Gathering the limbs of the text in Shelley Jackson’s "Patchwork girl"

Shelley Jackson’s Patchwork Girl is not simply a new recreation of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein in hypertext format; it also tries to develop some of the implications in the original text from the paradigms of contemporary science and criticism. This study is an attempt to bring to light the ways in which these paradigms, characterized by their emphasis on fragmentariness, are made to interact dialogically with Shelley’s novel in order to produce a postmodern version of the old Promethean myth. Apart from exploring the filial connections that one might expect in any rewriting exercise, this essay focuses on the way Jackson questions the concept of authorship, origin(ality) and literary property, and related issues such as intertextuality and assemblage, all of which are indices of the theoretical concerns underlying Jackson's text and of the ways in which it follows, re-writes or invites us to re-read Shelley's “hideous progeny

Is Testimonial Injustice Epistemic? Let Me Count the Ways

This work was funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy (Project FFI2016-80088-P, FPI Predoctoral Fellow BES-2017-079933), the Spanish Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports (FPU16/04185), the Spanish Ministry of Science (PID2019-109764RB-I00), Junta de Andalucia (B-HUM-459-UGR18), and the FiloLab Group of Excellence funded by the University of Granada.Miranda Fricker distinguishes two senses in which testimonial injustice is epistemic. In the primary sense, it is epistemic because it harms the victim as a giver of knowledge. In the secondary sense, it is epistemic, more narrowly, because it harms the victim as a possessor of knowledge. Her characterization of testimonial injustice has raised the following objection: testimonial injustice is not always an epistemic injustice, in the narrow, secondary sense, as it does not always entail that the victim is harmed as a knowledge-possessor. By adopting a perspective based on Robert Brandom’s normative expressivism, we respond to this objection by arguing that there is a close connection, conceptual and constitutive rather than merely causal, between the primary and the secondary epistemic harms of testimonial injustice, such that testimonial injustice always involves both kinds of epistemic harm. We do so by exploring the logic and functioning of belief and knowledge ascriptions in order to highlight three ways in which the secondary epistemic harm caused by testimonial injustice crystallizes: it undermines the epistemic agency of the victim, the epistemic friction necessary for knowledge, and the possibility of occupying particular epistemic nodes.Spanish Government FFI2016-80088-P BES-2017-079933 FPU16/04185 PID2019-109764RB-I00Junta de Andalucia B-HUM-459-UGR18FiloLab Group of Excellence - University of Granad

Exactamente, ¿qué quieres decir?

This work was funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy (Project FFI2016-80088-P, FPI Predoctoral Fellow BES-2017-079933), the Spanish Ministry of Science (PID2019-109764RB-I00), Junta de Andalucia (B-HUM-459-UGR18), and the University of Granada (FiloLab Excellence Unit).The purpose of this paper is to explore the boundaries of a subset of the evaluative uses of language: offensive speech. More in particular, our goal is twofold. Firstly, we want to chart the relationship between context and evaluative utterances, as it stands in the current literature. Secondly, we focus on the experimental study of a particular interaction between contextual information and our evaluative claims –when the context is able to turn a seemingly descriptive utterance into an evaluative one. For this second purpose, we argue, certain recent positive proposals, in spite of their merit, come a bit short.El propósito de este trabajo es explorar los límites de un subconjunto de los usos evaluativos del lenguaje: el discurso ofensivo. Nuestro objetivo es doble. Primero, introducimos la relación que hay entre el contexto y las proferencias evaluativas, tal y como puede rastrearse en la literatura reciente acerca de la cuestión. Segundo, nos centramos en el estudio experimental de una interacción particular entre la información contextual y nuestras afirmaciones evaluativas: cuándo el contexto es capaz de convertir una proferencia aparentemente descriptiva en una evaluativa. Para este segundo propósito, argumentamos, ciertas propuestas positivas recientes, a pesar de su mérito, son insuficientes.Spanish Ministry of Economy FFI2016-80088-P BES-2017-079933Spanish Government PID2019-109764RB-I00Junta de Andalucia B-HUM-459-UGR18University of Granad

Wittgenstein y la hipótesis del espectro visual invertido

Un caso de inversión peligrosa del espectro visual es aquél en el que dos personas tienen impresiones visuales distintas cuando ven el mismo objeto y sin embargo coinciden al afirmar que el objeto es, por ejemplo, rojo. De acuerdo con Ned Block, si los casos de inversión del espectro visual son concebibles, entonces puede construirse un argumento a favor de la existencia de los qualia: si dos sujetos tienen distintas impresiones visuales, entonces deben estar diciendo cosas distintas cuando profieren "esto es rojo" al describir su modo de ver el mismo objeto. Según Block, Wittgenstein se comprometió con la posibilidad de un tipo de inversión del espectro visual que permite defender la existencia de los qualia y, sin embargo, Wittgenstein parece oponerse a la idea de los qualia, luego hay una incoherencia en su pensamiento. Nuestra tesis en este trabajo es que el argumento de Block no es un problema para la posición de Wittgenstein con respecto al significado de los términos relativos a la percepción y que tal incoherencia en su pensamiento es solo aparente.  TITLE: Wittgenstein and the Inverted Spectrum HypothesisABSTRACTA case of dangerous inverted spectrum is that one in which two subjects have different impressions when they see the same object and both claim, for example, that the object is red. According to Ned Block, if cases of dangerous inverted spectrum are conceivable, then we can offer an argument in favour of existence of qualia: two subjects with inverted spectrum don’t mean the same when they utter that the object is red. According to Block, Wittgenstein accepted the possibility of a kind of case of inverted spectrum that allows to defend the existence of qualia, and nevertheless Wittgenstein seems to be opposed to the idea of qualia. There is thus, it seems, an incoherence in the Wittgensteinian thought. Our thesis in this paper is that Wittgensteinian’ discussion about the inverted spectrum hypothesis is a particular discussion about the grammar of perceptual terms that pretends to show the irrelevance of our sensations in determining the meaning of perceptual terms. From this interpretation, the discussion of a case of inverted spectrum does not mean the commitment with the possibility of that case, and then such incoherence on Wittgenstein’ thought is only apparent.