189 research outputs found
Right out of the box: How to situate metaphysics of science in relation to other metaphysical approaches
Several advocates of the lively field of âmetaphysics of scienceâ have recently argued that a naturalistic metaphysics should be based solely on current science, and that it should replace more traditional, intuition-based, forms of metaphysics. The aim of the present paper is to assess that claim by examining the relations between metaphysics of science and general metaphysics. We show that the current metaphysical battlefield is richer and more complex than a simple dichotomy between âmetaphysics of scienceâ and âtraditional metaphysicsâ, and that it should instead be understood as a three dimensional âboxâ, with one axis distinguishing âdescriptive metaphysicsâ from ârevisionary metaphysics,â a second axis distinguishing a priori from a posteriori metaphysics, and a third axis distinguishing âcommonsense metaphysicsâ, âtraditional metaphysicsâ and âmetaphysics of science.â We use this three-dimensional figure to shed light on the project of current metaphysics of science, and to demonstrate that, in many instances, the target of that project is not defined with enough precision and clarity
Why is the transference theory of causation insuffcient? The challenge of the Aharonov-Bohm effect
The transference theory reduces causation to the transmission (or regular manifestation) of physical conserved quantities, like energy or momenta. Although this theory aims at applying to all felds of physics, we claim that it fails to account for a quantum electrodynamic effect, viz. the Aharonov-Bohm effect. After having argued that the Aharonov-Bohm effect is a genuine counter-example for the transference theory, we offer a new physicalist approach of causation, ontic and modal, in which this effect is embedded
Why is the transference theory of causation insuffcient? The challenge of the Aharonov-Bohm effect
The transference theory reduces causation to the transmission (or regular manifestation) of physical conserved quantities, like energy or momenta. Although this theory aims at applying to all felds of physics, we claim that it fails to account for a quantum electrodynamic effect, viz. the Aharonov-Bohm effect. After having argued that the Aharonov-Bohm effect is a genuine counter-example for the transference theory, we offer a new physicalist approach of causation, ontic and modal, in which this effect is embedded
Right out of the box: How to situate metaphysics of science in relation to other metaphysical approaches
Several advocates of the lively field of âmetaphysics of scienceâ have recently argued that a naturalistic metaphysics should be based solely on current science, and that it should replace more traditional, intuition-based, forms of metaphysics. The aim of the present paper is to assess that claim by examining the relations between metaphysics of science and general metaphysics. We show that the current metaphysical battlefield is richer and more complex than a simple dichotomy between âmetaphysics of scienceâ and âtraditional metaphysicsâ, and that it should instead be understood as a three dimensional âboxâ, with one axis distinguishing âdescriptive metaphysicsâ from ârevisionary metaphysics,â a second axis distinguishing a priori from a posteriori metaphysics, and a third axis distinguishing âcommonsense metaphysicsâ, âtraditional metaphysicsâ and âmetaphysics of science.â We use this three-dimensional figure to shed light on the project of current metaphysics of science, and to demonstrate that, in many instances, the target of that project is not defined with enough precision and clarity
What Price Changing Laws of Nature?
In this paper, we show that it is not a conceptual truth about laws of nature that they are
immutable (though we are happy to leave it as an open empirical question whether they do
actually change once in a while). In order to do so, we survey three popular accounts of lawhood
â(Armstrong-style) necessitarianism, (Bird-style) dispositionalism and (Lewis-style) âbest system
analysisââand expose the extent, as well as the philosophical cost, of the amendments that
should be enforced in order to leave room for the possibility of changing laws
Symétrie : réflexions sur les formes naturelles
ThÚse numérisée par la Direction des bibliothÚques de l'Université de Montréal
Electrodeposition of arrays of Ru, Pt, and PtRu Alloy 1D metallic nanostructures
Arrays of Ru, Pt, and PtRu one dimensional 1D nanowires NWs and nanotubes NTs were prepared by electrodeposition through the porous structure of an anodic aluminum oxide AAO membrane. In each case, micrometer-long NW and NT were formed with an outer diameter of ca. 200 nm, close to the interior diameter of the porous AAO membrane. Arrays of NW and NT can be formed by varying the metallic salt concentration, the applied potential, and the conductivity of the electrolyte. The Ru and Pt deposition rates were measured in the various deposition conditions, using an electrochemical quartz crystal microbalance. The mechanisms responsible for the formation of Ru and Pt NW and NT are discussed based on the observed deposition rates and models found in the literature. Finally, it is shown that arrays of PtRu alloy NT and NW can be readily prepared and their compositions can be varied over the whole compositional range by changing the metallic salt concentration of the electrodeposition bath
Essai introductif : la crĂ©dibilitĂ© de lâexpertise en contexte de risque
Dans cet essai, je compte me concentrer sur certains aspects Ă©pistĂ©mologiques de lâexpertise car le risque engendre de nouveaux et difficiles dĂ©fis dans ce domaine. Ma question sera dâidentifier et de circonscrire des facteurs qui diminuent la confiance quâun agent cognitif pourrait avoir envers un expert et ce, en contexte de risque. Ceci nâexclut bien sĂ»r pas que dâautres aspects (par exemple sociaux et politiques) soient importants et je renvoie le lecteur Ă la vaste littĂ©rature sur le sujet. De maniĂšre concrĂšte, je mettrai en Ă©vidence comment la question du risque accentue le problĂšme du rĂŽle des valeurs contextuelles en Ă©pistĂ©mologie. Pour ce faire, dans la premiĂšre section, je compte briĂšvement expliquer comment lâexpertise scientifique implique une forme aigĂŒe du problĂšme de la connaissance par tĂ©moignage. Dans la deuxiĂšme section, jâexposerai comment la notion de risque introduit le problĂšme des valeurs non-Ă©pistĂ©miques en science et ce, de deux façons : par lâĂ©valuation et la valorisation. La troisiĂšme section sera consacrĂ©e Ă exposer quelques approches pour sauvegarder lâintĂ©gritĂ© et la crĂ©dibilitĂ© de lâexpertise scientifique en contexte de risqu
Right out of the box: how to situate metaphysics of science in relation to other metaphysical approaches
Several advocates of the lively field of âmetaphysics of scienceâ have recently argued that a naturalistic metaphysics should be based solely on current science, and that it should replace more traditional, intuition-based, forms of metaphysics. The aim of the present paper is to assess that claim by examining the relations between metaphysics of science and general metaphysics. We show that the current metaphysical battlefield is richer and more complex than a simple dichotomy between âmetaphysics of scienceâ and âtraditional metaphysicsâ, and that it should instead be understood as a three dimensional âboxâ, with one axis distinguishing âdescriptive metaphysicsâ from ârevisionary metaphysicsâ, a second axis distinguishing a priori from a posteriori metaphysics, and a third axis distinguishing âcommonsense metaphysicsâ, âtraditional metaphysicsâ and âmetaphysics of scienceâ. We use this three-dimensional figure to shed light on the project of current metaphysics of science, and to demonstrate that, in many instances, the target of that project is not defined with enough precision and clarity
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