Law, Democracy, and Constitutionalism: Reflections on Evans v Attorney General

AbstractThe difference of judicial opinion in the Supreme Court in Evans provokes reflection on fundamental constitutional principles, such as parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law. A statute that on its face seems to permit a government minister to override a judicial decision of which he disapproves inevitably raises acute concern; the correct reading of the statute depends on the most persuasive integration of basic principles, placing the text within its wider constitutional context. The Justices deployed distinctions between law, fact, and public interest in rather different ways, reflecting their divergent interpretative approaches. The role of constitutional convention is also of particular interest – central to the legal issues arising, on one view, but largely irrelevant on another. At the root of these disagreements lie contrasting conceptions of law and adjudication.This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Cambridge University Press via http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0008197315000951

The moral unity of public law

Instead of a public law fragmented into discrete departments, we should envisage a unified scheme of constitutional rights and legal standards, expressing a coherent moral theory of the rule of law. That moral theory underpins all legitimate legal orders, properly respectful of human dignity; and common law adjudication is best understood as the working out, according to context, of the practical implications of the theory. An initial focus on more local legal tradition ultimately leads to a broader inquiry about the true demands of human rights and civil liberties, offering the prospect of a larger vision of democratic constitutionalism. While Jeremy Waldron has doubted the similarity between legal analysis and moral reasoning – rejecting an analogy with Rawlsian reflective equilibrium – his view may be contested. A common law judge who attempts to reason morally in the name of the whole society, in the manner suggested by Ronald Dworkin’s theory of integrity, must take account of those legal texts and precedents that political morality makes pertinent. Legal reasoning is simply moral reasoning, attentive to historical and political context. This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from the University of Toronto Press via https://doi.org/10.3138/UTLJ.395

Judicial Review, Irrationality, and the Limits of Intervention by the Courts

When exercising judicial review, the courts, on occasions, have intervened in circumstances where administrative decisions were not irrational. However, these low standards of judicial intervention are arguably constitutional, especially since the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). To this end, this article seeks to establish a zone of executive decision-making, for reasons of democracy, where the courts are clearly excluded. But it is unable to do so. Does this mean, therefore, that judicial intervention on the grounds of irrationality exists without limit? Assuming this to be the case, it is suggested that the courts should show greater respect to the administrative branch of the state where it has genuinely sought to engage with the legal process in arriving at its decisions

Why the law is what it ought to be

When legal practice satisfies certain modest conditions of legitimacy, affirming the equal dignity of persons, the law is what it ought to be. It provides the morally appropriate basis for the resolution of disputes between people who may disagree about what justice, ideally conceived, requires. Specific rules or rulings are properly interpreted in accordance with legal and constitutional principle, which tracks the nature and boundaries of legitimate government. Procedural and substantive moral standards are encompassed within an appropriate conception of the rule of law. The law is thereby constituted the measure of justice for the political community: a public conception of justice is substituted for conflicting private ones. Our legal obligations are precisely the moral obligations we owe as citizens, faithful to that community. We honour the demands of justice by obedience to law—the law that obtains in virtue of adherence to the ideal of the rule of law

Principle, Practice, and Precedent: Vindicating Justice, According to Law

Legal judgment, I argue, entails moral judgment; legal obligations, correctly identified, are genuine moral obligations. Dworkin’s legal theory is instructive, but problematic: his account of integrity fails to provide a convincing reconciliation of practice and principle. We can, however, defend a superior account in which the moral ideals that we invoke to justify legal practice—affirming its legitimacy under certain conditions—retain their force throughout our judgments about its specific demands in particular cases. Common law reasoning exemplifies that approach, reflecting the interdependence of practice and principle. It is an internal, interpretative inquiry, drawing on the moral resources of our own tradition, treated as an influential guide to the requirements of justice. The law is constituted, accordingly, neither by its socially authoritative sources, whatever their merits, nor by the moral effects of our legal practice. It is rather the scheme of justice we construct in our continuing efforts to bring our practice closer to the ideals that inspire and redeem it

Realism and analysis within public law

Allan, Loughlin and Walker represent leading theorists within the realm of public law analysis. Accordingly, when such theorists write on a similar topic, such as that of the theory of constitutionalism, it can be assumed that their analysis and evaluation of the theory represents a ‘realistic’ account. However, close examination of their writings does not reveal similarity but instead much divergence, even incompatibility. This then raises the question, how can such diversity represent reality? If all three theorists are examining the same phenomenon then surely there must be some similarity between their accounts for there to be reality? Alternatively, if all the perceptions of the theorists are indeed real, then perhaps it is the way that public lawyers represent reality that needs to be examined