 2020. The primary outcome was the burden of burnout during the pandemic indicated by the validated Shirom-Melamed Burnout Measure. Results: Nine hundred fifty-four surgeons completed the survey. The median length of practice was 10 years; 78.2% included were male with a median age of 37 years old, 39.5% were consultants, 68.9% were general surgeons, and 55.7% were affiliated with an academic institution. Overall, there was a significant increase in the mean burnout score during the pandemic; longer years of practice and older age were significantly associated with less burnout. There were significant reductions in the median number of outpatient visits, operated cases, on-call hours, emergency visits, and research work, so, 48.2% of respondents felt that the training resources were insufficient. The majority (81.3%) of respondents reported that their hospitals were included in the management of COVID-19, 66.5% felt their roles had been minimized; 41% were asked to assist in non-surgical medical practices, and 37.6% of respondents were included in COVID-19 management. Conclusions: There was a significant burnout among trainees. Almost all aspects of clinical and research activities were affected with a significant reduction in the volume of research, outpatient clinic visits, surgical procedures, on-call hours, and emergency cases hindering the training. Trial registration: The study was registered on clicaltrials.gov "NCT04433286" on 16/06/2020

Stochastic convexity in dynamic programming

This paper explores sufficient conditions for a continuous stationary Markov optimal policy and a concave value function in stochastic dynamic programming problems. Also, the paper addresses conditions needed for the differentiability of the value function. The paper uses conditions such as first order stochastic dominance, second order stochastic dominance and concave stochastic dominance that are widely applied in economics. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003Keywords and Phrases:Dynamic programming, Stochastic dominance, Concave value function, Differentiable value function., JEL Classification Numbers:C61, O41, D80, D90.,

REPUTATION WITH LONG RUN PLAYERS

Previous work shows that reputation results may fail in repeated games with long-run players with equal discount factors. Attention is restricted to extensive-form stage games of perfect information. One and two-sided reputation results are provided for repeated games with two long-run players with equal discount factors where the first mover advantage is maximal. If one of the players is a Stackelberg type with positive probability, then that player receives the highest payoff, that is part of an individually rational payoff profile, in any perfect equilibria, as agents become patient. If both players are Stackelberg types with positive probability, then perfect equilibrium payoffs converge to a unique payoff vector; and the equilibrium play converges to the unique equilibrium of a continuous time war of attrition. All results generalize to simultaneous move stage games, if the stage game is a game of strictly conflicting interest