12 research outputs found

    On The Similarity Metric

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    In mathematics, and more specifically in topology, the notion of distance metric is well known since the nineteenth century. It is used to measure the difference between two objects. When it comes to characterizing the similarity between two objects, a similarity metric is needed. Although widely used in computer science, such a metric is not clearly defined mathematically. We fill in the existing gap in the current literature concerning similarity metrics, connecting them to the well-known notion of partial metrics in general topology

    Ehrhart positivity and Demazure characters

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    Demazure characters, also known as key polynomials, generalize the classical Schur polynomials. In particular, when all variables are set equal to 11, these polynomials count the number of integer points in a certain class of Gelfand--Tsetlin polytopes. This property highlights the interaction between the corresponding polyhedral and combinatorial structures via Ehrhart theory. In this paper, we give an overview of results concerning the interplay between the geometry of Gelfand-Tsetlin polytopes and their Ehrhart polynomials. Motivated by strong computer evidence, we propose several conjectures about the non-negativity of the coefficients of such polynomials.Comment: To appear in the conference proceedings of the Summer workshop on lattice polytopes, Osaka 201

    Are Terrorist Networks Just Glorified Criminal Cells?

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    The notions of organized crime and terrorism have an old and rich history around the globe. Researchers and practitioners have been studying events and phenomena related to these notions for a long time. There are pointers in the literature in which it is misleading to see the unfair comparison between terrorist and criminal networks with the argument that all actors involved in these networks are simply evil individuals. In this paper, we conduct a systematic study of the operational structure of such networks from a network science perspective. We highlight some of the major differences between them and support our hypothesis with analytical evidence. We hope our work will impact current and future endeavors in counter terrorism, especially within the cyber realm, inside the United States of America and across our allied nations

    Adversarial Machine Learning in Network Intrusion Detection Systems

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    Adversarial examples are inputs to a machine learning system intentionally crafted by an attacker to fool the model into producing an incorrect output. These examples have achieved a great deal of success in several domains such as image recognition, speech recognition and spam detection. In this paper, we study the nature of the adversarial problem in Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS). We focus on the attack perspective, which includes techniques to generate adversarial examples capable of evading a variety of machine learning models. More specifically, we explore the use of evolutionary computation (particle swarm optimization and genetic algorithm) and deep learning (generative adversarial networks) as tools for adversarial example generation. To assess the performance of these algorithms in evading a NIDS, we apply them to two publicly available data sets, namely the NSL-KDD and UNSW-NB15, and we contrast them to a baseline perturbation method: Monte Carlo simulation. The results show that our adversarial example generation techniques cause high misclassification rates in eleven different machine learning models, along with a voting classifier. Our work highlights the vulnerability of machine learning based NIDS in the face of adversarial perturbation.Comment: 25 pages, 6 figures, 4 table

    Intelligent Feature Engineering for Cybersecurity

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    Feature engineering and selection is a critical step in the implementation of any machine learning system. In application areas such as intrusion detection for cybersecurity, this task is made more complicated by the diverse data types and ranges presented in both raw data packets and derived data fields. Additionally, the time and context specific nature of the data requires domain expertise to properly engineer the features while minimizing any potential information loss. Many previous efforts in this area naively apply techniques for feature engineering that are successful in image recognition applications. In this work, we use network packet dataflows from the Defense Research and Engineering Network (DREN) and the Engineer Research and Development Center\u27s (ERDC) high performance computing systems to experimentally analyze various methods of feature engineering. The results of this research provide insight on the suitability of the features for machine learning based cybersecurity applications

    Efficient quantum loading of probability distributions through Feynman propagators

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    We present quantum algorithms for the loading of probability distributions using Hamiltonian simulation for one dimensional Hamiltonians of the form H^=Δ+V(x)I{\hat H}= \Delta + V(x) \mathbb{I}. We consider the potentials V(x)V(x) for which the Feynman propagator is known to have an analytically closed form and utilize these Hamiltonians to load probability distributions including the normal, Laplace and Maxwell-Boltzmann into quantum states. We also propose a variational method for probability distribution loading based on constructing a coarse approximation to the distribution in the form of a `ladder state' and then projecting onto the ground state of a Hamiltonian chosen to have the desired probability distribution as ground state. These methods extend the suite of techniques available for the loading of probability distributions, and are more efficient than general purpose data loading methods used in quantum machine learning.Comment: 50 pages, 44 figure

    A Machine Learning Pressure Emulator for Hydrogen Embrittlement

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    A recent alternative for hydrogen transportation as a mixture with natural gas is blending it into natural gas pipelines. However, hydrogen embrittlement of material is a major concern for scientists and gas installation designers to avoid process failures. In this paper, we propose a physics-informed machine learning model to predict the gas pressure on the pipes' inner wall. Despite its high-fidelity results, the current PDE-based simulators are time- and computationally-demanding. Using simulation data, we train an ML model to predict the pressure on the pipelines' inner walls, which is a first step for pipeline system surveillance. We found that the physics-based method outperformed the purely data-driven method and satisfy the physical constraints of the gas flow system

    Introducing v0.5 of the AI Safety Benchmark from MLCommons

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    This paper introduces v0.5 of the AI Safety Benchmark, which has been created by the MLCommons AI Safety Working Group. The AI Safety Benchmark has been designed to assess the safety risks of AI systems that use chat-tuned language models. We introduce a principled approach to specifying and constructing the benchmark, which for v0.5 covers only a single use case (an adult chatting to a general-purpose assistant in English), and a limited set of personas (i.e., typical users, malicious users, and vulnerable users). We created a new taxonomy of 13 hazard categories, of which 7 have tests in the v0.5 benchmark. We plan to release version 1.0 of the AI Safety Benchmark by the end of 2024. The v1.0 benchmark will provide meaningful insights into the safety of AI systems. However, the v0.5 benchmark should not be used to assess the safety of AI systems. We have sought to fully document the limitations, flaws, and challenges of v0.5. This release of v0.5 of the AI Safety Benchmark includes (1) a principled approach to specifying and constructing the benchmark, which comprises use cases, types of systems under test (SUTs), language and context, personas, tests, and test items; (2) a taxonomy of 13 hazard categories with definitions and subcategories; (3) tests for seven of the hazard categories, each comprising a unique set of test items, i.e., prompts. There are 43,090 test items in total, which we created with templates; (4) a grading system for AI systems against the benchmark; (5) an openly available platform, and downloadable tool, called ModelBench that can be used to evaluate the safety of AI systems on the benchmark; (6) an example evaluation report which benchmarks the performance of over a dozen openly available chat-tuned language models; (7) a test specification for the benchmark

    Introducing v0.5 of the AI Safety Benchmark from MLCommons

    Get PDF
    This paper introduces v0.5 of the AI Safety Benchmark, which has been created by the MLCommons AI Safety Working Group. The AI Safety Benchmark has been designed to assess the safety risks of AI systems that use chat-tuned language models. We introduce a principled approach to specifying and constructing the benchmark, which for v0.5 covers only a single use case (an adult chatting to a general-purpose assistant in English), and a limited set of personas (i.e., typical users, malicious users, and vulnerable users). We created a new taxonomy of 13 hazard categories, of which 7 have tests in the v0.5 benchmark. We plan to release version 1.0 of the AI Safety Benchmark by the end of 2024. The v1.0 benchmark will provide meaningful insights into the safety of AI systems. However, the v0.5 benchmark should not be used to assess the safety of AI systems. We have sought to fully document the limitations, flaws, and challenges of v0.5. This release of v0.5 of the AI Safety Benchmark includes (1) a principled approach to specifying and constructing the benchmark, which comprises use cases, types of systems under test (SUTs), language and context, personas, tests, and test items; (2) a taxonomy of 13 hazard categories with definitions and subcategories; (3) tests for seven of the hazard categories, each comprising a unique set of test items, i.e., prompts. There are 43,090 test items in total, which we created with templates; (4) a grading system for AI systems against the benchmark; (5) an openly available platform, and downloadable tool, called ModelBench that can be used to evaluate the safety of AI systems on the benchmark; (6) an example evaluation report which benchmarks the performance of over a dozen openly available chat-tuned language models; (7) a test specification for the benchmark
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