Philosophy of NanoTechnoScience

Nanoscientific research has been characterized as an “engineering way of being in science.” This mode of research calls for a philosophy of technoscience that investigates the four questions: i) What is the role of theory and theory-development in nanoscale research, and what kinds of theories are needed for nanotechnological development? ii) What are the preferred methods and tools and the associated modes of reasoning in nanoscientific research? iii) What is nanotechnoscience and how are its objects constituted? iv) What kind of knowledge do technoscientific researchers typically produce and communicate? The consideration of these questions yields a survey of nanotechnoscience in terms of disciplinary questions (a complex field partially disclosed by stretching closed theories), of methodology (constructions and qualitative judgments of likeness), of ontology (a thin conception of nature as unlimited potential), and of epistemology (acquisition and demonstration of capabilities). In all four cases, the strictly philosophical discussion leads to societal dimensions and questions of value

Collapse of Distance: Epistemic Strategies of Science and Technoscience

Already the title of this paper shoulders too heavy a burden of proof. By contrasting science and technoscience it alludes to an epochal break or fundamental shift in the culture of research. "Science " refers to theoretical representations of nature as we know them primarily from the history of physics and primarily from a tradition that begins with Einstein and end

Philosophie der Nanotechnowissenschaft

Nanoscientific research has been characterized as an “engineering way of being in science.” This mode of research calls for a philosophy of technoscience that investigates the four questions: i) What is the role of theory and theory-development in nanoscale research, and what kinds of theories are needed for nanotechnological development? ii) What are the preferred methods and tools and the associated modes of reasoning in nanoscientific research? iii) What is nanotechnoscience and how are its objects constituted? iv) What kind of knowledge do technoscientific researchers typically produce and communicate? The consideration of these questions yields a survey of nanotechnoscience in terms of disciplinary questions (a complex field partially disclosed by stretching closed theories), of methodology (constructions and qualitative judgments of likeness), of ontology (a thin conception of nature as unlimited potential), and of epistemology (acquisition and demonstration of capabilities). In all four cases, the strictly philosophical discussion leads to societal dimensions and questions of value

Noumenal Technology: Reflections on the Incredible Tininess of Nano

Noumena are distinct from phenomena. While the latter are the things as they appear to us and as we experience them, the noumena are the philosophically infamous and mysterious things-in- themselves.2 The “noumenal technology” referred to in the title of this paper would therefore appear to be a contradiction in terms: Technology is a human creation that involves human knowledge and serves human needs; this firmly roots it in phenomena and it appears absurd to speak of technology that exists beyond human perception and experience among the things-in-themselves. The noumenal world is nature uncomprehended, unexperienced, and uncontrolled; it is nature in the sense of uncultivated, uncanny otherness. By speaking of “noumenal technology” this paper argues that some technologies are retreating from human access, perception, and control, and thus assume the character of this uncanny otherness. Three seemingly disparate reflections prepare the formulation of this thesis, and the remaining sections work to establish at least its plausibility

Molecular Disjunctions: Staking Claims at the Nanoscale

Nanoscience may be surrounded by controversy but is characterized by its absence. Evidence for this comes from the reconstruction of a peculiarly muted scientific "debate" regarding the claim that a single organic molecule may serve as a wire in electronic circuitry. Even though there are fundamentally different theoretical approaches, the debate remains entirely implicit. This is because the research in question is motivated by interest neither in a true representation of nature, nor simply in the invention of devices or production of new substances. As a place-oriented enterprise NanoTechnoScience consists mostly in the settlement and staking of claims on the nanoscale

Object lessons: towards an epistemology of technoscience

Discussions of technoscience are bringing to light that scientific journals feature very different knowledge claims. At one end of the spectrum, there is the scientific claim that a hypothesis needs to be reevaluated in light of new evidence. At the other end of the spectrum, there is the technoscientific claim that some new measure of control has been achieved in a laboratory. The latter claim has not received sufficient attention as of yet. In what sense is the achievement of control genuine knowledge in its own right; how is this knowledge acquired; and publicly validated? Notions of tacit or embodied knowledge, of knowledge by acquaintance, of engineering or thing knowledge, and reconstructions of ability or skill take us only part of the way towards answering such questions. The epistemology of technoscience needs to account for the acquisition and demonstration of a public knowledge of control that does not consist in the holding of propositions, even though it is usually communicated in writing: Technoscientific knowledge is, firstly, objective and public insofar as it is exhibited and documented. Secondly, it presupposes a specific context of technology and expertise. Thirdly, it is communicable, even where the achieved capability itself is not. Knowledge of control entails, fourthly, a knowledge of causal relationships, and it sediments itself, fifthly, as a habit of action in the sense proposed by Charles Sanders Peirce

Towards the Non-Mertonian Ethos of a Non-Mertonian Science: Situating the Research Value of Openness

It is hard to disagree with the thrust of René von Schomberg's position paper. It is driven by the worry that current conceptions of "open science" are all too impoverished - that they need to be complemented by the social practice of "mutual responsiveness". In terms of political theory or notions of democracy, on the one hand, in terms of socially relevant research practice, on the other hand, only an ambitious commitment to open science will be robust enough to make a difference and contribute to the solution of pressing problems. In contrast, it is paying lip service only to the ideal of openness when "open science" becomes reduced to "open access publishing" or data storage rituals. As von Schomberg shows, this might actually deepen disparities and redundancies within dysfunctional science