Does Partisan Alignment Affect the Electoral Reward of Intergovernmental Transfers?

In this paper we test the hypothesis that intergovernmental grants allocated to co-partisans buy more political support than grants allocated to local governments controlled by opposition parties. We use a rich Spanish database containing information about the grants received by 617 municipalities during the period 1993-2003 from two different upper-tier governments (Regional and Upper-local), as well as data of municipal voting behaviour at three electoral contests held at the different layers of government during this period. Therefore, we are able to estimate two different vote equations, analysing the effects of grants given to aligned and unaligned municipalities on the vote share of the incumbent party/parties at the regional and local elections. We account for the endogeneity of grants by instrumenting them with the average amount of grants distributed by upper-layer governments. The results suggest that grants given to co-partisans buy some political support, but that grants given to opposition parties do not bring any votes, suggesting that the grantee reaps as much political credit from intergovernmental grants as the grantor.voting, parties, grants

The Effects of Partisan Alignment on the Allocation of Intergovernmental Transfers. Differences-in-Differences Estimates for Spain

In this paper we test the hypothesis that municipalities aligned with upper-tier grantor governments (i.e., controlled by the same party) will receive more grants than those that are unaligned. We use a rich Spanish database, which provides information on grants received by nearly 900 municipalities during the period 1993-2003 from three different upper-tier governments (i.e., Central, Regional and Upper-local). Since three elections were held at each tier during this period, we have enough within-municipality variation in partisan alignment to provide differences-in-differences estimates of the effects of alignment on the amount of grants coming from each source. Moreover, the fact that a municipality may simultaneously receive grants from aligned and unaligned grantors allows us to use a triple-differences estimator, which consists of estimating the effects of changing alignment status on the change in grants coming from the aligned grantors relative to the change in grants coming from the unaligned ones. The results suggest that partisan alignment has a sizeable positive effect on the amount of grants received by municipalities.grant allocation, alignment, electoral competition

Does partisan alignment affect the electoral reward of intergovernmental transfers?

In this paper we test the hypothesis that intergovernmental grants allocated to co-partisans buy more political support than grants allocated to local governments controlled by opposition parties. We use a rich Spanish database containing information about the grants received by 617 municipalities during the period 1993-2003 from two different upper-tier governments (Regional and Upper-local), as well as data of municipal voting behaviour at three electoral contests held at the different layers of government during this period. Therefore, we are able to estimate two different vote equations, analysing the effects of grants given to aligned and unaligned municipalities on the vote share of the incumbent party/parties at the regional and local elections. We account for the endogeneity of grants by instrumenting them with the average amount of grants distributed by upper-layer governments. The results suggest that grants given to co-partisans buy some political support, but that grants given to the opposition do not bring any votes, suggesting that the grantee reaps as much political credit from intergovernmental grants as the grantor.grants, voting, parties

The effects of partisan alignment on the allocation of intergovernmental transfers. Differences-in-differences estimates for Spain

In this paper we test the hypothesis that municipalities aligned with upper-tier grantor governments (i.e., controlled by the same party) will receive more grants than those that are unaligned. We use a rich Spanish database, which provides information on grants received by nearly 900 municipalities during the period 1993-2003 from three different upper-tier governments (i.e., Central, Regional and Upper-local). Since three elections were held at each tier during this period, we have enough within-municipality variation in partisan alignment to provide differences-in-differences estimates of the effects of alignment on the amount of grants coming from each source. Moreover, the fact that a municipality may simultaneously receive grants from aligned and unaligned grantors allows us to use a triple-differences estimator, which consists of estimating the effects of changing alignment status on the change in grants coming from the aligned grantors relative to the change in grants coming from the unaligned ones. The results suggest that partisan alignment has a sizeable positive effect on the amount of grants received by municipalities. Length: 33 pagesgrant allocation, alignment, electoral competition

Virus emergents

No fa massa es creia que el risc derivat de les malalties infeccioses seria aviat un tema del passat, gràcies als avenços en medicina i higiene. Avui en dia, ja en el nou mil·leni res està més lluny de la realitat.Mentre que les malalties infeccioses segueixen sent la primera causa de mortalitat globalment en tot el món, i la tercera causa de mortalitat en països desenvolupats, van apareixent cada cop amb més freqüència noves malalties causades per patògens de recent descobriment o per la reaparició d'agents que es creien eradicats o en via d'eradicació. De tots els patògens emergents destaquen per nombre i importància els virus que han estat responsables de l'aparició de malalties com la sida, algunes febres hemorràgiques com l'Ebola, el dengue o Lassa, el SARS i, més recentment, la grip aviària.Some time ago, it was believed that medicine and hygiene advances would give up with risks arising from infective diseases, nevertheless, the world today is far from that expectation.Whereas infective diseases are still globally worldwide the first death cause, and the third cause of mortality at developed countries, new diseases are appearing more frequently, caused both by recently discovered pathogens or reappeared agents believed eradicated or in the way of eradication.Within emergent pathogens, we remark, basing on number and prevalence, viruses such as those causing AIDS, some hemorrhagic fevers as Ebola, dengue or Lassa, SARS, and recently chicken influenza

Corruption scandals, press reporting, and accountability. Evidence from Spanish mayors.

We analyse the effects of local corruption on electoral outcomes with Spanish data. Based upon press reports published between 1996 and 2009, we are able to construct a novel database on corruption scandals and news related to bribe-taking in exchange for amendments to land use plans. Our data show that local corruption scandals first emerged during the 1999-2003 term, but that they peaked just before the 2007 elections. We estimate an equation for the incumbents vote share at this electoral contest and find the average vote loss after a corruption scandal to be around 4%, and the effect to be greater for cases receiving wide newspaper coverage (up to 9%). The effects found for the 2003 elections are much lower. When we consider cases in which the incumbent has been charged with corruption and press coverage has been extensive the vote loss can rise to 12%. However, press reports have a negative impact on the vote even when no judicial charges have been brought.voting, corruption, accountability

zfit: scalable pythonic fitting

Statistical modeling is a key element in many scientific fields and especially in High-Energy Physics (HEP) analysis. The standard framework to perform this task in HEP is the C++ ROOT/RooFit toolkit; with Python bindings that are only loosely integrated into the scientific Python ecosystem. In this paper, zfit, a new alternative to RooFit written in pure Python, is presented. Most of all, zfit provides a well defined high-level API and workflow for advanced model building and fitting, together with an implementation on top of TensorFlow, allowing a transparent usage of CPUs and GPUs. It is designed to be extendable in a very simple fashion, allowing the usage of cutting-edge developments from the scientific Python ecosystem in a transparent way. The main features of zfit are introduced, and its extension to data analysis, especially in the context of HEP experiments, is discussed.Comment: 12 pages, 2 figure

Corruption scandals, press reporting, and accountability. Evidence from Spanish mayors

We analyse the effects of local corruption on electoral outcomes with Spanish data. Based upon press reports published between 1996 and 2009, we are able to construct a novel database on corruption scandals and news related to bribe-taking in exchange for amendments to land use plans. Our data show that local corruption scandals first emerged during the 1999-2003 term, but that they peaked just before the 2007 elections. We estimate an equation for the incumbent’s vote share at this electoral contest and find the average vote loss after a corruption scandal to be around 4%, and the effect to be greater for cases receiving wide newspaper coverage (up to 9%). The effects found for the 2003 elections are much lower. When we consider cases in which the incumbent has been charged with corruption and press coverage has been extensive the vote loss can rise to 12%. However, press reports have a negative impact on the vote even when no judicial charges have been brought.voting, accountability, corruption

A new 130nm F.E readout chip for microstrip detectors

In the context of the Silicon tracking for a Linear Collider (SiLC) R&D collaboration, a highly compact mixed-signal chip has been designed in 130nm CMOS technology intended to read Silicon strip detectors for the experiments at the future International Linear Collider. The chip includes eighty eight channels of a full analog signal processing chain and analog to digital conversion with the corresponding digital controls and readout channels. The chip is 5x10mm2 where the analog implementation represents 4/5 of the total Silicon area.Comment: 3 pages, 4 figures, LCWS08 worksho