Nebular Abundance Errors

The errors inherent to the use of the standard "ionization correction factor" ("i_CF") method of calculating nebular conditions and relative abundances of H, He, N, O, Ne, S, and Ar in emission line nebulae have been investigated under conditions typical for planetary nebulae. The photoionization code CLOUDY was used to construct a series of model nebulae with properties spanning the range typical of PNe. Its radial "profiles" of bright, frequently observed optical emission lines were then summed over a variety of "apertures" to generate sets of emission line measurements. These resulting line ratios were processed using the i_CF method to "derive" nebular conditions and abundances. We find that for lines which are summed over the entire nebula the i_CF-derived abundances differ from the input abundances by less than 5% for He and O up to 25% or more for Ne, S, and Ar. For resolved observations, however, the discrepancies are often much larger and are systematically variable with radius. This effect is especially pronounced in low-ionization zones where nitrogen and oxygen are neutral or once-ionized such as in FLIERs, ansae and ionization fronts. We argue that the reports of stellar-enriched N in the FLIERs of several PNe are probably specious.Comment: 22 pages, 4 tables, and 1 figure. Accepted for publication in the Astronomical Journal. Replaced to correct a referenc

The collapse of cooperation in evolving games

Game theory provides a quantitative framework for analyzing the behavior of rational agents. The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma in particular has become a standard model for studying cooperation and cheating, with cooperation often emerging as a robust outcome in evolving populations. Here we extend evolutionary game theory by allowing players' strategies as well as their payoffs to evolve in response to selection on heritable mutations. In nature, many organisms engage in mutually beneficial interactions, and individuals may seek to change the ratio of risk to reward for cooperation by altering the resources they commit to cooperative interactions. To study this, we construct a general framework for the co-evolution of strategies and payoffs in arbitrary iterated games. We show that, as payoffs evolve, a trade-off between the benefits and costs of cooperation precipitates a dramatic loss of cooperation under the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma; and eventually to evolution away from the Prisoner's Dilemma altogether. The collapse of cooperation is so extreme that the average payoff in a population may decline, even as the potential payoff for mutual cooperation increases. Our work offers a new perspective on the Prisoner's Dilemma and its predictions for cooperation in natural populations; and it provides a general framework to understand the co-evolution of strategies and payoffs in iterated interactions.Comment: 33 pages, 13 figure

Small games and long memories promote cooperation

Complex social behaviors lie at the heart of many of the challenges facing evolutionary biology, sociology, economics, and beyond. For evolutionary biologists in particular the question is often how such behaviors can arise \textit{de novo} in a simple evolving system. How can group behaviors such as collective action, or decision making that accounts for memories of past experience, emerge and persist? Evolutionary game theory provides a framework for formalizing these questions and admitting them to rigorous study. Here we develop such a framework to study the evolution of sustained collective action in multi-player public-goods games, in which players have arbitrarily long memories of prior rounds of play and can react to their experience in an arbitrary way. To study this problem we construct a coordinate system for memory-$m$ strategies in iterated $n$-player games that permits us to characterize all the cooperative strategies that resist invasion by any mutant strategy, and thus stabilize cooperative behavior. We show that while larger games inevitably make cooperation harder to evolve, there nevertheless always exists a positive volume of strategies that stabilize cooperation provided the population size is large enough. We also show that, when games are small, longer-memory strategies make cooperation easier to evolve, by increasing the number of ways to stabilize cooperation. Finally we explore the co-evolution of behavior and memory capacity, and we find that longer-memory strategies tend to evolve in small games, which in turn drives the evolution of cooperation even when the benefits for cooperation are low

The evolution of complex gene regulation by low specificity binding sites

Transcription factor binding sites vary in their specificity, both within and between species. Binding specificity has a strong impact on the evolution of gene expression, because it determines how easily regulatory interactions are gained and lost. Nevertheless, we have a relatively poor understanding of what evolutionary forces determine the specificity of binding sites. Here we address this question by studying regulatory modules composed of multiple binding sites. Using a population-genetic model, we show that more complex regulatory modules, composed of a greater number of binding sites, must employ binding sites that are individually less specific, compared to less complex regulatory modules. This effect is extremely general, and it hold regardless of the regulatory logic of a module. We attribute this phenomenon to the inability of stabilising selection to maintain highly specific sites in large regulatory modules. Our analysis helps to explain broad empirical trends in the yeast regulatory network: those genes with a greater number of transcriptional regulators feature by less specific binding sites, and there is less variance in their specificity, compared to genes with fewer regulators. Likewise, our results also help to explain the well-known trend towards lower specificity in the transcription factor binding sites of higher eukaryotes, which perform complex regulatory tasks, compared to prokaryotes

The majority-party disadvantage: revising theories of legislative organization

Dominant theories of legislative organization in the U.S. rest on the notion that the majority party arranges legislative matters to enhance its electoral fortunes. Yet, we find little evidence for a short-term electoral advantage for the majority party in U.S. state legislatures. Furthermore, there appears to be a pronounced downstream majority-party disadvantage. To establish these findings, we propose a technique for aggregating the results of close elections to obtain as-if random variation in majority-party status. We argue that the results from this approach are consistent with a phenomenon of inter-temporal balancing, which we link to other forms of partisan balancing in U.S. elections. The article thus necessitates revisions to our theories of legislative organization, offers new arguments for balancing theories, and lays out an empirical technique for studying the effects of majority-party status in legislative contexts

The effects of external planets on inner systems: multiplicities, inclinations, and pathways to eccentric warm Jupiters

We study how close-in systems such as those detected by Kepler are affected by the dynamics of bodies in the outer system. We consider two scenarios: outer systems of giant planets potentially unstable to planet--planet scattering, and wide binaries that may be capable of driving Kozai or other secular variations of outer planets' eccentricities. Dynamical excitation of planets in the outer system reduces the multiplicity of Kepler-detectable planets in the inner system in $\sim20-25\%$ of our systems. Accounting for the occurrence rates of wide-orbit planets and binary stars, $\approx18\%$ of close-in systems could be destabilised by their outer companions in this way. This provides some contribution to the apparent excess of systems with a single transiting planet compared to multiple, however, it only contributes at most $25\%$ of the excess. The effects of the outer dynamics can generate systems similar to Kepler-56 (two coplanar planets significantly misaligned with the host star) and Kepler-108 (two significantly non-coplanar planets in a binary). We also identify three pathways to the formation of eccentric warm Jupiters resulting from the interaction between outer and inner systems: direct inelastic collision between an eccentric outer and an inner planet, secular eccentricity oscillations that may "freeze out" when scattering resolves in the outer system; and scattering in the inner system followed by "uplift", where inner planets are removed by interaction with the outer planets. In these scenarios, the formation of eccentric warm Jupiters is a signature of a past history of violent dynamics among massive planets beyond $\sim1$ au.Comment: 24 pages, 19 figures. Accepted to MNRA

Residual acceleration data on IML-1: Development of a data reduction and dissemination plan

The research performed consisted of three stages: (1) identification of sensitive IML-1 experiments and sensitivity ranges by order of magnitude estimates, numerical modeling, and investigator input; (2) research and development towards reduction, supplementation, and dissemination of residual acceleration data; and (3) implementation of the plan on existing acceleration databases